Reducing fishing vessel capsizing in Newfoundland and Labrador by establishing a relationship between common causes and operators' understanding of stability and risk by Davis, Bryan
  
REDUCING FISHING VESSEL CAPSIZING IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND 
LABRADOR BY ESTABLISHING A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMON 
CAUSES AND OPERATORS’ UNDERSTANDING OF STABILITY AND RISK  
 
 
By Bryan Davis 
 
A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Engineering 
 
Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science 
Memorial University  
 
May 2019 
 
St. John’s                                            Newfoundland and Labrador                                               Canada  
ii 
 
Abstract 
Commercial fishing is considered one of the most dangerous industries in the world. 
Among the different types of fishing vessel accidents, capsizing has one of the highest 
fatality rates. In Newfoundland and Labrador, fatalities, due to the loss of stability in 
fishing vessels, have been identified as a significant problem.  
This study’s primary objective was to determine the main causes of fishing vessel 
capsizing and recommend preventative measures to reduce the frequency of fishing vessel 
capsizes in Newfoundland and Labrador. Through an analysis of fishing vessel capsizing 
investigation reports, and a series of discussions with operators, the study identified the 
primary causes of these events. In 57 of the 60 capsizes analyzed, operators’ actions were 
determined to play a significant role.  
A second component of the discussion portion of the study focused on operator and 
crew understanding of vessel stability. This portion of the study revealed a correlation 
between the amount of formal training an operator had received and their understanding of 
stability. Those who had received some form of stability education appeared better 
equipped to avoid or manage potential capsizing events. 
Many fishing vessel capsize events were attributed to operator error and operators with 
no stability training are more likely to make poor decisions based on common 
misconceptions of vessel stability. Based on this conclusion, it is recommended that a 
compulsory stability education course be offered in the province. An outline and proposed 
curriculum including potential delivery methods for such a course is presented. 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Objectives  
Commercial fishing has been vital to the economy of Newfoundland and Labrador for 
hundreds of years. Despite a moratorium, imposed in 1992 to preserve cod stocks, fishing 
for other species has remained a major industrial activity in the province. As of 2016, 
commercial fishing directly accounted for 3,100 jobs in the province and an additional 
3,000 indirect jobs (Newfoundland and Labrador Statistics Agency, 2017). Not only does 
fishing provide a significant source of employment in NL, it is a fundamental part of the 
province’s culture and identity.  
High profile fishing vessel accidents in Newfoundland and Labrador have led to public 
pressure to address fishing safety, frequently with emphasis on systematic issues such as 
vessel design or search and rescue response. Incidents such as the Ryan’s Commander 
(Richer, S., 2007) and the Melina and Keith II (“Melina and Keith II Sinking Report,” 
2007) in recent years have led to calls for improvements to working conditions and 
regulations in the commercial fishing industry. 
The overall objective of this study is to identify methods to reduce the frequency of 
fishing vessel capsizing through appropriate preventative measures. Before effective 
preventative measures can be put in place, the primary contributing causes of fishing vessel 
capsizing must be determined. Without an understanding as to why fishing vessels capsize, 
it is unlikely that preventative measures will be successful.  
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To assess contributing factors, publicly available marine incident reports were 
analysed in order to identify common causes of specific cases of fishing vessel capsizing. 
A further investigation of near miss reporting, a technique used in other industries to guide 
safety decisions and provide additional data, was conducted. This information was gathered 
through interviews and discussions with fish harvesters to determine the incidence and 
causes of near miss capsizing events and to further assess their understanding of vessel 
stability and how they perceive the risk of capsizing. These discussions followed one of 
two formats: a one-on-one interview or a roundtable discussion with multiple participants.  
Understanding operators’ stability knowledge and their concern for capsizing is an 
important element of this project’s research. The literature review (section 2.0) shows that 
multiple authors have studied the link between fishing vessel operators’ understanding of 
stability and the likelihood of a vessel’s loss of stability. Conducting interviews and 
roundtable discussions with operators allowed for an assessment of the general 
understanding of basic principles of stability and the perception of risk among operators in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. From these conversations, the connection was established 
between operators’ knowledge and common causes of capsizing identified from 
investigation reports. The link between these two parameters is important for putting 
effective preventative measures in place to reduce capsizing.   
Once primary causes of capsizing are identified and operators’ level of stability 
knowledge is understood, more effective measures can be taken to mitigate capsizing 
events. Identifying and correcting operators’ practices and decisions that have detrimental 
effects on stability may be a more efficient way to reduce capsizing incidence. Better 
understanding the link between operator and crew knowledge of stability and the incidence 
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of stability accidents is thought to be a promising approach in preventing stability 
accidents. This study’s hypothesis is that an operator’s actions or decisions that contribute 
to fishing vessel capsizing are due, in part, to a lack of education or training in vessel 
stability. Operators’ decisions related to vessel stability may be based on misconceptions 
arising from lack of awareness and understanding of basic stability principles or a lack of 
knowledge of the consequences of detrimental stability actions. 
After considering both operators’ understanding of vessel stability and common causes 
of capsizing, a program that educates operators and provides them with better stability 
knowledge and training can be recommended. It is important that before implementing any 
type of educational program, the needs of the operators be considered. Without considering 
the current level of stability knowledge of operators, it is unlikely that a program will be 
successful in making a significant reduction to vessel capsizes. The interviews and 
roundtables conducted as part of this study were used as a qualitative assessment of 
operators’ understanding of stability. With this information, a program can be tailored to 
individuals who may have little or no formal education. This knowledge and training will 
allow operators to make better informed decisions during fishing operations to mitigate the 
risk of capsizing.  
1.2 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis begins with a literature review (section 2.0) of research relevant to the 
prevention of fishing vessel capsizes. Included in this portion of the thesis is a review of 
general fishing vessel stability research, dynamic stability, the use of near miss reporting 
in other industries, fishing vessel stability education programs, and current regulations 
related to fishing vessel stability. Gaps in the current academic research and regulations 
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were identified. Section 3.0 discusses certification requirements relevant to the research. 
This section includes current stability training requirements and restrictions on the length 
of inshore fishing vessels. 
Section 4.0 highlights the research methodology for both the analysis of the 
investigation reports and discussions with operators. The results for both portions of the 
research are presented in section 5.0. For the investigation reports, quantitative results are 
presented, with the reported contributing causes from each incident discussed and 
tabulated. For interviews with operators, the results are qualitative. The conclusions from 
these discussions in regards to fishing vessel stability and the perception of the risk of 
capsizing are identified and discussed. Section 5.0 concludes with a discussion of near miss 
capsizing events that were obtained from interviews and roundtables. These results 
supplemented the quantitative data from the analysis of investigation reports. 
The results of the research are analyzed and discussed in section 6.0. The primary 
causes of capsizes as identified from investigation reports are examined. Each cause was 
identified as being due to poor decisions by operators, or to circumstances created by poor 
decisions. These can be linked, at least in part, to a lack of understanding of stability on 
behalf of owners and/or operators. This section includes a statistical analysis of fishing 
vessel capsizing trends in Canada. A possible correlation between the trend and operator 
training in Canada is discussed. 
Section 6.0 continues with a discussion of the qualitative data obtained from interviews 
and roundtable discussions with operators. The primary conclusion from these discussions 
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was the positive correlation between an operator’s understanding of stability and the 
amount of stability training that operator had received. 
Recommendations for additional work are presented in section 7.0. The primary 
recommendation from this research was the need for improved stability awareness among 
members of the Newfoundland and Labrador’s fishing community. Finally, an outline for 
an educational program to improve stability awareness in Newfoundland and Labrador is 
discussed in section 8.0. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
This review covers the current literature related to fishing vessel stability including: 
 General analysis of fishing vessel stability 
 Research to reduce the frequency of fishing vessel capsizing 
 Limitations of stability regulations due to a lack of dynamic stability 
considerations 
 The impact near miss reporting has had on accident reduction in other 
industries 
 Impact of operator training on vessel stability 
 Stability education programs aimed at improving operator awareness 
These are discussed in relation to future work to reduce capsizes and work associated 
with this research. 
2.1 General Fishing Stability Research 
Fishing vessel capsizing is a serious event that often results in fatalities and significant 
economic loss. Capsizing is a result of a vessel becoming unstable and overturning in the 
water. Research has been done to identify the primary causes of a vessel becoming unstable 
and the factors that can have an adverse effect on a vessel’s stability. This thesis will focus 
on links between operator decisions and stability outcomes with emphasis on operations in 
Newfoundland and Labrador.  
It is well understood that commercial fishing is a high-risk industry. Roberts (2002) 
investigated industries in the UK and identified commercial fishing as the country’s most 
dangerous occupation. The fatal accident rate of 103.1 deaths per 100,000 worker-years is 
approximately twice as high as next most dangerous industry (merchant seafaring) and 50 
times higher than for the average worker. While there are many different types of accidents 
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that affect fishing vessels, capsizing has been found as the highest contributor to the 
number of fatalities (Loughran et al., 2002).  
Capsizing, compared to other accidents, is relatively rare. Loughran et al. point out 
that capsizing accounted for only 2% of all fishing vessel incidents recorded in the United 
States between 1989 and 1995. However, during the same period, capsizing accounted for 
29.1% of all deaths. While capsizing events are infrequent, they are of great concern 
because of the high fatality rate. Capsizing is often a precipitous event, which leaves crews 
with little or no warning prior to an incident. In addition, capsizing usually results in rapid 
flooding or sinking which immediately forces evacuees into the water, frequently without 
time to deploy safety equipment. These factors contribute to the high fatality rates. 
Current stability regulations for fishing vessels are based on static stability 
measurements, but it is well understood that capsizing is most often the result of dynamic 
forces on a vessel (Gourlay and Lilienthal, 2002). While a lack of regulation concerning 
fishing vessel stability may be a problem, imposing stricter regulations, using existing 
criteria, is not seen by some authors as an effective solution to reduce capsizing (Johnson 
and Womack, 2001).  
2.2 Reducing Fishing Vessel Capsizing 
2.2.1 Model Testing to Determine Causes and Reduce Capsizing 
Researchers have aimed to identify the primary causes of fishing vessel capsize 
through the use of model tests. Perez Rojas et al. (2007) investigated two incidents off the 
coast of Spain. Scaled models of each vessel were evaluated in sea states similar to those 
encountered at the time of capsizing. The authors note that they were only able to get one 
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of the vessels to capsize during the tests, and that was when the wave length and height 
were varied such that the waves were overly steep. The authors concluded that the 
capsizing likely occurred because the vessel’s stability was reduced due to operators’ 
actions. 
Taguchi et al. (2013) undertook a similar procedure to ascertain the cause of two 
vessels capsizing near Japan: one in the North Pacific Ocean and the other in the East China 
Sea. Once again, scaled model tests were performed and analyzed to determine why the 
ships capsized. The authors were able to identify multiple reasons for the capsizing of each 
vessel, highlighting the complicated nature of the accidents. 
2.2.2 Development of Technology to Assist Operators  
Gonzalez et al. (2012) discuss the high-risk of capsizing for smaller fishing vessels. 
They explain that the high-risk is largely due to a lack of training of small fishing vessel 
crews. In many cases, crews have a poor understanding of stability and do not understand 
the level of risk associated with their job. The paper also points out that stability books are 
ineffective in preventing capsizing because they are not well understood by operators. The 
authors explain that there is also a lack of regulations guiding fishing vessels in many parts 
of the world.  
In order to reduce capsizing, the authors developed stability software that could be 
implemented on most vessels. They focused on ensuring that the software was “user 
friendly.” After development, the authors tested the software with a “usability analysis.” 
This analysis involved operators using the software and their performance was measured 
in the areas of efficiency, accuracy, learnability, and emotional response.  
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Gonzalez et al. (2016) also approached the task of reducing fishing vessel capsizing 
by developing an on board system to compute a vessel’s metacentric height (GM) in real 
time. The system used inputs from the crew to generate a vessel’s initial stability. While 
this system has benefits, uncertainty exists because there is no way to determine how 
accurate the crew’s inputs are. The most likely source of error, as identified by the authors, 
is determination of a vessel’s transverse radius of gyrations by the crew. This becomes 
important when estimating the GM based on vessel motion frequencies. 
2.3 Dynamic Stability 
An important consideration for this project is the current regulatory requirements for 
fishing vessel stability. Current Transport Canada regulations include requirements for 
initial and large angle stability for larger fishing vessels, but do not cover the Canadian 
Small Fishing Vessel Class (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2006). Initial stability 
is determined by performing an inclining experiment to calculate a vessel’s metacentric 
height (GM), while loading and large angle stability is presented via stability booklets. 
Stability booklets show GZ curves for various loading conditions. GZ curves are a means 
to predict the maximum angle to which a vessel can roll before capsizing (Transport 
Canada, 2017). In addition, the GZ curve provides a measure of the energy that a rolling 
vessel can absorb in a dynamic situation. 
GM and GZ curves have limitations in assessing a vessel’s stability because they do 
not fully account for dynamic effects, particularly the effects of different wave frequencies. 
As discussed by Molyneux (2007), research into stability in waves is the focus of much 
research in the ship stability community. However, current stability regulations employ 
empirical methods to account for dynamics. Ship dynamics is a relatively well understood 
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field in which ship motions from waves are predicted using Newton’s Second Law of 
Motion (Gourlay and Lilienthal, 2002). Gourlay and Lilienthal recognize problems 
associated with stability regulations based on static measurements. They explain that while 
capsizing is an event that arises from a vessel’s dynamic behaviour, GZ curves are static 
indices. As such, they do not account for effects such as ship speed and heading or wave 
parameters (i.e. height, steepness, and frequency). This discrepancy can lead to a false 
sense of security among operators. If a vessel is found to have sufficient static stability as 
required by regulations, operators may be prone to underestimate the risk of capsize due to 
dynamic loads and motions.  
Johnson and Grochowalski (2002) also recognize that vessels often capsize as the 
result of dynamic action. They performed model tests in a range of wave heights and 
periods and observed the vessel response. They conclude that building on their work could 
lead to the development of risk based stability criteria as opposed to the deterministic 
criteria for static stability currently in place.  
Gourlay and Lilienthal’s (2002) and Johnson and Grochowalski’s (2002) research 
points out that static stability regulations do not fully account for the dynamic effects, such 
as broaching, that often lead to capsizing. 
2.4 Near Misses  
One of the project objectives in the current study is to try to document near miss 
accidents in the commercial fishing industry as a means of expanding the data on common 
causes of capsizing. The practice of reporting near misses is virtually non-existent in the 
fishing industry, which is in contrast to industries such as oil and gas, mining, and 
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manufacturing. In many industries, it is common practice to report near misses in order to 
learn from them and avoid more serious, major accidents. Because this practice has not 
been adopted by the commercial fishing industry, near miss incidents cannot currently be 
used to supplement (reported) major accidents to create a safer working environment. The 
benefit of using near miss data is summarized by Wright and van der Schaff (2004). 
Decision making about investing in safety improvements is usually based upon the 
relative importance of root causes in accidents and failures. However, such 
decisions can only be reached by referring to statistics from large databases. As 
accidents themselves are (fortunately) too few in number to aid such decision 
making processes the use of near misses to dramatically increase the number of 
databases is one way to counteract this problem. (p.105) 
Jones et al. (1999) looked at the chemical industry and discussed the importance of 
reporting near misses. The authors argue that because near misses serve as warnings of a 
major accident occurring, a system that reports and investigates near misses can be an 
effective prevention tool. 
Numerous statistics are available that relate the number of full scale accidents to the 
number of near misses but the ratios between the two variables vary. Jones et al. list these 
and point out that while there may be some variance, it is accepted that for a single major 
accident, there is a larger corresponding number of smaller accidents and near misses. 
There is a proportional relationship between near misses and major accidents: as the 
number of near misses is reduced, so is the number of major accidents.  If reported near 
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misses serve as lessons learned, their frequency will decrease. In turn, so will major 
accidents. 
Jones et al. also stress the importance of the difference in reported near misses and 
unreported near misses. They discuss that many workers are reluctant to report near misses 
for fear of retribution from their employer. Companies that have stressed the importance 
of reporting near misses and ensured that employees will not face discipline for reporting 
them have seen accidents reduced. There is an inversely proportional relationship between 
reported near misses and major accidents. This is perhaps the most important takeaway 
from the Jones et al. paper as it relates to commercial fishing: documenting and reporting 
near misses can reduce the frequency of major accidents. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
if capsizing near misses are documented, they can be an effective tool in implementing safe 
practices to reduce the frequency of capsizing.  
Nielsen et al. (2006) investigated the effect that reporting near misses had on the 
frequency of lost time incidents (LTIs) and major accidents. For the study, they set up a 
near miss reporting system in two different manufacturing plants. Prior to the experiment, 
neither plant had a system in place to report near misses. The experiment spanned three 
years and results were collected for one-and-a-half-years with no reporting system in place 
and one-and-a-half-years with the system in place. The authors based the experiment on 
Heinrich’s work (1950) that states that there exists a large ratio of near misses to LTIs and 
that the causes of LTIs and near misses are the same. The authors hypothesize that reporting 
and learning from near miss incidents can reduce LTIs because it allows management to 
put proper preventative measures in place.  
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Both plants had near miss reporting systems put in place at the mid-point of the study. 
Plant A, which consisted of a younger demographic of workers, used the system 
effectively. In the first year and a half of the study, no near misses were reported. When 
the system was put in place at the one-and-a-half-year mark, 1883 near misses were 
reported until the study ended. The authors also explain that top management at the plant 
actively encouraged all employees to report any near misses. 
Plant B, which had a higher employee average age than plant A, failed to use the near 
miss reporting system that was put in place. There were no near misses reported during the 
full duration of the study. The authors point out that there was little engagement from 
management to use the reporting system. In the study, a “safety climate” was quantified to 
describe each plant’s dedication to a safe work environment. This parameter takes into 
account reporting of near misses and LTIs. Plant A had a much higher safety climate score 
than Plant B. 
Plant A, which had made effective use of the reporting system, saw LTIs drop 
significantly over the three-year study (44% reduction was observed). Plant B, which failed 
to report near misses, did not see a significant change in LTIs (17% reduction which was 
in line with historical fluctuations). The study was effective in confirming the authors’ 
original hypothesis that reporting near misses can reduce LTIs because it allows for 
preventative measures to be taken. The study identifies management commitment as the 
most important contributor to reporting near misses. They further stress that anonymity is 
important because near misses due to unsafe behaviour are more likely to be reported if 
sources are able to remain anonymous. Finally, Heinrich’s high ratio of near misses to LTIs 
was observed as Plant A had a final count of 1883 near misses to 14 LTIs. 
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Wright and van der Schaaf (2004) studied an important hypothesis, often stated in near 
miss studies, that near misses and LTIs have identical causes. This is referred to as the 
“causal hypothesis.” The hypothesis was an original part of Heinrich’s work but, as the 
authors explain, it has been challenged in more recent studies. The hypothesis is an 
important factor in determining the effectiveness of reducing LTIs by reporting near miss 
incidents.  
The study focused on a literature review of papers that investigate the relationship 
between the cause of near misses and LTIs. For the numerous papers reviewed, those that 
challenged the causal hypothesis were each found to have flaws in their original 
assumptions that led to inaccurate conclusions. The study found that Heinrich’s causal 
hypothesis is still accurate and validates the use of near misses to reduce LTIs. The authors 
also studied incidents in the UK railroad industry and found 198 near misses and 17 
fatalities. This supports the idea that there are a large number of near misses for every 
fatality.  
2.5 Operator Training’s Impact on Vessel Stability 
Womack (2002) examined the current stability criteria for small fishing vessels and 
made a general assessment of crews’ understanding of stability. The paper suggested that 
there are multiple factors that lead to vessels becoming unstable during operations. These 
factors include a lack of understanding of stability by crews, insufficient presentation of 
stability guidance from naval architects and engineers, and insufficient stability criteria.  
A crew’s understanding of stability and the presentation of stability data are not 
independent. As Womack explains, stability data is in the form of either a stability book or 
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stability letter. Both are often incomprehensible to the operators of fishing vessels. Vessel 
stability is a technical field and letters and books are composed by naval architects and 
engineers with years of technical training. The disconnect between engineers and operators 
is significant and operators often do not trust the assessment of engineers and do not 
understand the stability work performed. The lack of understanding can lead to decisions 
that contribute to a loss of vessel stability. 
Womack identifies the solution to this problem in two parts: first, engineers must keep 
in mind the technical knowledge of operators and produce stability letters that are 
“comprehensible by crews with little or no technical training.” Womack suggests that 
simplified, color coded load matrices which outline different loading scenarios and weather 
conditions as a possible solution to this. Second, Womack explains that educational 
programs on vessel stability for operators are crucial to the success of any published data 
engineers produce, however simply presented it may be. Training that discusses the basic 
concepts of stability is required to bridge the gap between operators and engineers and it is 
an important step in ensuring that operators trust the stability work produced by naval 
architects. Operators equipped with the basic knowledge of stability that includes an 
understanding of the important relationship between a vessel’s center of gravity and center 
of buoyancy will be in a position to make more informed decisions while operating their 
vessels. 
Womack also cites insufficient stability criteria as a concern. He traces the origins of 
current stability criteria in place for fishing vessels and argues that these are out-dated and 
not reflective of current vessels. Because the current criteria are static and do not account 
for scalability, they do not capture many of the problems that lead to capsizing. Further, 
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for European fleets of vessels less than 24m in length (79 feet), Womack proposes there 
are currently “…no universally accepted stability evaluation methods available”.  
Womack’s 2002 paper builds on a paper written by Johnson and Womack (2001) that 
discusses the best way to develop a “user friendly approach to fishing vessel stability.” The 
paper outlines a panel put in place by the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 
(SNAME) to improve the safety culture of fishing vessels in regards to stability. The panel 
comprised of four groups (A, B, C, and D) with group B focusing on developing tools to 
allow seafarers to better understand stability.  
Johnson and Womack (2001) state that the primary defence against capsizing is a 
truncated version of a stability book, the stability letter. Group B’s work is motivated by 
the fact that stability books are ineffective because they are not understood by the crew. 
The authors point out two reasons for this, both of which describe a disconnect between 
naval architects and fishing vessel operators. The first is that terms used by naval architects 
to describe the stability of a vessel are often incomprehensible to crews with no formal 
stability training. The second is that stability letters include restrictions that are impractical 
and measured in ways that are dangerous or impossible for the crew to determine. The 
authors use the example of specifying minimum freeboard to illustrate. As put by the 
authors: “While a good method in theory is to specify maximum loadings, it is 
impracticable, and dangerous, for a crew to measure freeboards while underway by 
hanging over the boat’s side in any type of sea.” Stability letter specifications such as this 
often result in the letters being ignored by members of the crew.  
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The paper discusses the problems posed by crews having little or no stability training. 
Specifically, they identify a lack of understanding of the difference between initial (small 
angle) and overall (large angle) stability as a serious problem. Crews most often experience 
a vessel’s initial stability in everyday operations but typically only deal with overall 
stability during a rare, severe weather incident. In many cases, vessels are loaded to 
improve the “feel” of the vessel at small roll angles, which is often interpreted as improved 
stability. This is commonly done by ballasting or overloading the vessel. Crews do this 
unaware that their actions are reducing the overall stability; the range of positive righting 
arms, area under the righting arm curve, and the heel angle of maximum righting moment 
all see significant reductions when the vessel is loaded to reduce the initial stability (or 
stiffness of the vessel). As a result, the overall stability may be insufficient when the 
weather becomes bad and the vessel experiences large angle roll motions.  
Johnson and Womack propose that load matrices are good way to mitigate the risk of 
capsize. They are presented as easy to use for operators with no formal training and have a 
simple layout. The inputs to the example load matrix they show are the level of ballast and 
the number of cages on the vessel. The outputs are the conditions which the vessel can 
safely operate in given the inputs (i.e. for 10 cages with 75% full fuel tanks the vessel can 
safely operate in storms -  see Figure 1). The matrices, the authors believe, would be an 
improvement over stability letters and the crew would not have to rely on the “feel” of the 
vessel to estimate the vessel’s stability. An important consideration of the load matrix 
method is that the captain has the ability to make operational decisions because they would 
better understand how the matrix applied to the vessel. This is in contrast to stability letters, 
which often put operational decisions in the hands of the naval architects. 
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Figure 1: Load Matrix from Johnson and Womack (2001) 
In order for the load matrix, or any other replacement for stability letters, to be 
effective, Johnson and Womack argue some formal training is required. They propose a 
program consisting of a written manual and verbal presentation that would teach crews the 
basic concepts of vessel stability. An aspect of the course in the paper’s previous sections 
aimed to “show the effect on a boat’s stability level from typical boat operations.” Included 
in this was the effect that operators’ decisions had on a vessel’s stability, such as loading 
conditions and free surface effect.  
Johnson and Womack address some of the major problems regarding vessel stability 
and how it is influenced by crews’ actions. They identify the knowledge gap between naval 
architects and vessel operators as a problem. Their proposed solution to bridging the gap 
involves improving stability guidelines and introducing training that takes into account 
operator’s knowledge and background. They recognize the need for naval architects and 
operators to work together to improve the safety culture on fishing vessels. 
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Howe and Johansen (2007) developed a fishing vessel stability education program 
called “Fish Safe Stability Education Program” (FSSEP). The authors discuss the risk of 
capsize and fatalities that typically occur. With each incident, the authors explain, there is 
a discussion about why fishers struggle with the concept of stability. It is the perilous nature 
of capsizing and fishers’ lack of understanding of stability that was the motivation behind 
the creation of the FSSEP in 2005. 
The program focuses on applying the fundamentals of adult training and education to 
fishers and stability. While stability training was in place, it lacked effectiveness because 
it did not fully appreciate the “complex problem that involves the inter-relationship 
between fishers, traditional training methods, and the learning environment.” The adult 
education program that the authors devised was aimed at addressing this problem more 
thoroughly than previous work had.  
The authors state that it is imperative that program instructors have not only some 
formal teaching training but also fishing experience. The program first gives a needs 
assessment, which refers to an industry meeting. At the meeting, fishers made it clear that 
they favoured an educational program because it was the only way any regulations could 
be implemented.  Next, the learning outcomes of the FSSEP were listed as “You will take 
ownership of fundamental principles of stability, and they will be central to your everyday 
reality when making any decision that affects your vessel’s operation”. The program used 
both direct instruction (i.e. lectures) and indirect instruction (i.e. laboratories, case studies) 
to meet the learning outcomes. Further, discussions and video were important to 
accommodate participants who could not read or write. Specifically, the four curriculum 
goals were: 
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1. You will have a stability vocabulary that will enable you to talk about stability 
with personal authority 
2. You will be able to read a stability data book and use the information to help 
make operational decisions when fishing 
3. You will appreciate the cumulative nature of threats to vessel stability 
4. You will be able to write stability instructions specific to your fishing vessel and 
fishing operations 
Following the course, participants were surveyed to assess the program’s 
effectiveness. Comments were considered and improvements were made to the program as 
required. Comments from participants were generally positive. Many believed that they 
came away with a much better understanding of stability and recognized some of the error 
in their previous way of thinking. The results show an effective education program can 
bridge the gap between naval architects and operators. The paper does not assess whether 
capsizing in British Columbia (BC) has decreased as a result of the program. For greater 
detail on the FSSEP, refer to section 2.6. 
Kaplan and Kite-Powell (2000) conducted interviews with 22 members of the New 
Bedford (USA) fishing community to gauge the level of satisfaction of the government’s 
safety regulations with which they had to comply. The study did not focus on capsizing 
and all incidents were of equal interest to the authors. The study is important because one 
of the primary findings was that fishers felt there was a large disconnect between 
government officials who were responsible for regulations and the operators who had to 
abide by them. There was a strong consensus among those interviewed that they had no 
opportunity to provide input into the regulations. They felt that those responsible had little 
understanding of the industry’s hands on operations and, as a result, the regulations did 
little to create a safe working environment. 
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Wang et al. (2005) analyzed fishing vessel accidents in the UK from 1992 to 1999. 
Their study points out that imposing stricter safety regulations does not always reduce the 
number of vessels lost. The paper cites rule changes in the UK in the mid-1980s in which 
stricter regulations were applied to vessels 12m and over. While this resulted in reduced 
losses of larger vessels, losses of vessels, less than 12m, doubled. The authors attribute this 
to the number of registered vessels less than 12m long doubling during the same time 
period; operators simply avoided the regulations by using vessels smaller than those to 
which the new rules applied.  
The Wang et al. (2005) paper goes on to state that 20.72% of the accidents analyzed 
could be attributed to “negligence/carelessness of the crew.” A problem identified by the 
authors is that for many accidents there is not enough information to determine the primary 
causes. Finally, the authors conclude the paper by emphasizing the need for an enhanced 
safety culture in the fishing community.  
Loughran et al. (2002) discusses how disasters have led many to question the current 
level of risk in the industry and how it may be reduced. The paper highlights the work of 
previous authors that focused on improving training programs to reduce accidents. The 
paper does not just focus on capsizing but all types of accidents to fishing vessels. It does 
highlight the fact that capsizing is a relatively rare event that has high consequences. From 
1989 to 1994 in the UK, capsizing ranged from 1% to 6% of all accidents annually. 
However, capsizing accounted for the largest number of fatalities for the same period with 
46 of the 152 deaths recorded attributed to capsizing. 
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Lucas et al. (2014) studied the effectiveness of a safety program aimed at decreasing 
the frequency of freezer-trawl (FT) and freezer-longline (FL) fishing vessel accidents. The 
program discussed is the Alternate Compliance and Safety Agreement (ACSA). In order 
to meet the program’s compliance objectives, operators must adhere to guidance, which 
includes a section for vessel stability (United States Coast Guard, n.d.). As per the 
program’s outline, operators’ best practices are encouraged by ensuring operators have an 
understanding of basic principles of stability. Additionally, vessels are required to meet 
minimum requirements regarding watertight integrity and pump capacity. As is discussed 
in section 5.1, these factors often contribute to loss of fishing vessels from capsizing.  
The authors performed statistical analysis that examined accident trends prior to and 
after implementation of the ASCA program for both FT and FL vessels. As described in 
detail in the paper, “…reported rates of serious vessel casualties decreased after the vessels 
reached compliance with ASCA requirements.” While this program can be considered a 
form of imposing stricter regulations, the focus is not on the design of the vessel or its 
inherent stability. Instead, the ASCA program encourages best practices and improved 
operator awareness. 
2.6 Stability Education Programs 
Stability education programs that aim to improve operator awareness are in place 
outside of Newfoundland and Labrador. An organization in the UK, Seafish, has three 
different programs in place that vary in complexity. The lowest level stability program that 
Seafish offers is a half day introduction to stability concepts that is intended for new and 
inexperienced crew who work on vessels less than 16.5m in length (Seafish, 2014). The 
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outline of the program is presented in Table 1. At the end of approximately 3 hours of 
instruction, there is a 15-minute evaluation.  
 
Table 1: Outline of Seafish’s ½ Day Stability Course 
Seafish offers a more extensive one-day stability education program intended for 
skippers and experienced crews of vessels less than 16.5m in length (Seafish, 2014). As 
expected, this program covers more facets and detail of stability than the half-day course. 
The outline is presented in Table 2. The course includes approximately six hours of 
instruction and there is a one-hour assessment and ten-minute evaluation. The assessment 
consists of formative and summative portions. The summative assessment is in the form of 
a 30-question multiple choice test which participants must obtain a 70% to receive a pass 
in the course. 
Learning outcomes Assessment criteria. (Be able to)
1. Understand the terms used to describe 
basic vessel stability
1. Explain the terms used to describe 
basic vessel stability.
2. Understand the principles of stability
1. Explain the 3 states of vessel 
equilibrium
2. Explain the righting lever (GZ) in 
relation to equilibrium
3. Explain what happens to G as weight 
is added and removed from a vessel
4. Explain the influence that free fluids 
can have on a vessel including how these 
influences can be reduced
3. Understand Practical Stability
1. Explain the importance of vessel 
maintenance
2. Explain the importance of watertight 
and weathertight integrity
3. Explain the importance of roll period 
as an indicator of vessel stability
4. Describe how to complete a roll and 
heel test.
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Table 2: Outline of Seafish’s 1 Day Stability Course 
The most comprehensive stability program offered by Seafish is a more advanced 
version of the one-day stability program. This is intended for more experienced skippers 
and covers material in greater detail (S. Potten, personal communication, June 22, 2018). 
For all three programs, the instructor must be approved by Seafish. Instructors are required 
to be technically competent and experienced seafarers.  
Another stability education program is Fish Safe BC’s Fishing Vessel Stability 
Education Program (introduced in section 2.5). This is a four-day course offered to fishing 
vessel crew members in BC (Stability Education Course, 2018). At the beginning of the 
course, participants are given a 98-page binder to be used as both a reference and workbook 
Learning outcomes Assessment criteria. (Be able to) Learning outcomes Assessment criteria. (Be able to)
1. Understand the principles of floatation 
as they apply to fishing vessels
1. Explain the terms used to describe 
floatation
2. Explain the principles of floatation as 
they apply to fishing vessels
3. Explain the link between floatation and 
stability.
6. Understand the free surface effect
1. Explain how fluids can cause the 
free surface effect
2. Explain how the free movement of 
fluids influences the stability of the 
vessel
3. Describe the measures that can be 
used to limit the free surface effect
2. Understand the terms used to describe 
basic vessel stability
1. Explain the terms used to describe 
basic stability
2. Describe how a fishing vessel's center 
of gravity can be influenced
3. Explain how the metacentre of a 
fishing vessel is determined
4. Show on a diagram the relative 
positions of Center of Gravity (G) and 
Centre of Buoyancy (B).
7. Understand weathertight and 
watertight integrity and they can 
effect vessel stability
1. Describe basic fishing vessel design
2. Explain weathertight and watertight 
integrity linked to vessel design
3. Describe how failures in watertight 
and weathertight integrity can 
influence a vessel's stability
3. Understand the difference states of 
vessel equilibrium
1. Explain the 3 states of vessel 
equilibrium 
2. Explain metacentre (M) and the 
righting lever (GZ) for various conditions 
of equilibrium
3. Explain the angle of Loll and how it 
may be corrected
8. Understand how a seaway can 
influence a vessel's stability
1. Explain how a sea state can 
influence a vessel's stability
2. Explain the terms used to describe 
the period of a roll
3. Describe how the period of roll is 
used as an indicator of stability
4. Describe roll and heel tests
4. Understand of the movement of 
weight can influence a vessel's stability
1. Explain how the movement of weight 
can influence a vessel's stability
2. Explain how the addition of weight  
can influence a vessel's stability
3. Explain how the removal of weight  
can influence a vessel's stability
9. Understand the processes used to 
determine the stability and limits of 
operation for a vessel
1. List the sources of stability 
information and guidance
2. List the content of a stability book
5. Understand how the hauling of gear 
and the landing  of catch  can influence a 
vessel's stability
1. Explain how the fishing operations 
influence a vessel's stability
2. Explain how the landing of catch 
influences a vessel's stability
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throughout the course. There is little difference in the deliverables from this course and the 
course discussed previously from the UK. However, there are four full days to cover the 
material and more time can be spent going over concepts that are likely to be unfamiliar to 
participants.  
Like Seafish’s program in the UK, instructors for Fish Safe’s Stability Education 
Program are experienced seafarers with strong technical skills (J. Krgovich, personal 
communication, June 12, 2018). The program stresses hands on work to demonstrate 
technical concepts and makes use of relatable case studies. Coverage of technical concepts 
is extensive. 
In 2008 and 2009, quantitative and qualitative surveys on the program were completed, 
respectively. The quantitative surveys were completed through questionnaires emailed to 
participants (Applied Research and Evaluation Services, 2008).  The qualitative surveys 
were completed through two separate focus groups in Richmond and Nanaimo (Lynda 
Griffiths and Associates, 2009). Results of both surveys were, for the most part, positive. 
For example, in the quantitative surveys, 96.8% of participants said they learned something 
from the course, and 94.4% said they would recommend the course to fellow fishers. 
Furthermore, 62.7% of participants changed their working practices based on what they 
took away from the course (p.3). These statistics are encouraging and suggest that the 
program is effectively improving operator practice. The qualitative surveys also had 
positive results, with participants of the focus group quoting “It dispelled ideas I had 
previously about what I thought was safe” and “I had preconceived [wrong] ideas of 
stability” (p.5). The results of both surveys highlight the effectiveness of the program in 
terms of improving operator awareness.  
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2.7 Literature Review Summary  
As previously stated, the goal of this project is to reduce the frequency of capsizing by 
identifying primary causes and then finding ways to mitigate risk. The review of the 
literature indicates that previous studies have looked at fishing vessel capsizing from 
various perspectives. These studies indicate that capsizing is a relatively rare but highly 
consequential event. Although preventative regulations exist, there are significant 
limitations in the regulatory criteria and in terms of operator understanding of the 
regulatory criteria. Near miss data, which is regularly collected in other industries, has been 
shown to be a useful tool in both identifying common causes and in improving the safety 
culture of an operation. However, such data is not currently available in the fishing 
industry. Finally, stability education has been shown to be a significant contributor to better 
operating practices and understanding of stability concepts although no specific studies 
have directly linked stability education and reduction in capsizing frequency. 
There has been relatively little research completed that has aimed to determine the 
primary causes of fishing vessels capsizing. The work that has been done has focused on 
individual incidents and has attempted to reproduce the accidents through model tests. 
While some investigations into individual accidents were extensive, a relatively small 
number of accidents have been studied. As such, the results of the studies were not able to 
determine broad primary causes of fishing vessel capsizes. Development of technology to 
assist operators has also been a research focus. It is recognized that operators do not often 
understand stability books. The authors discuss proposals for “user friendly” technology 
that warns crews when a vessel’s initial stability is reduced. However, these technologies 
rely on potentially erroneous input from the crew, which can lead to inaccurate predictions. 
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Further, these technologies do not give a full description of a vessel’s stability 
characteristics because they do not address large angle stability.  
Research on dynamic stability (Johnson and Grochowalski, 2002; Gourlay and 
Lilienthal, 2002) highlights the complex nature of vessel motions, which cannot be 
accurately captured by current stability criteria. As a result, stricter regulations or broader 
application of regulations may still not capture the dynamic effects that dominate capsizing 
events. These studies suggest that changes to regulations may not have a significant impact 
on reduction to the number of capsizing events.  
The literature review of near misses as they relate to major accidents suggests that 
reporting near misses may be an effective way to reduce capsizing. Studies that 
investigated the chemical, manufacturing, and railroad industries all concluded that there 
are many more near misses than there are major accidents. Jones et al. (1999) and Nielsen 
et al. (2006) both saw a reduction in major accidents as the reporting of near misses 
increased, and Wright and van der Schaaf (2004) found the causes of near misses and major 
accidents to be virtually the same. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that documenting near 
misses will identify best practices and improve safety culture.  Near misses also offer a 
potential solution to a problem identified by Wang et al. (2005). The authors suggest that 
fishing vessel accidents often lack information and it can be difficult to determine primary 
causes. Documenting near misses is a possible solution to this problem.  
Much of the literature reviewed has shown that capsizing poses a significant risk to 
operators largely due to their lack of understanding of vessel stability. There is a dangerous 
disconnect between naval architects who compose stability booklets and the operators use 
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them. While there has been work done to simplify the stability book, there is still a 
considerable lack of understanding by operators.  
Multiple sources support the idea that the most effective way to reduce capsizing is by 
improving stability knowledge and awareness of fishing vessel operators. Specifically, 
Womack (2002), Johnson and Womack (2001), and Howe and Johansen (2007) all identify 
a lack of operator awareness as one of the leading causes of fishing vessel loss due to 
capsizing. Howe and Johansen and Loughran et al. (2002) argue that improving operator 
knowledge of stability can be accomplished by effective training programs.  
Other literature suggests that improved awareness is likely to be more effective than 
stricter regulations in reducing fishing vessel capsizing. This is argued most strongly in 
Wang et al.’s (2005) research which highlights the tendency for operators to circumvent 
new regulations, often rendering them ineffective. The authors state the importance of an 
improved safety culture in the fishing community. Without understanding, new regulations 
are likely to be circumvented, and the best way to develop a safety culture would be through 
improved education and training. This approach would also address the incidents that are 
the result of “negligence/carelessness of the crew.” Lucas et al. (2014) concluded that 
improved operator practice resulted in a reduction in accident rates of US freezer-trawl and 
freezer-longline vessels. The same rationale may apply to capsize reduction of fishing 
vessels in NL. 
Recognition of the need for educational programs has led to the development of 
stability education programs in Canada (BC) and the UK. These programs vary in length 
but the topics covered are generally the same. In BC, qualitative and quantitative surveys 
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were completed to assess the effectiveness of the program. Results from both surveys were 
positive and participants felt that they had improved awareness following completion of 
the program. A better way to measure the effectiveness of the program would be through 
analysis of the number of capsizing events in the province of BC prior to and following 
implementation of the program. This is currently not being done. 
The research in this thesis builds on these conclusions by identifying the primary 
causes of fishing vessels capsizing through analysis of published investigation reports. An 
attempt was also made to increase the effective database by investigating the applicability 
and potential for near miss reporting from interviews with operators. This data was then 
supplemented with an assessment of operators’ understanding of stability based on 
interviews conducted at the same time as the near miss discussions. 
2.8 Research Objective Statement 
The primary objective of this study is to determine the common causes of fishing 
vessel capsizes as a means of proposing rational mitigation measures focused in the most 
effective areas. This research will take a broad approach by attributing causes to a wide 
range of published fishing vessel capsizing incidents. Furthermore, the research will 
attempt to determine if near misses can be used as a tool to supplement published data in 
identifying common causes. This methodology has proved successful in other industries in 
reducing accidents.  
Until now, research that discusses operators’ understanding of stability has been 
generally anecdotal, with little qualitative or quantitative data available. This research will 
attempt to assess operator’s understanding of stability with qualitative data obtained from 
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interviews and roundtables with fishing vessel operators and crew. Operators’ knowledge 
and the decisions they make during operations will be documented. Correlation between 
this data and operators’ background (i.e. experience and training) will be investigated. An 
attempt will be made to link the level of stability knowledge of operators and crews in NL 
with common causes of fishing vessel capsizes. 
This link will be discussed as a possible basis to reduce common causes of fishing 
vessel capsizing. From the conclusions, preventative measures will be recommended to 
reduce capsizing in Newfoundland and Labrador.  
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3.0 Relevant Certification Requirements 
Background information relevant to the current study is discussed below. This 
primarily focuses on current stability regulations and requirements for operator training in 
Canada and specifically in Newfoundland and Labrador.  
3.1 Limitations of Current Stability Regulations for Fishing Vessels 
Transport Canada (TC) is the governing body for marine vessel regulations in Canada. 
All vessels must adhere to TC’s TP7031E: Stability, Subdivision, and Load Line Standards. 
Fishing vessels must meet the minimum requirements for STAB 4 of this document. STAB 
4 criteria are divided into regulations for Large Fishing Vessel Inspection and Small 
Fishing Vessel Inspection. Small fishing vessels are vessels with a gross tonnage of less 
than 150T and length less than 24.4m.  
As discussed by Molyneux (2007), STAB 4 requirements match the International 
Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Torremolinos Protocol. This document was written in 
1977 and amended in 1993 (IMO, 2018), and it provides guidance on fishing vessel safety 
and training. The Torremolinos Protocol was updated most recently in 2012 during the 
Cape Town Agreement (IMO, 2012). 
The stability criteria (no ice accumulation) as outlined by STAB 4 is presented in Table 
3 and Table 4.  
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Table 3: Minimum Area under GZ Curve Requirements 
 
 
Table 4: Minimum Righting Lever Requirement 
Further, the maximum righting arm, GZ, must occur at an angle of heel between 25° 
and 30°, and the transverse metacentric height (GM), must be at least 0.35 m. The 
regulations require calculation of GM via an inclining experiment and the submission of 
hydrostatic curves in the form of a stability booklet. 
While TC and IMO regulations require vessels to have sufficient static stability, there 
exist significant gaps as applied to fishing vessels. First, as pointed out by Gourlay and 
Lilienthal (2002) and Johnson and Grochowalski (2002), these regulations are based on 
static stability requirements and it is well understood that capsizing is often the result of 
dynamic action in wind and waves. The requirements for area under the GZ curve do 
consider the capacity of the vessel to absorb roll energy but this is an empirical measure 
and does not encompass wave heading, resonance, damping, or other parameters that affect 
seakeeping and a vessel’s predicted roll behaviour in waves.  
The regulations do not apply to small fishing vessels (SFV) less than 24.4m in length 
with a gross tonnage less than 150 tons. For most species, if a vessel meets the SFV criteria, 
there is no requirement to evaluate the stability of the vessel. If fishing for pelagic species 
such as mackerel, herring, or capelin, operators of SFVs must meet certain stability criteria. 
Angle of Heel, 
θ (degrees)
Area Under GZ 
Curve (m∙radians)
θ < 30° 0.055
θ < 40° 0.09
30° < θ < 40° 0.03
θ > 30°
Angle of Heel, θ
(degrees)
Righting Lever, GZ
(m)
0.2
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In many instances, a SFV’s stability has been analyzed following capsize to find that it 
does not meet STAB 4 requirements (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2006). Many 
small fishing vessels operate with inadequate stability because regulations do not require 
stability assessment. 
The lack of regulations for small fishing vessels has long been recognized as a problem 
in Canada. Coming into effect July 13, 2018, any new fishing vessel constructed over 9m 
in length will is required to “successfully undergo a stability assessment by a competent 
person” (Transport Canada, 2017). While this is an improvement, most vessels operating 
for the foreseeable future were constructed prior to July 2018 and will not need to perform 
a stability assessment; the more lenient regulations are still relevant for the majority of 
fishing vessels. 
An important, and infrequently discussed, aspect of regulations, as they apply to 
fishing vessels, is the operator’s understanding of stability books and how they are used. 
This is discussed further in section 5.1, but in many cases, operators of fishing vessels do 
not understand how to properly use stability booklets. Womack (2002) writes that stability 
booklets and letters are often “incomprehensible” to crews and operators. The stability 
assessment, which is expensive and time consuming, is disregarded. Even the most 
extensive stability assessments can be ineffective because they are often not understood or 
followed by operators.   
3.2 Formal Stability Training Requirements in Canada for Operators 
Operators’ understanding of stability is likely a function of formal training. The level 
of training required to operate a given vessel depends on the vessel’s tonnage and its 
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operational area. Skippers of fishing vessels in Canada are required to hold a certificate 
listed in Table 5 (Transport Canada, 2016).  
 
Table 5: Transport Canada Certification Requirements 
The training required for each certificate is more rigorous at the top of the table and 
less sophisticated towards the bottom. An operator with a Fishing Master, First Class 
certificate is required to undertake the greatest amount of training, with operator training 
decreasing towards Master of a Fishing Vessel of less than 60 GT.  
The training that an individual must undertake to obtain a certificate is described in 
Transport Canada’s document, The Examination and Certification of Seafarers (2004; 
2007; 2016). The most recent edition of this document was published in 2016. However, 
previous revisions were released in 2007 and 2004. See Table 6 for revisions that have 
impacted stability training for operators.  
Certificate Validity
 1
Areas of 
Operation
Max Vessel 
Gross Tonnage
Fishing Master, First Class
The holder of this certificate may act as Master of a fishing vessel of any 
tonnage engaged on an unlimited, near coastal or sheltered waters voyage.
Unlimited Unlimited
Fishing Master, Second Class
The holder of this certificate may act as Master of a fishing vessel of any 
tonnage engaged on a near coastal or sheltered waters voyage and as Chief 
Mate of a fishing vessel of any tonnage engaged on an unlimited voyage.
Coastal/sheltered 
Waters
Unlimited
Fishing Master, Third Class
The holder of this certificate may act as Master of a fishing vessel of any 
tonnage engaged on a near coastal or sheltered waters voyage and as Officer in 
charge of the watch of a fishing vessel of any tonnage engaged on an unlimited 
voyage.
Coastal/sheltered 
Waters
Unlimited
Fishing Master, Fourth Class
The holder of this certificate may act as Master on board a fishing vessel of not 
more than 100 gross tonnage engaged on a near coastal or sheltered waters 
voyage and as Officer in charge of the watch of a fishing vessel of any tonnage 
engaged on near coastal and sheltered waters voyage.
Coastal/sheltered 
Waters
100
Certificate of service as Master of a 
fishing vessel of less than 60 Gross 
Tonnage
The holder of this certificate may act as Master on board a fishing vessel of not 
more than 60 gross tonnage engaged on an unlimited, a near coastal, class 1 or 2 
or a sheltered waters voyage, according to the voyages on which the qualifying 
service for the certificate has been acquired. The validity will be specified on the 
certificate.
Unlimited 
2 60
1) As described in Transport Canada's The Examination and Certification of Seafarers (2016)
2 ) Validity of area of operation depends on  the operator
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Table 6: Stability Training for Fishing Vessel Operator Certificates 
Both SCS Level 1 and 2 (and “Ship Stability” prior to 2007) courses provide 
participants with an extensive overview of ship stability principles. An operator that has 
passed an examination for these courses should be well equipped with a sound knowledge 
and understanding of stability. Available descriptions of the courses are listed in The 
Examination and Certification of Seafarers, which can be accessed online.  
Upon review of Transport Canada regulations, it can be inferred that operators with a 
First, Second, or Third Class certificate have received an education that equips them with 
a sound understanding of stability. Following changes to regulations in 2007, operators 
with a Fourth Class certificate would also have obtained some understanding of stability. 
Operators with a certificate for a vessel less than 60T or those with a Fourth Class ticket 
prior to 2007 are assumed to not have received any formal stability training.  
3.3 Vessel Length Restrictions in Newfoundland and Labrador 
Fishing vessels operating offshore Newfoundland and Labrador have been identified 
as generally having design features that have a detrimental effect on stability (Wiseman 
and Burge, 2000). The Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) imposed vessel 
Rev 6 (2016) Rev 5 (2007) Rev 4 (2004)
Fishing Master, First Class SCS 
1
 Level 2 SCS Level 2 Ship Stability
Fishing Master, Second Class SCS Level 2 SCS Level 2 Ship Stability
Fishing Master, Third Class SCS Level 2 SCS Level 2 Ship Stability 
Fishing Master, Fourth Class SCS Level 1 SCS Level 1 None
Certificate of service as Master of 
a fishing vessel of less than 60 
Gross Tonnage
None None None 
2
2) For this revision, the max tonnage for this certificate was 100T
Certificate
Stability Education/Training Courses
1) SCS: Ship Construction and Stability
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replacement regulations in the 1990s based on fish stock conservation (DFO, 2002). In 
order to limit the amount of fish that could be stowed in a single trip, DFO’s policy on 
issuing new licences restricts many vessels to an overall length of 19.8m (65 feet) (DFO, 
1996). Wiseman and Burge identify these regulations as a safety issue for fishing vessels. 
Although vessel length is restricted, beam and depth are not restricted and this results in 
pressure to increase these dimensions to accommodate additional catch and/or extra fishing 
gear. This results in vessels that are poorly proportioned.  
The authors also explain that stability of the vessel is reduced by loading conditions 
during operations. Loading is restricted by the vessel’s length, and the loading conditions 
often raise the center of gravity due to the inability to spread catch or equipment lengthwise. 
Furthermore, the vessel’s size and proportions, as limited by regulations, does not make 
the vessel well suited for harsh weather. This is when the vessel would see the most 
significant roll action in large waves and require sufficient reserve buoyancy to right itself.  
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4.0 Research Methodology and Data Collection 
The first component of this study is to determine the primary causes of fishing vessel 
capsizes. In many countries, accidents resulting in injury, fatality, significant property loss, 
or environmental damage lead to an investigation and an accompanying report by the 
respective country’s government. The primary source of capsize accident data collection 
for this project is published investigation reports. While reports are published ranging from 
different types of accidents to different types of vessels, only reports of fishing vessels 
capsizing were of interest for this project. For each incident report, the causes that 
contributed to the capsizing were identified. Incident reports are available online for 
different countries. Most sites are searchable, and it was necessary to filter for reports that 
relate to the capsizing of fishing vessels. 
In the next stage of the research, individual interviews were conducted with fishing 
vessel operators. The original motivation for this approach was to supplement the data from 
investigation reports with near miss events. The interviews were seen as a possible way to 
document near misses, a practice that is not currently done in the commercial fishing 
industry.  It is also intended to assess the utility of such data in terms of operator willingness 
to report and operator ability to describe cases including potential causes and effects. As 
explained by Wright and van der Schaaf (2004), accidents are rare compared to near misses. 
If accidents could be supplemented by a much greater number of near misses, common 
causes could be identified with greater confidence. However, the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Fish Harvesters Safety Association (NLFHSA) recommended that the approach 
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be broadened to include other factors such as operators’ understanding of stability and how 
they perceive the risk of capsizing in addition to a discussion of near misses. 
Finally, roundtable discussions with commercial fish harvesters were conducted. This 
also stemmed from a recommendation from the NLFHSA. Roundtable discussions 
included multiple participants and allowed for a wider range of qualitative data. In addition 
to collecting near miss incidents, these discussions focused on how fish harvesters 
determine whether their vessel is stable or not. Perceived risk of vessel capsizing was also 
covered in the discussions. Another point of interest was how harvesters use their stability 
book and the perceived effectiveness of current regulations. The findings of these 
discussions were compared to the previous work covered in the literature review. 
The interview and roundtable portions of the study were approved by Memorial 
University’s Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research (ICEHR). Prior to 
an interview or roundtable taking place, all participants signed a consent form.   
Common trends identified in the investigation reports were highlighted and are 
discussed in detail in section 5.1. Interviews and roundtables were conducted in large part 
to provide an assessment of operators’ understanding of stability and perception of risk. 
Discussions allowed the rationale behind operational decisions to be explored. This 
information is currently not available from investigation reports alone. Operators’ 
knowledge of stability is also an important factor to consider, and discussions investigated 
the impact of an inadequate knowledge of stability on operations. Interviews and 
roundtables with operators also brought up topics such as stability analysis and additional 
training. In both individual interviews and roundtable discussions, operators were 
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specifically asked about any near misses they may have had. Answers to this question 
provided additional quantitative data to supplement analysis of investigation reports. 
4.1 Investigation Reports 
In many countries, governing agencies publish investigation reports after an accident 
occurs. In the event that a fishing vessel capsizes, investigation reports are made available 
to the public. Typically, these reports discuss the vessel history and crew experience, the 
history of the voyage, and factors that may have contributed to the vessel’s capsizing. 
Data is available from many countries. As this project emphasizes commercial fishing 
in NL, Canada’s Transport Safety Board’s database of marine accident investigation 
reports was the primary source of information. This online database includes accidents of 
all types to all vessels in Canada dating back to 1990. Prior to 1990, investigation reports 
are available in archives. For this project, greater relevance was placed on reports that are 
more recent and only investigation reports available online were analyzed. As stated, this 
database includes all types of accidents to all vessels. The data base was filtered with 
criteria: 
1. Vessel: commercial fishing vessel 
2. Accident type: capsizing 
 
To supplement commercial fishing vessel capsizes in Canada, other countries 
investigation reports were also analyzed. These included reports from the United States, 
Norway, Ireland, Australia, and the UK. For each report the following information was 
noted: 
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1. Vessel Name 
2. Vessel Particulars (Length, Beam, Draft, Displacement) 
3. Date 
4. Weather Conditions (Wind and Waves) 
5. Primary Causes 
The last category in the list above, “Primary Causes” was of the most interest. 
Common causes were identified and highlighted.  
4.2 Interviews 
Anonymous interviews were conducted with individuals who had experience as a fish 
harvester (crew or skipper). The original premise was to limit interviews to discuss near 
miss capsizing events. However, the NLFHSA recommended that the approach be altered 
because it would likely be difficult to recruit participants on the basis of a near miss 
capsizing event. This was due to operators possibly lacking the awareness to recognize that 
they had been involved in a near miss or being reluctant to speak about an incident that 
could fault their behaviour or decisions. 
The approach was altered in order to speak with individuals about their fishing 
experience. Individuals were recruited to discuss the risk of capsizing and their 
understanding of stability. Following this first part of the interview, each individual was 
asked if they had had a near miss experience and if they would like to discuss it. Changing 
the approach of the interviews resulted in more volunteers coming forward to take part. 
Recruitment of interviewees was originally done through the NLFHSA, but was later 
expanded to “cold calling” participants based on names provided from industry contacts. 
The interviews were structured as follows: 
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1. General information: experience, vessel size, species 
2. How do you know/determine if your vessel is stable? 
3. Do you have a stability book? Do you think they are useful? 
4. How do you maintain the stability of your vessel? 
5. What poses the largest risk to your vessel capsizing? 
6. What do you think is the most effective way to reduce/prevent capsizing 
(stability books/stability testing, formal stability training, educational 
programs)? 
7. Have there been instances where you felt the stability of your vessel was 
compromised and close to capsizing? If so, can you please explain the event? 
The responses from the interviews allowed for operators’ understanding of stability to 
be studied and assessed. Assessing operators’ understanding of stability was the primary 
objective of the interview process. This was an important consideration and provided a 
benchmark to compare with research that relates capsizing to operators’ understanding of 
stability. Further, any near misses that were documented would be used to supplement the 
data from the investigation reports.   
4.3 Roundtables 
The final portion of research was roundtable discussions that focused on operators’ 
understanding of stability and how they perceived the risk of capsizing. The only criterion 
for participation was that individuals have experience working on a commercial fishing 
vessel. All recruitment of participants was done through the NLFHSA. 
The goal of the roundtables was to gain insight into the level of stability knowledge of 
operators. The roundtable format allowed for a more casual discussion than the interviews. 
The discussions were guided by a chairperson, but in general, participants were encouraged 
to pursue any topic that they considered relevant to the discussion on stability and 
capsizing. The structure of the discussion is as follows: 
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1. General information: experience, vessel size, species 
2. What does it mean to have a stable vessel? 
3. How do you maintain the stability of your vessel? 
4. What poses the largest risk to the stability of a vessel? 
5. Have there been instances when you have felt: 1) that the vessel’s stability was 
compromised or 2) that your vessel was close to capsizing? 
6. What would you consider the most effective way to reduce/prevent the loss of 
stability or capsizing? 
For a detailed roundtable outline, see Appendix A. As with the interviews, this 
research provided information not available in investigation reports. While investigation 
reports often hypothesize about an operator’s knowledge of stability based on the outcome 
of the incident, they do not provide any assessment of the general level of understanding 
of stability amongst operators. Roundtables attempted to assess this parameter qualitatively 
and determine in what areas operators were lacking.  
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5.0 Results 
The following sections discuss the results of the three forms of research undertaken: 
analysis of investigation reports, interviews, and roundtable discussions with operators.  
5.1 Investigation Reports 
In order to determine the primary causes of fishing vessels capsizing, investigation 
reports were analyzed. For this project, investigation reports from Canada, the United 
States, Norway, Ireland, and Australia were studied. In order to meet criteria for the study, 
the vessel must have been a fishing vessel and it must have capsized (i.e. grounding, man 
overboard, etc. were not included). Investigation reports referenced are available to the 
public. There were a total of 60 reports analyzed for the project. See Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Investigation Reports Analyzed by Country 
Following analysis of the reports, common causes of capsizing were identified. For a 
complete list of events and summaries see Appendix B-1 and Appendix B-2. Appendix B-
1 includes details of the vessels involved in each incident, while Appendix B-2 provides 
details on the causes determined to contribute to each capsizing incident. For each 
investigation report, the cause (or causes) of the event could be placed into one of four 
major categories.  
Country No. of Reports Analyzed
Canada 32
United States 6
Ireland 7
Norway 3
Australia 1
United Kingdom 11
Total 60
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1. Operator’s practice 
 Unsafe loading 
 Knowingly operating with watertight integrity compromised  
 Knowingly operating with the free surface effect present 
 Operating in excessively harsh weather 
2. Unsafe modifications 
3. Lack of maintenance  
4. Small scale design flaws 
 Insufficient freeing ports 
 Insufficient bilge pumps 
 Equipment installed that increased center of gravity 
“Operator’s practice” and “Small scale design flaws” are divided into subcategories. 
Each of these is discussed with an example provided for illustrative purposes (see section 
6.6). Capsizing is often due to a combination of two or more of these causes. It is also 
important to note that while it is not considered a cause, many vessels were not required to 
meet any stability regulations. The lack of regulatory requirements will be reviewed in 
relation to the primary causes listed above. 
Table 8 and Table 9 list all investigation reports of capsizing events that were analyzed 
and their associated causes. The frequency of different causes and sub-causes is illustrated 
in Table 12 and Figure 3. Table 10 outlines the percentage of incidents that each of the four 
primary causes contributed to. Table 11 shows the total number of times a cause was 
determined to contribute to an incident.  
For each incident, there were often multiple causes and sub causes. For example, as 
per Table 10, operator’s practice contributed to 57 of the 60 incidents. However, in many 
cases, multiple causes played a role. Such was the case for Ryan’s Commander, in which 
unsafe loading and operating with watertight integrity compromised were determined to 
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contribute to the capsizing. For that single incident, two examples of operator’s practice 
were tabulated as part of the 86 examples highlighted in Table 11. 
Following analysis, accident trends in the Canadian fishing industry from 2004 to 2017 
were examined. This data is publicly available in the form of an excel file. This analysis 
was only performed for Canada because other countries did not provide such extensive 
data. The incidents were also sorted by vessel size to determine if there was any relationship 
between the size of the vessel and the likelihood of an incident occurring. These analyses 
are discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3, respectively.  
 
 
Table 8: Investigation Reports and Causes (1/2) 
1 Canada Ryan's Commander 2004    
2 Canada Lannie & Sisters II 2006    
3 Canada Melina & Keith II 2005   
4 Canada Big Sister 2007    
5 Canada Cape Fin-Tose 2006  
6 Canada L' Acadien II 2008 
7 Canada Strait's Pride II 1990  
8 Canada Miss Cat Harbour 1997   
9 Canada Cap Rouge II 2002   
10 Canada Hope Bay 2004  
11 Canada Prospect Point 2004  
12 Canada Ocean Tor 2005  
13 Canada Sea Urchin 2007  
14 Canada Love and Anarchy 2008    
15 Canada Le Marsouin I 2009  
16 Canada Craig and Justin 2010  
17 Canada Jessie G 2012  
18 Canada Pacific Siren 2012   
19 Canada Caledonian 2015  
20 Canada Lady Devine 1994   
21 Canada Courageous 1995  
22 Canada Dalewood Provider 1995   
23 Canada Stephane P II 1996 
24 Canada Inskip 1995  
25 Canada 3J'S '93 (THE) 1996   
26 Canada CFV 151816 1997 
27 Canada C19496NB 2016 
28 Canada Five Star 2014    
29 Canada 
Le Bout de Ligne
 1990  
30 Canada Sea Serpent 25 2014  
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Table 9: Investigation Reports and Causes (2/2) 
 
Table 10: Number of Incidents Involving Causes 
 
Table 11: Frequency of Capsizing Causes 
31 Canada CFV #132145 1993 
32 Canada Sea Gypsey 2009 
33 Ireland Carraig An Isac 2011 
34 Ireland Catherine L 2005 
35 Ireland Honeydew II 2007 
36 Ireland Kyle Mhor 2000  
37 Ireland Dinsih 2006  
38 Ireland Rising Sun 2005  
39 USA Katami 2008     
40 USA Advantage 2012 
41 USA Christopher's Joy 2014  
42 USA Hawaii Five-1 2015    
43 USA Lydia and Maya 2016   
44 USA Evanick 1998 
45 USA FV Lady  Mary 2009  
46 Norway Viking 7 2014  
47 Norway Marina 2009 
48 Norway Monica IV 2009  
49 Austrailia Tamara 2002  
50 UK FV Sally Jane SM74 (1997) 1998   
51 UK FV Sally Jane SM74 (2013) 2013    
52 UK Bounty 2005  
53 UK Fraoch Ban 1999 
54 UK Angela 2001  
55 UK Kairos 2015   
56 UK FV Harvest Hope 2005    
57 UK FV Flamingo 2002    
58 UK FV Sundance 2001   
59 UK FV Stella Maris 2014    
60 UK Majestic 1989  
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57 95.0%
20 33.3%
9 15.0%
21 35.0%Poor
 Design
Cause
No. of Incidents 
Involving Cause
Percentage of 
Total Accidents
Operator's
 Practice
Unsafe Modifications 
that Reduced Stability
Lack of Maintenance that led to an Ingress of Water
Frequency
86
20
9
26
Cause
Operator's
 Practice
Unsafe Modifications 
that Reduced Stability
Lack of Maintenance that led to an Ingress of Water
Poor
 Design
47 
 
 
Table 12: Frequency of Capsizing Causes and Sub-causes 
 
Figure 2: Frequency of Capsizing Causes 
 
Figure 3: Frequency of Capsizing Causes and Sub-causes 
5.1.1 Common Causes 
The common causes identified in section 5.1 are discussed in greater detail in the 
following sections. 
Frequency
Unsafe Loading 40
Operating with F.S. 3
Operating with watertight integrity (knowingly) compromised 23
Operating in harsh
 weather 8
Other (Operator's Practice) 12
Unsafe Modifications 
that Reduced Stability 20
Lack of Maintenance that led to an Ingress of Water 9
Freeing ports
 insufficient 11
Bilge pumps and/or alarm system insufficient 3
Equipment installed in location that increased COG 3
Other (Poor Design) 9
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5.1.1.1 Operator’s Practice 
One of the most important contributing factors to capsizing was poor practice on behalf 
of operators. Investigation reports identified this as a common occurrence, with improper 
loading, operating with a free surface effect, and operating in poor weather conditions to 
be common examples of poor practice. As per Table 10, operator’s practices played a role 
in 57 of the 60 incidents. Amongst the 60 incidents analyzed, there were a total of 86 
examples of operator’s practice that contributed to a vessel capsizing (see Table 12). With 
40 occurrences, the most common sub-category of operator’s practice was unsafe loading. 
This was followed by operating with watertight integrity knowingly compromised (23), 
operating in harsh weather (8), operating with a free surface (3), and other (12). 
One of the most common examples of operators’ poor practice is improper loading of 
the vessel. Cases of improper loading often resulted in an increase in the vessel’s vertical 
center of gravity (COG). Raising the COG reduces a vessel’s metacentric height and 
stability. Examples of increasing the COG include storing heavy gear on upper decks or 
removal of permanent ballast near the keel of the vessel. Overloading the vessel was also 
identified as a serious problem. Overloading can significantly change the displacement 
from the values used in the stability book (if there is one) and reduces the vessel’s 
freeboard. Many investigation reports concluded that the operators would operate the 
vessel under loading conditions not accounted for in the stability book.  
Two other examples of poor practice identified in investigation reports was operating 
with a free surface or operating with watertight integrity knowingly compromised (i.e. a 
leak or watertight compartments not shut). Vessels operating with a free surface experience 
a reduction in stability because of the free surface effect. Munro-Smith (1967) explains that 
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the free surface effect occurs in any fluid in a ship’s tank or compartment which has a 
surface slope that changes when the ship rolls (i.e. any tank or compartment that is not 
100% or 0% full of fluid). As the fluid surface changes with ship motions, so does the 
location of the fluid’s center of gravity. The free surface causes a lateral shift of the ship’s 
center of gravity. The effect of this shift, as Munro-Smith states, “…is generally expressed 
as being equivalent to raising the center of gravity…” (Munro-Smith, 1967, p.208). The 
equivalent rise in the ship’s center of gravity reduces its stability.  
Vessels that take on water through leaks or flooding become subject to the free surface 
effect. Some capsizing events occurred due to flooding because watertight doors or 
compartments were not fastened shut as they should have been.  When the vessel begins to 
flood, many crews continue to operate because they do not realize that the stability of the 
vessel is being reduced. Operating with a flooded vessel also reduces freeboard, changes 
the displacement, and reduces reserve buoyancy and the vessel’s righting moment. As the 
vessel’s stability is reduced, it becomes more susceptible to capsizing.  
A final example of poor practice that was a common theme in the investigation reports 
was vessels operating in adverse weather conditions. When given sufficient storm warning, 
many operators continued to fish instead of seeking shelter from high winds and waves. 
These harsh environments can cause large heeling moments and shipped water which can 
lead to flooding. 
5.1.1.2 Unsafe Modifications 
A second common theme contributing to capsize accidents was unsafe modifications 
made to a vessel that reduced the vessel’s stability and made it more susceptible to 
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capsizing. This is another form of operator decision but it concerns the design rather than 
the operation. Of the 60 investigation reports, unsafe modifications were a factor in 20 
incidents. It was found that modifications typically consisted of the addition of equipment 
such as a winch or crane. Adding large, heavy equipment has two effects on the vessels’ 
stability: the displacement increases and the center of gravity changes. As many 
modifications identified in the investigation reports were above deck level, the center of 
gravity of the vessel was most often raised, thus reducing the vessel’s stability. When 
owners have had analysis performed to assess the stability of their vessel (i.e. an inclining 
experiment or a stability book), changes to the vessel that have an impact on the 
displacement and center of gravity are significant because they render the stability 
information inapplicable.  
For SFVs, owners are not always required to meet any stability requirements. 
Therefore, when there are modifications to the vessel, regardless of the work done, there is 
often no requirement for the owner to alert regulatory authorities of the changes or reassess 
the vessel’s stability. For vessels required to meet stability requirements, TC regulations 
state that “in the case of a vessel for which the stability information required by this section 
is available, that stability information shall be modified and submitted to the Board for 
approval” (Government of Canada, 2017). Transport Canada recognizes the need to keep 
track of changes to the vessel that may have an effect on the vessel’s stability and has 
issued bulletins in the past outlining procedures to track modifications (Transport Canada, 
2017). However, cases were identified in which vessel owners did not track changes or 
reassess the vessel’s stability. As a result, the stability of the vessel was reduced, and the 
previous stability calculations were no longer valid.   
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5.1.1.3 Lack of Maintenance 
Another trend, identified from the investigation reports, was the lack of maintenance 
of fishing vessels. The most common impact of poor maintenance was ingress of water to 
a vessel due to a loss of watertight integrity. This was the case for nine of the 60 incident 
reports. Typically, water would find its way into the vessel through hatches on the deck or 
hull that should have been watertight. Due to a lack of upkeep, the hatches were often 
unable to keep water from entering the vessel and flooding was common. Furthermore, 
cases were identified in which bilge pumps were not working. As a result, the vessel was 
unable to rid itself of shipped water and flooding could not be prevented. Flooding is 
detrimental to a vessel’s stability as it introduces the free surface effect and changes the 
displacement of the vessel.  
5.1.1.4 Small Scale Design Flaws 
Small scale design flaws that are not directly related to a vessel’s inherent stability 
were identified as a contributor to fishing vessels capsizing. Unlike issues relating to 
stability regulations discussed in section 3.1, these were often smaller design details that 
had an adverse effect on the vessel’s stability. 21 of the 60 incidents were, at least in part, 
the result of these design flaws. The most common design flaws identified from a review 
of incident reports prevented vessels from dealing with shipped water. Freeing ports, bilge 
pumps, and alarm systems were often identified as causal or contributing factors. 
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Issues relating to freeing ports were: 
- Freeing ports insufficiently sized. The area of the freeing ports was less than 
required by regulation. This prevented shipped water from clearing the deck of the 
vessel. 
- Freeing ports not equipped with flaps to prevent water from entering the deck. 
- Freeing ports welded shut. This would prevent shipped water from clearing the 
deck. 
Lack of bilge pumps often prevented the vessel from being able to remove water once 
flooding occurred. Further, some vessels lacked an alarm to alert the operators that flooding 
had occurred. Operating with design flaws mentioned above suggest that operators may 
not be aware of the risk of shipped water and the effect it can have on a vessel’s stability. 
5.1.2 Stability Regulations and Capsizing 
While regulations (or lack thereof) cannot “cause” a vessel to capsize, it is important 
to consider the role regulations have in relation to the frequency of fishing vessels 
capsizing. Regulations governing a vessel’s stability depend on the country the vessel is 
registered. However, as discussed by Molyneux (2007), regulations around the world are 
generally adopted from IMO’s Torremolinos Protocol, which came into effect in 1977 and 
updated in 2012.  These regulations, and those adopted from them, do not have stability 
requirements for vessels less than 24m in length. Of the 60 investigation reports analyzed, 
53 involved vessels that met TC’s length and displacement requirements for SFV 
classification. 
Despite the majority of vessels meeting SFV dimensions, only 35 of the 60 vessels did 
not have any stability assessment performed. 25 of the 60 vessels had some stability 
analysis performed, although in some cases the stability data was up to date as it should 
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have been1. Stability analysis refers to either an inclining test to determine the vessel’s 
initial stability or an entire stability book. The fact that approximately 42% of the vessels 
investigated had stability assessed indicates that requiring operators to produce stability 
data is not a fully effective means of capsizing prevention.  
As discussed in section 2.3, even when a vessel must adhere to stability regulations, 
there still exists a significant risk of capsize. Capsizing is often, at least partially, due to 
dynamic action in large waves. The motion of the vessel can be predicted by seakeeping 
methods that are based on vessel accelerations (Gourlay and Lilienthal, 2002; Johnson and 
Grochowalski, 2002). The IMO Torremolinos Protocol does not account for vessel 
dynamics, and therefore does not capture the full risk of capsizing.   The fact that when 
vessels do follow stability regulations there still exists a significant chance of capsizing is 
an important consideration. It reinforces the concept that reducing the frequency of fishing 
vessel capsizing is more likely to occur through more informed operator decisions as 
opposed to more stringent regulation. 
5.2 Near Miss Capsizing Events from Interviews and Roundtables 
Interviews with fishing vessel operators were originally intended to investigate the 
utility and applicability of near miss data as a supplement to the data presented in the formal 
accident reports. This strategy was adapted from other industries where it has been shown 
to be successful (Wright and van der Schaaf, 2004; Jones at al, 1999; Nielsen et al., 2006). 
During the course of interview planning with the NLFHSA, the approach to fishing vessel 
operators and crew was broadened to include questions on stability knowledge and training 
                                                 
1 Not all reports explicitly stated if stability analysis had been performed or to what degree. In some cases, 
assumptions were made based on the vessel’s size and regulations. 
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in addition to the near miss information. In the following sections, the near miss data is 
discussed separately from the stability knowledge data although both were gathered in the 
same individual interviews and roundtables. 
 The interviews and roundtables included a question that asked if participants had 
experienced a near miss capsizing event. If they had, they were asked to provide details 
surrounding the incident. Based on their description, causes were determined. Compared 
with the thorough investigation reports studied in section 5.1, details provided with the near 
miss incidents were typically sparse. In many cases, it was difficult to confidently assign 
causes to the events. The causes as they were understood are outlined in Table 13. 
Operator’s practice played a role in 11 of the 13 near miss capsizing events. While the 
sample size is relatively small, these numbers reinforce the results of section 5.1. As per 
Table 10, operator’s practice was a factor in 95% of the investigation reports analyzed. 
While the operator’s practice for near misses was not as frequently noted as the cause of 
the incident, it played a role in the majority of incidents (84.6%). 
Beyond operator’s practice, the other causes do not align as well with section 5.1. This 
discrepancy is likely because there is no extensive investigation report that follows a near 
miss event to identify these less frequent causes. It is probable that the details provided by 
interview and roundtable participants were not thorough enough to capture all of the causes 
that contributed to the near miss. This may have been due to either the participants not 
being aware of other factors, or purposefully withholding details. 
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Table 13: Near Misses from Interviews and Roundtables 
5.2.1 Description of Near Misses from Interviews 
The near miss incidents discussed during interviews are summarized below. 
5.2.1.1 Participant 4 
Participant 4 spoke of a near miss in which the crew was operating in relatively harsh 
weather. At around 3:00 a.m., a beam sea wave struck the vessel and caused a large roll to 
port. The participant said that the vessel returned to its even keel position quickly and he 
did not feel that, despite the harsh weather, the vessel was in significant danger. He stated 
that as they were in harsh weather, the crew took precautions and ensured that the height 
of the loads above the keel was kept as low as possible. 
1 Near Miss 1 Roundtable 1  
2 Near Miss 2 Roundtable 1 
3 Near Miss 3 Roundtable 2  
4 Near Miss 4 Roundtable 2  
5 Near Miss 5 Roundtable 2 
6 Near Miss 6 Roundtable 3 
7 Near Miss 7 Interview 4 
8 Near Miss 8 Interview 6 
9 Near Miss 9 Interview 9  
10 Near Miss 10 Interview 11 
11 Near Miss 11 Interview 12 
12 Near Miss 12 Interview 14 
13 Near Miss 13 Interview 16  
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5.2.1.2 Participant 6 
Participant 6 was hauling crab pots off the Grand Banks when he encountered harsh 
weather. The day’s forecast originally called for light winds but the weather picked up 
while they were hauling pots. Upon being alerted of the coming weather, the participant 
removed all of the crab pots from the deck and put them back in the water. In the harsh 
weather, a wave hit the vessel and it experienced a large angle of roll. The participant said 
that it was approximately 25 to 30 seconds before the vessel rolled back to an upright 
position. The participant said that he was worried that the harsh weather would cause the 
vessel to capsize. 
5.2.1.3 Participant 9 
Participant 9 was fishing when a pipe to the refrigerated seawater (RSW) tank broke 
which led to an ingress of water. A crew member said to the participant that they thought 
the vessel’s behaviour was abnormal. The participant checked the below deck videos and 
found the leak. The vessel was taking on water faster than the bilge pump could clear the 
water. When the leak occurred, there was close to 600 crab pots and 5000 lbs of bait on the 
deck of the vessel which increased the center of gravity. The participant used an emergency 
pump to clear the water and repaired the broken pipe.  
5.2.1.4 Participant 11 
Participant 11 was fishing when a large list occurred to his vessel. While fishing on a 
“poor day,” there was gear and catch on deck that was not strapped down. The load on the 
deck shifted “to one side” and a list occurred. The crew changed the direction of the vessel 
and used the wind to correct the list. 
57 
 
5.2.1.5 Participant 12 
Participant 12 lost a vessel while fishing. While this would exceed what is considered 
a “near miss,” it is included in this section because the data was collected with other 
interviews. Participant 12 said he took on water through the stern of the vessel which led 
to the vessel sinking. The participant said he did not realize the vessel was taking on water 
until it was too late. The participant was unable to provide many details surrounding the 
incident. As such, it is difficult to confidently attribute a cause to the incident. 
5.2.1.6 Participant 14 
Participant 14 said he was not involved in a near miss experience himself, but he knew 
of a fellow operator who was. During the near miss incident, the operator was hauling 
capelin over the side of the vessel. As they started pumping the load on board, the capelin 
began to die and sink in the net. This resulted in a heeling moment and a list occurred. The 
crew let the capelin go and the vessel returned upright. 
5.2.1.7 Participant 16 
Participant 16 said he had approximately 48,000 lbs of capelin on board when the 
vessel encountered strong winds. It was discovered that the lazerette pump was not working 
and they were unable to dewater the capelin. As a strong wind hit the vessel, the load shifted 
and the vessel began to sink by the stern. They were able to avoid loss of the vessel and 
were escorted back to port by another vessel. However, the participant felt that loss of the 
vessel was likely and said “I thought for sure she was gone then.” 
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5.2.2 Description of Near Misses from Roundtables 
The near miss incidents discussed in the three roundtable sessions are summarized 
below. 
5.2.2.1 Roundtable No. 1 – November 29, 2017 
Two participants told of instances in which they felt that they were close to capsizing. 
In both cases, operators’ practices were the primary cause of the “near miss.” In the first 
instance, the participant said he was in shallow water. He had ended up in rougher weather 
than he had anticipated because he had not checked the forecast. As he attempted to turn 
the vessel, a large angle of heel ensued before it returned upright. The participant stated 
that he should not have been in the area in that particular vessel and he should have 
followed the forecast to avoid the rough seas.  
The second incident occurred when a different participant was steaming with tubs full 
of fish on deck. With an increased center of gravity, the vessel experienced a large angle 
of heel before it returned upright and the crew were able to make it to port. The participant 
acknowledged that the tubs should have been stored in the hold of the vessel and ensured 
that he did so for future trips. 
Both incidents have been included in Table 13. These incidents are additional examples 
of operator’s practice being the primary cause of a near capsizing event. Both participants 
said the events were isolated incidents. The group said that near miss events are becoming 
less frequent because of the quota system in place. With a quota system, operators do not 
need to take as great of a risk to increase their overall catch.  The importance of experience 
was brought up once more as a participant said that experienced operators take measures 
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to reduce the likelihood of a near miss incident occurring. Finally, participants discussed 
the cod fishery. It was agreed that as cod returns to relevance in the Newfoundland and 
Labrador fishery, the current fleet of vessels will have trouble accommodating it. As a 
result, the number of near misses and capsizing events may increase.  
5.2.2.2 Roundtable No. 2 – January 16, 2018 
Multiple near misses involving participants were discussed. Participant 2 spoke of two 
separate incidents. In both incidents, improper dewatering of the catch led to the free 
surface effect. During the first “near miss,” the vessel was half loaded with capelin. 
Because the equipment was not performing as it should, there was a large amount of water 
in the hold. The load acted as a free surface and reduced the vessel’s stability. As a result, 
the vessel rolled to a large angle when it encountered a significant swell but the crew made 
it to port without capsizing. Participant 2’s second near miss came when he was pumping 
capelin on a new vessel. There was a gap in the pen boards and the bottom of the hold and 
the load shifted during pumping operations.  A large list occurred and the crew ceased 
operations and made it to port with a “heavy list.” For both incidents, operator’s practice 
was the primary cause according to participant 2 during this session. 
Participant 4 also brought up a near miss in which he was involved in. A vessel that 
was being used for sealing was modified with a five-foot extension on the stern. The owner 
was confident it would be fine but did not get any stability work done and no inspections 
were performed. However, during operations the crew noticed the vessel was exhibiting 
abnormal behaviour that was originally attributed a malfunctioning autopilot. The vessel 
met a large swell that rolled the vessel to an angle that “threw” the crew from their bunks. 
A second swell caught the newly installed appendage and the vessel was put on its side for 
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two minutes (as approximated by the participant). The vessel made it back to port. In this 
case, the impact of the appendage on the vessel’s performance in rough weather was not 
considered. As such, it was an unsafe modification that was the primary cause of the near 
miss capsizing event. The three near misses are documented in Table 13. 
5.2.2.3 Roundtable No. 3 – March 28, 2018 
Participant 4 disclosed that he had been on a vessel that had come close to capsizing. 
The vessel was out in rough weather and rolled to an angle of approximately 45° when it 
was hit with a gust of wind close to 65 knots. After the large roll, the transmission failed 
and they had to be rescued. The participant said he had confidence in the vessel and that 
he never felt in any real danger. The cause of this near miss is operator practice as the 
vessel was operating in weather conditions it should not have been. The incident has been 
documented in Table 13. 
5.3 Interviews 
In order to gain a better understanding of operators’ level of stability knowledge, one-
on-one interviews were conducted. The interviews focused on vessel stability and the risk 
of capsizing. The outcomes of interviews were divided into critical categories pertaining 
to vessel stability, as described below. 
1. Determining if a Vessel is Stable or Unstable 
One of the basic indicators of stability is how a stable vessel “feels” compared to an 
unstable vessel. A vessel with a high metacentric height (a high initial stability) will feel 
“stiff” and respond quickly to disturbances. Accelerations are high and a vessel that has an 
excessive metacentric height will be uncomfortable. On the other hand, a vessel with low 
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initial stability will feel “tender.” It will respond slowly to disturbances exhibiting low 
acceleration and feels comfortable. 
While a vessel’s metacentric height does not describe the entire range of its stability, 
it is an important indicator of the risk of a vessel capsizing. It is important that operators 
are aware of the relationship between how a vessel responds to the sea and its stability. 
Without this basic understanding, it can be difficult for operators to make appropriate 
decisions regarding stability and capsizing. 
2. Stability books 
Operators were asked whether they had a stability book and, if they did, did they know 
how to use it and find it useful. 
3. Maintaining a Stable Vessel 
This question aimed to identify what operators perceived as best practices in regards 
to stability during operations. Operators’ actions while fishing are an important indicator 
of their understanding of stability. Understanding these actions can provide insight into 
whether or not operators are putting themselves in high-risk situations. This portion of the 
discussion can also indicate if there are any important best practices that operators are not 
aware of or if there are any dangerous practices that are common amongst participants. 
4. Risk of Capsizing 
Interview participants were asked what they felt posed the largest risk to capsizing a 
vessel during operations. Operators indicating what they perceive as the most significant 
risk can help to clarify their understanding of stability and what factors can make their 
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vessel more susceptible to capsizing. Operators were also asked if they identified capsizing 
as a major risk. It is important to evaluate the awareness of operators to the risk of 
capsizing. Without sufficient recognition of the risk that capsizing poses, an operator may 
under-value decisions or actions that make their vessel more susceptible to capsizing. 
5. Best ways to Reduce Capsizing   
Finally, operators were asked what they felt was the best way to reduce capsizing risk. 
Specifically, participants were asked if the felt stricter regulations or increased education 
would be effective ways to reduce capsizing.  Participants were asked if they would be 
open to additional stability training. 
The interviews are summarized in the sections below. Participants that have received 
formal stability training are discussed in 5.3.1 and those without any formal stability 
training are discussed in 5.3.2. Interview participants are listed in Table 14. Operators with 
formal stability training are highlighted in red, while those without are in blue. Those 
fishing furthest away from St. John’s are highlighted in red, as are those with the least 
amount of experience. Distance from St. John’s was tracked as a potential proxy variable 
to measure the proximity to, or ease of availability of, stability training. 
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Table 14: Interview Participants 
5.3.1 Participants with Formal Stability Training 
Participants who completed a Fishing Master First, Second, or Third Class ticket (or a 
Fourth Class ticket after 2007) are considered to have received formal stability training. 
Among other requirements, participants must pass a test that covers basic stability 
principles.  The responses of participants to the categories listed in section 5.3 are 
summarized below. 
1. Determining if a Vessel is Stable or Unstable 
All participants who had received formal training were aware that an unstable vessel 
is “tender” and a stable vessel is “stiff.” When asked how they could determine if a vessel 
was stable, most participants responded that the vessel’s “feel” was an important indicator 
of a vessel’s stability. During the ongoing discussion, all participants in this group 
Participant 
Number
Years 
Experience
Vessel Length 
(feet)
Distance from St. 
John's (km)1
Formal Stability 
Training
1 27 60 91 Yes
2 38 65 938 Yes
3 33 57 106 Yes
4 25 65 90 Yes
5 38 65 938 Yes
6 52 45 133 No
7 40 65 420 Yes
8 26 70 90 Yes
9 14 50 131 Yes
10 40 35 131 No
11 55 40 131 No
12 35 35 163 No
13 40 39 130 No
14 32 39 130 No
15 30 40 85 No
16 50 35 85 No
In
te
rv
ie
w
s
1) Driving distance to participant's residence per Google Maps
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confirmed that they were aware of the relationship between comfort and stability. Some 
participants specifically cited the term “metacentric height” or “GM” and possessed a 
sound understanding of the concept of initial stability. 
Five of the eight participants explicitly stated that experience on the vessel was 
necessary to make safe decisions that ensure vessel stability. In other words, experience 
aboard a vessel is necessary to determine if it is stable or not. While opinions on stability 
books varied (see below), Participant 1 was the only operator said that stability analysis 
could be used to determine if a vessel was stable. The rest of the group that was interviewed 
did not rely on stability analysis to assess a vessel’s stability. Even Participant 1 stressed 
that while stability assessment was important, operators’ decisions and practices could not 
be underestimated.   
2. Stability Books 
Six of the eight participants who were interviewed that had formal stability training 
also had stability books for their vessel. However, opinions on the usefulness of stability 
books within those six operators varied greatly. Three operators felt that stability books 
were beneficial and useful. Participant 1, Participant 7, and Participant 8 were able to use 
and refer to stability books. Participant 1 went so far as to say, “Every boat should have a 
stability book.” As discussed previously, this participant felt that a stability assessment was 
a suitable way to assess a vessel’s stability. Participant 7 and Participant 8 gave less 
credence to stability books, but still felt they served a purpose. Participant 8 said that he 
referred to a vessel’s stability book when he did not have experience on that vessel. 
65 
 
In contrast, Participant 3, Participant 4, and Participant 9 did not refer to stability books 
or feel they were overly useful. These participants had stability books only to meet 
regulatory requirements. The stability work performed on the vessel had negligible 
influence on these operators’ practices.  
The two participants who did not have a stability book were Participant 2 and 
Participant 5. Participant 2 did say that stability books can provide some additional 
assurance. Participant 5 was the most against stability books within the group and stated, 
“Stability books are good for nothing.” 
3. Maintaining a Stable Vessel 
Operators’ responses to this question displayed a strong understanding of stability. The 
answers generally reflected actions that are important to take in order to avoid capsizing. 
Participants were not limited to a single response or the “most important” action to take in 
order to maintain a stable vessel; participants were allowed to provide as many answers to 
this question as they wanted. The responses to the question are summarized in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: Actions Cited as Important to Maintaining a Stable Vessel – Operators with Formal Stability 
Training 
Avoiding the free surface effect was the most common response to this question, cited 
by four of the eight participants. Participant 7, who also participated in the second 
roundtable session, was quoted in the roundtable session as saying, “Free surface is the 
Participant Avoid Overloading Avoid a High Center of Gravity Avoid Shifting Loads Avoid F.S.E. Avoid Bad Weather Use Stabalizers
1  
2   
3 
4 
5  
7 
8  
9 
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killer.” During the interview, Participant 7 elaborated and said that if the weather is fine, 
there are many times he will load a vessel such that it has negative freeboard (i.e. the 
waterline is above the weather deck and below the top of the sheer strake). He explained 
that he takes proper precautions to ensure that the vessel is watertight and is confident he 
will not take on shipped water. Participant 8 also stressed the importance of ensuring that 
the vessel is watertight to avoid down-flooding.  
Proper loading of the vessel was also a common response. This came in the form of 
overloading to ensure sufficient freeboard and/or keeping weights low to maintain a low 
center of gravity. The only conflicting remark came from Participant 7 who admitted that 
he overloads his vessel when he feels the risk is sufficiently low. Finally, avoiding shifting 
loads was the response of three operators. It was explained that on deck it is important to 
strap gear down, while in the holds it is important to use pen boards that are in good shape. 
4. Risk of Capsizing 
Responses to this question typically reflected what actions operators took to maintain 
stability on a vessel. Participant 1 felt that small scale design changes posed a significant 
risk to vessel capsizing. The example he gave reflected his response to the previous 
question, as he said many operators remove concrete ballast from their vessels, thus 
increasing the center of gravity. Participant 3’s response was similar as he cited icing as 
having the potential to increase a vessel’s center of gravity. 
Participant 4 was the only operator to respond with extreme weather posing a 
significant risk of capsizing. Participant 9 was the only operator who cited the type of 
species being caught posing the most significant risk to a vessel capsizing. He said that sea 
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cucumbers are most worrisome for him because it is difficult to prevent them from shifting 
in a vessel’s hold. 
Operators were asked to provide a general assessment of the risk they felt capsizing 
posed to them. It was clear that all participants were well aware of the risk posed to their 
lives due to capsizing. This was reflected in answers to the third and fourth questions. In 
general, however, participants felt well equipped to avoid capsizing because of their 
understanding of vessel stability. From their formal stability training, participants were 
aware of the risk of capsizing and best practices to take to minimize the risk of capsizing. 
5. Best ways to Reduce Capsizing 
There was unanimous agreement amongst the participants that improved education 
and awareness would be beneficial to the fishing community to reduce capsizing. 
Participants 4 and 8 specifically said that the stability training they received was useful. 
Participant 8 said that operators in NL on smaller vessels who are not required to participate 
in formal training may be lacking in this area. This idea was repeated in interviews with 
Participants 1, 2, 3, and 7. All felt that operators without Fishing Master Class tickets 3 or 
less were at a greater risk of capsizing because they lacked a sufficient understanding of 
vessel stability. 
Participants were less receptive to the idea of stricter regulations that would require 
stability books on all vessels. Participants 1 and 4 felt that stricter regulations would 
provide some benefit because lack of regulations for smaller vessels can lead to poor 
design. However, the consensus amongst participants was that stability books are not likely 
to have a considerable effect on fishing vessel safety because they may not influence the 
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decisions operators make while fishing. This sentiment is reflected by Participant 3 who 
stated, “If you don’t know how to use [a stability book], it’s no use to you.” 
5.3.2 Participants with no Formal Stability Training 
Operators with no formal stability training were posed the same questions as those 
who had received formal stability training. Members of this group were operators who had 
not received a Fishing Masters Class 3 ticket or higher or no equivalent training. There 
were a total of eight interviewees who had not received formal stability training. 
1. Determining if a Vessel is Stable or Unstable 
All participants referred to experience on a vessel as being the most reliable way to 
determine a vessel’s stability. Participant 11 was the only participant who felt that if a 
vessel had stability work performed it was inherently stable. Participant 15 and 16 both 
said that a vessel’s stability characteristics can be determined by comparing a vessel’s draft 
with the height of the vessel. Both participants felt that if the vessel had a shallow draft 
compared to its height, it was more susceptible to capsizing. This belief alludes to the idea 
that a vessel with a high center of gravity has poor stability characteristics and the operators 
based their assessment of a vessel’s stability on its appearance.  This idea was also brought 
up by Participant 6. He stated that he was able to assess a vessel’s stability based on its 
dimensions. 
Of the eight participants in this group, only Participant 12 referred to a vessel’s roll 
period as being indicative of its stability. Participant 12 said that if a vessel rolls out too 
far, it is unstable. Although he did not explicitly state the relationship between stability and 
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comfort, it was apparent that this operator understood that a tender vessel is more 
susceptible to capsizing than a stiff vessel.  
No other participant in this group referred to the stability of a stiff versus tender vessel. 
While no participant explicitly stated that a comfortable vessel implies stability, there were 
comments made that suggested this may be the case. For example, Participant 6 recalled a 
near miss when he described the vessel as being in “good shape” because prior to the 
incident it felt comfortable on the water and did not move much. Another example of a 
similar attitude was Participant 16. He complained that many vessels today are unstable 
because they are designed to optimize carrying capacity instead of comfort.  
2. Stability Books 
Participant 12 was the only participant who had a stability book, but he admitted that 
he does not use it. Most participants were generally indifferent on the subject of stability 
books and inclining tests. Participant 6 said that while a stability assessment would not 
hurt, it alone is not sufficient to ensure that a vessel does not capsize. This sentiment was 
repeated by Participant 13, who said that most accidents can be attributed to human error 
as opposed to vessel design.  
Participants 15 and 16 both felt that stricter regulations on design need to be 
implemented for newer vessels, and stability analysis should be performed to ensure that 
these vessels meet design standards. Both operators stated that newer vessels are more 
likely to capsize because they are poorly designed by naval architects who lack experience. 
Participants 15 and 16 both strongly felt that the main reasons fishing vessels capsized was 
because of poor vessel design. 
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3. Maintaining a Stable Vessel 
Although operators in this group did not have formal stability training, their responses 
to this question indicate that they take appropriate actions to avoid capsizing via causes 
highlighted in section 5.1. Actions taken by each participant are listed in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Actions Cited as Important to Maintaining a Stable Vessel – Operators without Formal Stability 
Training 
The most noticeable discrepancy in this group of participants and the group with 
stability training was that every operator without stability training brought up the impact 
that a shifting load has on stability. Because operating a smaller vessel does often not 
require any stability training, this response was not surprising. A smaller vessel is more 
likely to be impacted by a shifting load than a larger vessel. Therefore, it is likely of greater 
concern to the group of interviewees that operate smaller vessels.  
This group also had two participants say avoiding harsh weather and using stabilizers 
as important ways to maintain stability. Neither of these responses was brought up by 
operators with stability training. Wind and waves can pose more of a risk to a smaller 
vessel, so operators without stability training on smaller vessels are more likely avoid 
rough weather.  
Avoiding a high center of gravity and free surface were only mentioned once and 
twice, respectively. While operators may not have explicitly stated the effect a center of 
Participant Avoid Overloading Avoid a High Center of Gravity Avoid Shifting Loads Avoid F.S.E. Avoid Bad Weather Use Stabalizers
6  
10 
11  
12 
13   
14   
15  
16   
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gravity has on stability, it was brought up as a concern on multiple occasions during other 
portions of the interviews. Specifically, Participants 6, 15, and 16 all said that vessels that 
appear top heavy are likely unstable. Similar sentiments were brought up in regards to the 
free surface effect. While operators may not have an exact understanding of the impact of 
a free surface on stability, they are aware that leaks are detrimental to safe operations. 
4. Risk of Capsizing 
Much like the group of operators with formal stability training, answers as to what 
posed the most significant risk of capsizing generally reflected the actions the operators 
took to maintain stability. Fish species was brought up in this portion of the interview. 
Participant 12 discussed sea cucumbers posing a risk of capsizing because of the possibility 
of shifting loads, while Participant 13 mentioned pelagic species. Operators also remarked 
that rough weather and leaks pose a risk to their vessel capsizing.  
All participants agreed to meet to discuss the risk of capsizing. Therefore, there is little 
doubt that to a certain extent, they are all aware that there is some degree of risk regarding 
the loss of their life and/or vessel due to capsizing. However, among operators with no 
formal stability training, the perception of this risk varied greatly. Furthermore, this group 
of operators generally regarded the risk of capsizing as being much less severe than the 
group of operators with some form of stability training. Several operators made comments 
that suggest that they feel capsizing poses little risk. Others made comments which 
reflected an impression of unconditional safety, provided certain criteria are met.  
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Participant 102, when prompted to assess the risk he felt capsizing posed, responded 
with “No risk.” This is an example of a lack of operator awareness. Participants 13 and 
14’s opinions of capsizing were not as nonchalant as Participant 10, but both stated that 
they did not feel that capsizing posed a significant risk. With regards to capsizing, 
Participant 14 said that he “…doesn’t think about it much.” Participants 13 and 14 appeared 
as capable operators but it is apparent that they lacked awareness of the risk posed by 
capsizing. 
In other cases, operators without formal stability training gave the impression that the 
risk of a vessel capsizing is next-to-negligible if that vessel meets certain design 
parameters. For example, Participant 6 opined that it was primarily undecked vessels that 
should be concerned with capsizing because they much more likely to become swamped 
than a decked vessel. Similar sentiments were expressed by Participant 11. He stated that 
if a vessel had an inclining test performed, it had suitable stability characteristics and 
therefore there was little risk of capsizing.  Participants 15 and 16 also felt that if a vessel 
was designed properly, an operator did not have to worry about a capsizing event occurring, 
and that capsizing of modern vessel was due, in large part, to poor engineering and naval 
architecture decisions.  
5. Best ways to Reduce Capsizing  
While no participant could be said to be overly enthusiastic about an educational 
program, the general consensus was that any training that could improve safety would have 
some benefit. Participants 13 and 14 said they would be open to additional training in the 
                                                 
2 Participant 10 was only a crew member on his vessel, not a skipper.  
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form of a seminar, as did Participant 11. However, within this group there was an emphasis 
placed on the need for stricter regulations on vessel design. Participants 15 and 16 were the 
most adamant on this point. Both felt that the primary cause of vessels capsizing was due 
to poor design. They felt that the most effective way to reduce capsizing events would be 
to place stricter regulations on the vessel design and ensure that they meet stability criteria.  
The effect that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans’ (DFO) regulations have on 
operator safety was also raised. Participants 6, 13, 15, and 16 all brought up sinking of the 
Pop’s Pride, an undecked vessel that sank off St. John’s while retrieving nets in 2016 
(Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2016). All of these participants said that the vessel 
should not have been on the water that day due to rough weather, but had to retrieve nets 
in order to avoid a fine.  
5.3.3 Summary of Interviews 
Interviewing fishing vessel operators was an effective means of providing an 
estimation of their understanding of stability. The most significant observation from this 
portion of the research was the discrepancy in the level of knowledge between operators 
that have received formal training and those that have not. To some degree, this also reflects 
a divide between those who work on large SFVs and those who work on smaller SFVs. 
Operators who had received stability training were well versed in basic stability principles. 
The most evident reflection of training was that these operators were all aware that a tender, 
comfortable vessel is more likely to capsize than a stiff vessel. Among operators without 
training, there was little evidence to suggest that they understood this relationship.  
74 
 
All operators interviewed (training or no training) provided examples of good practices 
they undertake to maintain stability of their vessel. This suggests that even without training, 
operators tend to make sound decisions based on their experience. In particular, operators 
without stability training understood the importance of avoiding shifting loads, leaks, and 
a high center of gravity. This knowledge can be attributed to intuition and experience as 
opposed to a formal understanding of vessel stability. In contrast, operators with training 
have supplemented their experience with a technical understanding of the principles of 
stability.  
Operators without stability training were generally less aware of the risk of capsizing. 
The most obvious disregard of the risk of a vessel capsizing from untrained interviewees 
came from Participant 10, who felt that capsizing posed “no risk.” In addition to a 
discrepancy in the concern between the two groups, operators without training made 
comments that suggest they lack proper awareness of the impact their actions can have on 
their vessel’s stability. Participant 6’s comments in regards to undecked vessels is an 
example of this. While undecked vessels are certainly more susceptible to shipped water, 
the majority of capsizing events analyzed in section 5.1 occurred on decked fishing vessels. 
Another example of an untrained participant not recognizing the risk of capsize was 
Participant 11, who suggested that meeting stability criteria implied a vessel was stable. 
Finally, comments by Participants 15 and 16 further reinforce the idea that untrained 
operators may not recognize the risk posed by capsizing. Their comments regarding the 
relationship between vessel design and the likelihood of capsizing suggest that they feel if 
an operator is confident in their vessel’s design, they may not pay the attention they should 
to the impact their actions have on vessel stability.  
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The perception of low risk, combined with an inability to determine when their vessel 
has become susceptible to capsizing, puts operators without training at a greater likelihood 
to capsize. This illustrates the positive impact that technical training has on the NL fishing 
community. It further suggests that expanding stability regulations to encompass smaller 
vessels may not be as effective as training in preventing capsizing. A lack of understanding 
of stability and awareness of the risk posed by capsizing would still be present amongst 
operators without formal stability training.  
Comments from participants 6, 11, 15, and 16 provide evidence that untrained 
operators place high reliance on stability assessments. This reliance introduces the potential 
for an operator to neglect best operating practices because they have the impression that 
stability work ensures that their vessel is unconditionally safe. It is important that operators 
realize the consequences of their actions and the role they play when it comes to 
maintaining a stable vessel.  
5.4 Roundtables 
The final portion of research was roundtable discussions with fishing vessel operators. 
There were three roundtables conducted, with all participants recruited through the 
NLFHSA. To encourage open and candid discussions, the roundtables were not recorded. 
Instead, extensive notes were taken during the discussions. The first two roundtables were 
chaired by a representative from the NLFHSA and notes were taken by the project 
investigator. The third roundtable was simultaneously chaired and noted by the project 
investigator. 
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In the following sections, summaries of each roundtable are provided. A detailed 
discussion on each of the roundtables can be found in Appendix C. In Appendix C, 
questions posed to the participants by the chairperson are numbered and a summary of the 
discussion amongst the group for each question is provided. 
5.4.1 Roundtable No. 1 – November 29, 2017 
The first roundtable was held in St. John’s on November 29, 2017. In addition to the 
chairperson and investigator, there were five participants. All participants were 
experienced operators who were open to the idea of joining the roundtable when 
approached by the NLFHSA. Throughout the discussion, all members contributed to the 
conversation. In general, there was a consensus amongst participants that stability is an 
important consideration for safe operation of a fishing vessel. As per Table 17, four 
participants had formal stability training while one did not. 
 
Table 17: Roundtable No. 1 Participants 
The participants for the first roundtable were all experienced operators. This was 
reflected in a strong understanding of stability among the group’s participants. While the 
formal training varied, everyone was aware of best practices. Unsafe loading and the free 
surface effect’s impact on vessel stability were well understood. Although some 
participants did not know how to use stability books (or felt they were not useful), all 
Participant 
Number
Years 
Experience
Vessel Length 
(feet)
Distance from 
St. John's (km)1
Formal Stability 
Training
1 35 45 286 Yes
2 52 39 13 No
3 25 65 108 Yes
4 42 39 90 Yes
5 30 65 11 YesR
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 1
1) Driving distance to participant's residence per Google Maps
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participants displayed a sound understanding of best practices. Experience was often 
brought up as an important aspect of maintaining a stable vessel. In this roundtable there 
were no examples of an operator not understanding basic principles of stability or the risk 
associated with capsizing. There was, however, an operator with no formal stability 
training. This is an example of an operator without formal training possessing sufficient 
knowledge to make safe and informed decisions. 
An important consideration brought up in this roundtable was the effect that the species 
being fished has on the stability of a vessel. While regulations are stricter for pelagic 
species, TSB reports do not attribute the species type as having a significant impact on 
capsizing events. Different species’ impact on stability is an important consideration for 
future work. 
Finally, the consensus among the group was that capsizing is a significant hazard and 
the best way to reduce the frequency of capsizing events is through education and 
awareness. No operator felt that stricter regulations or requiring all vessels to carry stability 
books would see a significant reduction of vessels capsizing. No participant mentioned 
overloading as a significant risk of capsizing, although this is repeatedly cited as a 
contributing cause of capsizing in TSB reports.  
5.4.2 Roundtable No. 2 – January 16, 2018 
The second roundtable was held in St. John’s on January 16, 2018. Like the first 
roundtable, it was chaired by a representative from the NLFHSA. Participants were from 
different parts of Newfoundland and Labrador and were in St. John’s to attend a Marine 
First Aid Recertification. Following a day of meetings, seven of the program’s attendees 
78 
 
agreed to stay to participate in the roundtable. Compared to the first roundtable, members 
were initially tentative and had to be encouraged by the chairperson. However, as the 
roundtable proceeded, most participants contributed to the discussion.  
Like the first roundtable, all participants were experienced operators. As per Table 18, 
everyone had at least 30 years of experience. However, this session had a much wider range 
of demographic than the first. The second roundtable included participants from outside of 
St. John’s or surrounding areas and the size of the vessels ranged from a 22’ open boat to 
64’11” fishing vessels. Only one member of the group had received formal stability 
training.  
 
Table 18: Roundtable No. 2 Participants 
With a wider demographic, the second roundtable presented different conclusions than 
the first. While all participants had extensive experience, the amount of formal training 
varied greatly. In this session, there was an observable discrepancy in the stability 
knowledge among the formally trained and untrained participants in the group. The most 
obvious example of this was when Participant 6 felt their vessel had poor stability 
characteristics because it was uncomfortable. Participant 7 corrected Participant 6 during 
the roundtable. This exchange involved two operators that had not received any formal 
Participant 
Number
Years 
Experience
Vessel Length 
(feet)
Distance from 
St. John's (km)1
Formal Stability 
Training
1 30 40 165 No
2 40 65 420 Yes
3 35 45 651 No
4 35 35 651 No
5 43 22 770 No
6 30 35 234 No
7 30 40 290 No
R
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n
d
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b
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 2
1) Driving distance to participant's residence per Google Maps
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stability training. However, the level of understanding of basic stability principles was 
quite different. Furthermore, only Participant 2 of this roundtable had formal stability 
training, but most of the group agreed with Participant 7’s statement that an uncomfortable 
and stiff vessel likely had sound stability characteristics. 
 Another relevant example was Participant 4 not knowing the effect of modifying a 
vessel deck would have on the vessel’s center of gravity and stability. The fact that 
Participant 4 inquired about a seemingly basic principle of vessel stability suggests a lack 
of understanding in that area. Finally, Participant 5, who operated a small open boat, 
contributed little during the (approximately) two-hour discussion. The three operators 
mentioned above did not have formal stability training.  
However, Participant 7, also with no formal stability training, displayed awareness of 
basic stability principles. This finding is attributed primarily to his statement that an 
uncomfortable vessel is likely stable. The reception to this response by other members 
without stability training is an example of those members displaying awareness despite a 
lack of training. However, Participant 2, the only member with stability training, 
demonstrated the strongest understanding of vessel stability amongst the group.  
Another important takeaway from the second roundtable was what the operators felt 
posed the most significant risk to a vessel capsizing. Based primarily on Participant 2’s 
testimony, the free surface effect is of the greatest concern in regards to vessel stability. 
Lack of vessel maintenance, which can result in leaks that accumulate in a free surface, 
was recognized by the group as being detrimental to vessel safety. Like the first session, 
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the type of species was considered important amongst the group. Sea cucumbers were 
identified as posing the greatest risk. 
In the second roundtable, the group’s reception to the idea of stability training was 
positive. There were no members who were opposed to the idea or felt that additional 
training would not be of use. An important consideration for any future educational 
program is the knowledge discrepancy between operators who have received formal 
training and those who have not.  
5.4.3 Roundtable No. 3 – March 28, 2018 
The third roundtable session took place in Lumsden, Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Following a day of Marine Emergency Duties (MED) training, the NLFHSA arranged for 
four operators to stay behind to take part in the roundtable. The motivation for the final 
roundtable was to meet with operators who lived outside of the St. John’s region and fished 
on vessels less than 35 feet long. With this demographic, it was possible to assess the 
stability knowledge of operators who had received little to no formal training. This session 
was both chaired and noted by the project investigator.  
As per Table 19, the participants had less experience than the previous two sessions; 
the most experienced operator had 18 years of experience and the least experienced 
operator had two. No participant had any formal training that would have covered stability. 
Participants were generally reluctant to contribute. This may have been because the session 
was not chaired by a NLFHSA representative, or it may have reflected the level of stability 
knowledge amongst the group.   
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Table 19: Roundtable No. 3 Participants 
Roundtable No. 3 was exclusively comprised of operators with no formal stability 
training. It was evident from responses that the group lacked an understanding of basic 
principles of vessel stability. There was no evidence that any member of the group was 
aware of the relationship between a vessel’s roll motion and stability. Participant 4, in 
particular, stated that a stable vessel is comfortable in rough waters. This roundtable’s 
participants were also the most hesitant to respond to the questions and contribute. This 
may have reflected an unwillingness to partake in the discussion or have been further 
evidence of a lack of stability knowledge.  
The group were generally not concerned with capsizing. Participant 2 explicitly stated 
that he felt capsizing posed little risk. It was obvious from this portion of the conversation 
that the group did not recognize capsizing as the significant risk that many participants of 
the other focus groups did. Their perception of risk was even more surprising given that 
the group was familiar with the loss of the Miss Cat Harbour due to capsizing (refer to 
Appendix C for more details on this part of the discussion). The fact that participants were 
not aware of the actual cause of the incident indicates that the members had not had an 
opportunity to learn from a tragedy that occurred to one of their peers. This supports the 
argument that the group does not recognize the risk that capsizing presents. 
Participant 
Number
Years 
Experience
Vessel Length 
(feet)
Distance from 
St. John's (km)1
Formal Stability 
Training
1 2 35 388 No
2 14 35 378 No
3 18 19 388 No
4 5 35 388 NoRo
u
n
d
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 3
1) Driving distance to participant's residence per Google Maps
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The group was open to an education program, however. Members provided their 
opinion on the best way to implement an awareness program aimed at improving stability 
knowledge of operators with no formal training. This is an important consideration for 
future work. 
5.4.4 Summary of Roundtables 
The roundtables provided valuable insight into operators understanding of stability. 
The most important findings are discussed below. 
1. Role of Formal Training 
Formal training had a significant impact on an individual’s knowledge of stability. For 
certain vessels, operators are not required to undergo any formal stability training (see 
section 3.2). There was a discrepancy in the level of stability knowledge in those that had 
received stability training and those that had not. Many of the participants without stability 
training showed less understanding of the basic principles of stability in comparison with 
those that had received training. Untrained participants were generally unaware of the 
relationship between roll characteristics and stability (Roundtable No. 2 – Participant 6; 
Roundtable 3). In contrast, participants with formal training were aware of the relationship. 
Those participants with formal training also brought up the relevance of the free surface 
effect throughout the sessions. There was little to indicate that operators of smaller vessels 
were as aware of the risks posed by having a free surface aboard a vessel. 
There were, however, exceptions to this trend. During the first roundtable, Participant 
2 did not have formal stability training yet made no response that suggested he was any 
less knowledgeable than other members of the group concerning stability. Roundtable No.2 
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provided further examples of operators without training showing an understanding of basic 
stability principles. Participant 7 correctly pointed out that an uncomfortable vessel is more 
likely to be stable than a comfortable vessel, and this statement was met with a positive 
response by other members of the group without stability training.  
Among operators with formal stability training, there were none who made statements 
to suggest that, despite their training, they lacked an understanding of vessel stability. All 
participants within this group possessed a strong knowledge of stability and awareness of 
the risk due to capsizing. While some accurate statements of operators without stability 
training demonstrated an understanding of stability, there was generally a strong 
correlation between stability knowledge and the amount of training an operator received. 
Those with training demonstrated a greater understanding and awareness than those who 
did not. 
 It is probable that for operators without stability training, their awareness and 
knowledge can be attributed to experience. The operators without training that displayed 
strong awareness all had at least 30 years of experience. This fact suggests that experience 
can play a role in regards to safe operation of a fishing vessel and maintaining stability.  
2. Risks Posed to Operators in Regards to Capsizing 
There were common factors identified throughout the roundtables that operators felt 
posed a risk to a vessel’s stability. The type of species being caught was emphasized in the 
first two sessions. In particular, sea cucumber was of great concern for many operators 
because of its ability to act as a shifting load. It was also well understood that vessels fishing 
for pelagic species are more susceptible to capsizing because of the viscosity of pelagic 
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species in bulk. It should be noted that none of the participants of Roundtable No. 3 fished 
for pelagic species.  
The free surface effect was also discussed extensively, especially in Roundtable No. 
2. It was stated explicitly by a participant in that session that many operators do not 
understand the free surface effect. The fact that the free surface effect was not brought up 
by any participants in Roundtable No. 3 supports this argument. The same participant stated 
his opinion that free surfaces on fishing vessels are the primary cause in the majority of 
capsizing incidents. Other participants discussed dangers due to down-flooding via shipped 
water or leaks. 
Participants of all sessions understood that increasing a vessel’s top weight makes that 
vessel more susceptible to capsizing. As this concept is perhaps the most intuitive, it is not 
surprising that it was well understood. Overloading was rarely mentioned as a significant 
contributor to capsizing events. Overloading, however, was prevalent in the investigation 
reports and was often identified as a primary cause. It was expected by the author that it 
would be taken into greater consideration among participants than it was. 
3. Operator Experience Versus Stability Assessment 
While only some participants felt that inclining tests and stability books were useful, 
the consensus was that operator experience was the best prevention against capsizing. This 
supports the hypothesis that the most effective way to reduce capsizing is to educate 
operators on best practices. This will allow operators who may not have as much 
experience to still make informed decisions in regards to the stability of their vessel. 
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Further, this would give experienced operators with no formal training an improved 
understanding of vessel stability and a greater awareness to the risk of capsizing.  
4. Openness to Education and Training  
One of the most important conclusions of the roundtable sessions was participant 
openness to educational programs focusing on vessel stability. There was consensus 
amongst participants across all demographics that education is beneficial. Even those with 
little understanding of stability supported a program that would provide them with 
additional training.  As this is the demographic that would likely benefit the most from an 
educational program, this response was encouraging. It was suggested in Roundtable No. 
3 that a program consist of classroom sessions with an instructor.  
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6.0 Discussion 
Results obtained from the research presented in section 5.0 are discussed in detail 
below. Identifying the primary causes of fishing vessel capsizing events was an important 
deliverable for this study. The results discussed in section 5.1.1 are revisited and 
commented on in section 6.6. Discussions with operators during interviews and 
roundtables provided an opportunity to explore the idea of near miss reporting in the fishing 
industry. While the development of a near miss reporting process was not a primary 
objective of the current research, the process is thought to offer promise. Interviews also 
provided an assessment of the understanding of vessel stability among operators in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. These findings are discussed and important trends are 
highlighted. Finally, the possible relationships between the primary causes of capsizing 
and operators’ understanding of stability are established and examined.  
6.1 Fatality Rates for Fishing Vessel Capsizing Events in Canada (2004-
2017)  
The trends of sinking/capsizing accidents were analyzed using Canada’s TSB data 
from 2004-2017. Note that fatalities due to sinking and capsizing have been included in 
the same category. This is because there are inconsistencies in the TSB’s database in 
regards to categorizing an accident as a “sinking” as opposed to “capsizing.”  However, 
because the causes of sinking and capsizing are often the same, and often both capsizing 
and sinking occur during the same incident, it is appropriate to include them in the same 
category. The data is available in Transport Canada’s Marine Occurrence spreadsheet that 
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the organization releases every month. The data includes all marine accidents in Canada 
from 2004 up to and including the respective month the data is released. 
According to the TSB, of the 11,218 total marine accidents, 5,027 were fishing vessel 
accidents (44.8%). Further, there were 248 fatalities in the marine industry during this time 
period. Of the total number of fatalities, 152 occurred on fishing vessels, accounting for 
61.3% of all fatalities.  
As per Table 20, of the 5,027 accidents involving fishing vessels, only 219 were due 
to sinking/capsizing (4.4%). However, of the 152 fishing vessel fatalities listed by the TSB, 
a disproportionate number is attributed to sinking/capsizing. 70 fatalities were the result of 
fishing vessels sinking/capsizing, or 46.1% of all fishing vessel fatalities. The ratio of the 
number of fatalities due to sinking/capsizing and the number of sinking or capsizing events 
supports the statistics presented by Loughran et al. (2002). 
 
Table 20: Fishing Vessel Capsizes from TSB (2004-2017) 
6.2 Capsizing Trends in Canada (2004-2017) 
The same data used to examine fatality rates for capsizing events was also studied to 
identify trends in the number of capsize events. The number of capsizes and number of 
fatalities from capsizes were tabulated for each year. The results are presented in Table 21. 
Employment of fish harvesters in Canada over the same time period was also included.  
Total Number of Accidents 11,218 Number of Fishing Vessel Accidents 5,027
Number of Fishing Vessel Accidents 5,027 Number of Fishing Vessel Stability Related Accidents 219
Percentage 44.8 Percentage 4.4
Total Number of Fatalities 248 Number of Fishing Vessel Fatalities 152
Total Number of Fishing Vessel Fatalities 152 Number of Fishing Vessel Stability Related Accident Fatalities 70
Percentage 61.3 Percentage 46.1
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Table 21: Capsizes and Capsizing Fatalities in Canada (2004-2017) 
The number of capsizes and the number of fatalities from capsizes each year were 
totalled to determine any observable trends. Capsizes – and fatalities from capsizes – are 
relatively rare. As expected from rare events, the number fluctuates greatly from year to 
year; for both sets of data there is a high coefficient of variation. While there is noise in the 
data, both events had decreasing trends from 2004 to 2017. See Figure 4 and Figure 5. 
 
 
Year Employment
No. of 
Capsizings
No. of Capsizings/10,000 
Operators Employed
No. of 
Fatalities
No. of Fatalities/10,000 
Operators Employed
2004 53,770 22 4.1 13 2.4
2005 52,805 19 3.6 11 2.1
2006 51,677 22 4.3 6 1.2
2007 53,820 13 2.4 1 0.2
2008 52,107 23 4.4 10 1.9
2009 52,812 10 1.9 6 1.1
2010 45,069 15 3.3 1 0.2
2011 50,920 7 1.4 0 0.0
2012 49,609 12 2.4 1 0.2
2013 43,250 14 3.2 6 1.4
2014 45,904 20 4.4 2 0.4
2015 40,940 13 3.2 6 1.5
2016 42,507 19 4.5 6 1.4
2017 44,342 10 2.3 1 0.2
% Change Trendline -22.7 -35.3 -13.7 -81.4 -68.5
Slope -958 -0.5165 -0.0367 -0.5275 -0.0815
Intercept 55,724 19.516 3.5099 8.956 1.6292
Average 48538.0 15.6 3.2 5.0 1.0
Standard Deviation 4470.6 5.0 0.99 4.0 0.8
Coefficient of Variation 9.2 31.7 30.5 80.7 76.2
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Figure 4: Capsizes in Canada from 2004 - 2017 
 
Figure 5: Capsizing Fatalities in Canada from 2004 – 2017 
In order to determine a possible explanation for the reduction in capsizes and fatalities, 
employment statistics for fish harvesters was taken into account. The number of people 
employed as fish harvesters in a given year is the best parameter available to estimate 
operator exposure. The number of vessel hours spent operating would provide a better 
assessment of the average operator’s true exposure but these statistics were not available. 
There was insufficient data available to accurately estimate the number of operator hours 
spent fishing for a given year. Therefore, it is assumed that the number of hours fishing per 
employed individual remains constant from year to year.  
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Figure 6: Fish Harvester Employment in Canada from 2004 – 2017 
As seen in Figure 6, employment of operators in Canada has declined from 2004 to 
2017. As reflected in the coefficient of determination (R2), the employment statistics have 
less variation than capsizing and fatality data. This is expected given that the employment 
numbers are three orders of magnitude greater than the frequency of capsizing and 
fatalities. 
The impact that employment/exposure has on the frequency of capsizing was assessed 
by calculating “Capsizing per 10,000 Operators Employed.” This normalized the 
capsizing/fatality data to determine the correlation between the frequency of accidents and 
operator exposure. A trend line that is constant would suggest that the decrease in accidents 
directly corresponds to the reduction in exposure. However, as per Figure 7 and Figure 8, 
the normalized data still decreased from 2004 to 2017. The fact that the normalized data is 
decreasing suggests that the reduction in capsizing may be attributed to more than simply 
a reduction in exposure. However, the role of exposure’s impact on accidents is still 
significant, as can be seen in Table 21. Specifically, the reduction in incidents as described 
in the trend line for the “No. of Capsizes” and “No. of Capsizes per 10,000 Operators 
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Employed” decreased from 32.5% to 12.5%3. Single linear regression analysis was 
performed to establish trend lines for each set of data. 
 
Figure 7: Capsizes/10,000 Operators Employed in Canada from 2004 - 2017 
 
Figure 8: Capsizing Fatalities/10,000 Operators Employed in Canada from 2004 – 2017 
6.2.1 Hypothesis Testing on the Slope of the Regression Line  
In order to determine if the downward trend in Figure 7 is statistically significant, it 
was necessary to perform hypothesis testing on the slope of the regression line. This 
analysis quantifies the likelihood that the slope of the line is simply a result of noise in the 
                                                 
3 From Figure 4, the value of the trend line in the year 2004 is 19.9. In 2017, the value is 12.8. This is a 32.5% 
reduction. The same exercise using the trend line from Figure 7 shows a 12.5% reduction from 2004 to 2017. 
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data over the years that sample data was available as opposed to an actual trend in capsizing 
events. A null hypothesis was established that stated the slope of the regression line was 0. 
If the probability of the slope being 0 given the observed slope in Figure 7 is less than 5%, 
the null hypothesis can be rejected. If this is the case, the alternative hypothesis, that the 
slope is less than zero, is assumed to be true. The results of the hypothesis test show that 
there is a 70% chance the slope of the regression line is statistically significant and not a 
result of fluctuations in the data. Details of the calculation are in Appendix D. 
Given that capsizes are rare events, the sample size was relatively small, and there was 
a small coefficient of determination, the conclusions from the hypothesis test are not 
surprising. While the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with significant confidence, its 
result says that there is 70% likelihood that there exists a decreasing linear relationship 
between the number of capsizes in a given year and the respective year. Otherwise stated, 
it is likely that there is a trend in capsizes independent from operator exposure.  
6.2.2 Possible Explanation for Trend – Training in Canada 
The results from the hypothesis test suggest that there is a trend in capsize events that 
is independent of operator exposure. One possible account for this trend is formal stability 
training. As per section 3.2, since 2007, operators obtaining a Fishing Master Fourth Class 
certificate have to undergo formal stability training. The number of operators holding this 
certification is significant in Canada. Although exact statistics are unavailable, estimates 
can be made based on data available from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (2016). 
From 2006 to 2008, approximately half of all fishing vessels registered in Canada were 
less than 35 feet, and approximately 40% were between 35 and 45 feet. Typically, these 
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vessels are less than 100T and operate in coastal waters. Thus, the highest certification 
operators of these vessels are likely to have is a Fishing Master Fourth Class.  
Given the distribution of vessel size in Canada, it is hypothesized that the majority of 
operators hold at most, a Fourth Class ticket. Alterations made to the training program in 
2007 are therefore likely to have a significant impact on the likelihood of an operator 
understanding basic stability principles. It is suggested that this increase in the training 
requirements for operators obtaining a licence post 2007 is responsible, at least in part, to 
the trend that was observed in fishing vessel capsizes from 2004 to 2017. 
6.3 Relationship between Vessel Size and Capsizing 
The frequency of incidents of fishing vessels in five-foot length intervals was 
compared to determine if there was any trend relating vessel length to likelihood of 
capsizing. As per Figure 9, the probability of capsizing depends little on the size of the 
vessel. The drop off after 85 feet in length is likely due to the fact that 98% of fishing 
vessels worldwide are less than 24m (78.7 feet) in length (Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 
2018). From the investigation reports studied, there was no definitive trend relating vessel 
size to the likelihood of capsizing. 
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Figure 9: Capsizing by Vessel Length 
6.4 Operator Stability Knowledge Trends 
In order to identify any trends in operator stability knowledge, interview and 
roundtable participants were assigned a “Stability Knowledge Index” of -1, 0, or 1. The 
index attempted to quantify a participant’s knowledge of stability and awareness of the risk 
of capsizing. A knowledge index of 1 represented a participant that showed a strong 
understanding of stability principles, while -1 represented a participant that displayed a 
lack of understanding. The primary indicator of an individual’s stability knowledge was 
their awareness of the relationship between stability and a vessel’s motions. Participants’ 
perceptions of the risk of capsizing were also taken into account when assigning knowledge 
indices. This was a completely subjective exercise. There was no quantitative data 
collected to calculate knowledge indices. Stability indices for participants can be found in 
Table 22. The table’s categories are explained in the following sections. 
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Table 22: Interview and Roundtable Participants Stability Knowledge Index 
In order to identify trends to predict the likelihood of an operator possessing a strong 
understanding of stability, the stability knowledge indices were plotted against some of the 
other variables collected during the study. 
Participant
Experience/10
(years)
Vessel Length/10
(m)
Stability Training
(yes/no)
Distance from St. 
John's 
Stability 
Knowledge 
Index
1 2.7 1.83 1 91 1
2 3.8 1.98 1 938 1
3 3.3 1.74 1 106 1
4 2.5 1.98 1 90 1
5 3.8 1.98 1 938 1
6 5.2 1.37 0 133 0
7 4 1.98 1 420 1
8 2.6 2.13 1 90 1
9 1.4 1.52 1 131 0
10 4 1.07 0 131 -1
11 5.5 1.22 0 131 -1
12 3.5 1.07 0 163 0
13 4 1.19 0 130 0
14 3.2 1.19 0 130 0
15 3 1.22 0 85 -1
16 5 1.07 0 85 -1
17 3.5 1.37 1 286 1
18 5.2 1.19 0 13 1
19 2.5 1.98 1 108 1
20 4.2 1.19 1 90 1
21 3 1.98 1 11 1
22 3 1.22 0 165 0
23 3.5 1.37 0 651 0
24 3.5 1.07 0 651 -1
25 4.3 0.67 0 770 -1
26 3 1.07 0 234 -1
27 3 1.22 0 290 1
28 0.2 1.07 0 388 -1
29 1.4 1.07 0 378 -1
30 1.8 0.58 0 388 -1
31 0.5 1.07 0 388 -1
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6.4.1 Experience versus Stability Knowledge 
The first analysis was of operator experience and stability knowledge. The two 
variables were plotted and a trend line was included. Operators’ years of experience has 
been divided by 10 for clarity. The coefficient of determination of 0.027 in Figure 10 
suggests that there is little correlation between operator experience and stability 
knowledge. 
 
Figure 10: Experience vs Stability Knowledge 
6.4.2 Vessel Length versus Stability Knowledge 
The length of an operator’s vessel was plotted against stability knowledge. As per 
Figure 11, the correlation coefficient of 0.535 is relatively high. This suggests that vessel 
length and stability knowledge are, at least somewhat, correlated. As per section 3.2, 
requirements for stability training are based largely on vessel length. Therefore, a 
correlation between vessel length and stability knowledge is expected.  
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Figure 11: Vessel Length vs Stability Knowledge 
6.4.3 Operator Training versus Stability Knowledge 
The third variable that was analyzed was operator training. This variable was binary: 
an operator who had completed some form of stability training was assigned a value of 1 
in the third column of Table 22 and an untrained operator was assigned a value of 0. There 
were six possible combinations of operator training and operator stability index, shown in 
Table 23. The table shows that there is a strong relationship between training and operator 
knowledge. 11 operators who did not have any stability training had stability indices of     -
1. Conversely, 11 operators who had stability training had indices of 1. 
 
Table 23: Stability Knowledge Indices of Trained and Untrained Operators 
The correlation between training and knowledge can also be seen by plotting the two 
variables and observing the trend line. Figure 12 has a correlation coefficient of 0.600. This 
Stability 
Knowledge Index
Number of 
Operators without 
Training
Number of 
Operators with 
Training
-1 11 0
0 6 1
1 2 11
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suggests that a correlation exists between the amount of training an operator has received 
and their level of stability knowledge. 
 
Figure 12: Operator Training vs Stability Knowledge 
6.4.4 Distance from St. John’s vs Stability Knowledge 
Participants’ locations were plotted against indices. Each participants’ location was 
measured as the distance they lived from St. John’s. The Marine Institute, which offers 
courses for Fishing Master certification, is located in St. John’s. The analysis was 
conducted to determine if operators living closer to the Marine Institute are more likely to 
have better understanding of stability than those that those that live further away due to 
proximity or more availability of training. As per Figure 13, the correlation coefficient of 
0.011 suggests a weak correlation between the two variables. The distance an operator lives 
from St. John’s (and in effect, the Marine Institute) does not appear to have a significant 
impact on stability knowledge and risk awareness.  
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Figure 13: Distance from St. John's vs Stability Knowledge 
6.4.5 Summary of Trends 
The two variables with the most significant impact on operator stability knowledge 
were vessel length and training. These variables are not independent, as requirements for 
training are based largely on the size of a vessel. Experience or the distance an individual 
lived from St. John’s did not appear to have a significant impact. 
6.5 Near Miss Investigation  
Near misses were investigated to supplement data on common causes of fishing vessel 
capsizes. As per Table 13, the most prevalent common cause identified from near misses 
obtained during interviews and roundtables was operators’ practice. This cause played a 
significant role in 11 of the 13 near misses documented. This figure aligns with the causes 
identified from analysis of investigation reports, as operators’ practice contributed to 57 of 
the 60 investigation reports studied.  
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Thirteen near misses were documented from discussions with 314 fishing vessel 
operators. The frequency of near miss events suggests that they are common among 
operators. However, the data collection methods of interviews and roundtable were not 
effective means of generating a large number of near miss events to supplement 
investigation reports. As per work by Wright and van der Schaaf (2004) and Jones at al 
(1999), there is a proportional number of near misses to reported accidents. While the exact 
ratio is disputed, it is agreed that there is a significantly higher number of near misses than 
reported accidents. As there were only 31 discussions with operators compared to 60 
investigation reports analyzed, it was unlikely there would have been more near misses 
collected than accident reports. 
While interviews and roundtables proved to be an effective means to assess operator’s 
understanding of stability and provided 13 near misses, there are likely more effective ways 
to gather near miss information. This will be explored further in section 7.2. 
6.5.1 Annual Probability of a Near Miss Incident 
The number of near misses collected during this study (13) was divided by the total 
years of experience of all operators who participated in roundtables and interviews (1001). 
This provided the annual probability of a near miss (APN): 
𝐴𝑃𝑁 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
 
This calculation provided an annual probability of a near miss of 0.013 near 
misses/operator years. As per Table 21, there were over 44,000 operators employed in 
                                                 
4 One operator participated in both the interview sessions and roundtable discussions (Interview Participant 
7)  
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Canada in 2017. Multiplying this umber by the APN obtained in this study provides an 
estimate of 575.9 capsizing near miss events occurring in Canada in 2017. The number of 
capsizes in 2017 was 10. This provided a ratio of accidents to near misses of approximately 
1:58. This proportion of accidents to near misses aligns with research by Jones et al. (1999) 
that discusses the dependant relationship between the two variables.  
6.6 Primary Causes of Capsizing 
The primary causes of fishing vessel capsizing events were divided into four main 
categories. These were identified from analysis of investigation reports in section 5.1 (see 
that section for a more detailed description of each of the primary causes). The decisions 
of operators played a role in all of the primary causes of capsizing incidents. This included 
direct operational decisions as the most common cause, covered by unsafe loading, 
operating with a free surface or with watertight integrity of the vessel knowingly 
compromised, and operating in harsh weather.  These causes were identified in the 
published reports and also figured significantly in the reported near miss cases. 
The other common causes of capsizing incidents were indirect operator decisions 
covered by unsafe modifications, lack of maintenance and minor design changes. These 
covered items such as owner installed equipment that significantly increased the center of 
gravity or alterations to the vessel’s displacement and/or freeboard. In many cases, owners 
had an initial stability book approved for the vessel by their respective government’s 
transportation officials. Following approval, owners would proceed to modify their vessel 
without accounting for the effect that the changes had on stability. Poor maintenance 
encompassed compromised watertight integrity and non-operational bilge pumps and 
alarm systems. The most significant example of hazardous minor design changes 
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concerned freeing ports. In many cases, the areas of the freeing ports were insufficient, 
flaps were missing, or the flaps were welded shut, all rendering the freeing ports 
ineffective. 
In this way, issues or decisions that were in the control of the owner/operator covered 
the vast majority of capsizing cases. The nature of fishing and the operation of fishing 
vessels provides an operator with a great deal of discretion in terms of the operations of, or 
modifications to, the vessel. Consequently, the safety of the vessel is, for the most part, in 
the hands of the operator. Thus, it is important that the operators and crew understand the 
stability related consequences of their decisions as the first line of defence against 
capsizing. 
6.6.1 Example of Operator’s Practice 
The capsizing of the Hope Bay is an example of poor practice contributing to the 
capsizing of a vessel (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2004). The Hope Bay was a 
commercial fishing trawler with a length and gross tonnage of 72.6 feet and 126T, 
respectively. On February 26, 2004, the Hope Bay capsized and all four crew members 
died. The vessel was a small fishing vessel and was not required by Transport Canada to 
have any stability analysis. The owners, however, had a stability report approved in 1982 
that stated that the maximum amount of ballast in the water tank be 5T. Beyond this 
amount, the TSB investigation report states, the vessel would have insufficient freeboard.  
Post-accident analysis determined that the vessel most likely exceeded the 5T limit as 
described in the stability book. This led to a reduced freeboard which resulted in shipped 
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water from wind and waves. In three to four metre waves, the vessel eventually flooded 
and capsized.  
The Hope Bay is an example of stability books not being a useful tool to prevent 
capsizing because they are not well understood by operators. The operators did not follow 
the prescriptions of the stability analysis, probably as a result of a lack of understanding of 
vessel stability and/or the effect of raising or lowering the center of gravity or the impact 
of a free surface on the vessel’s motions. Without this understanding, operators are more 
likely to make poor decisions despite having a stability book.  
6.6.2 Example of Unsafe Modifications  
An example of unsafe modifications is the capsizing of the Caledonian off the coast 
of Nookta Sound, BC on September 5, 2015 (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 
2016). The vessel capsizing led to the deaths of three of the four crew members. The 
Caledonian was built in 1975 with a length and gross tonnage of 30.63m and 259.92T, 
respectively. The vessel was therefore required to meet stability regulations outlined in the 
Large Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations (LFVIR). The regulations were met in 1976 
and the stability book was approved by Transport Canada. 
Over the years, however, the lightship weight of the vessel significantly increased. In 
1976, the stability assessment was performed with the lightship weight of 276T. By 2015, 
it was estimated that the weight had increased approximately 18% to 327T. The increase 
was gradual over the lifetime of the vessel and was attributed to, among other things, the 
addition of a net drum and trawl, empty space being used to store excess equipment, and 
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water absorption in the fish holds. The increase in the vessel weight resulted in an increase 
in the height of the vessel’s center of gravity and a reduction in the freeboard. 
An updated light ship weight estimation of the Caledonian was not performed until 
the post-accident stability analysis following the capsizing in 2015. Analysis with the 
updated lightship weight concluded that the vessel no longer met the LFVIR regulations 
and the previous stability analysis was no longer valid. However, modifications to the 
vessel were never monitored and operations continued while the vessel’s stability was 
continually reduced throughout its life. This series of effectively unsafe modifications that 
increased the vessel displacement was a contributing factor to the capsizing of the 
Caledonian. The fact that modifications were made over the lifetime of the vessel with no 
additional stability work suggests that the owner and/or crew were unaware of the effect 
that the modifications had on the stability of the vessel. 
6.6.3 Example of Lack of Maintenance 
Maintaining the seaworthiness of a vessel is the responsibility of the owner. An 
example of a lack of vessel maintenance is the Lannie and Sisters II (Transportation Safety 
Board of Canada, 2008). The Lannie and Sisters II was a small fishing vessel with a length 
and gross tonnage of 31.6 feet and 14.7T, respectively. On September 17, 2006, the vessel 
capsized “in good weather conditions,” resulting in the deaths of two crew members. At 
the time of the accident, there was an ingress of water through the propeller shaft seal. The 
vessel had gone into dry dock to repair the leak but the problem persisted following repairs. 
The leak was made worse by vibrations due to damaged propellers. According to the TSB 
report, the owner and crew were aware of the problem but decided to continue operations. 
Furthermore, of the six pumps on the vessel, only one was operational. The TSB also 
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questioned the integrity of the single operating pump because the wiring was of household 
grade held together with electrical tape as opposed to a marine grade connection. Because 
the vessel had a gross tonnage of less than 15T, it was not required to undergo any 
inspections by Transport Canada. 
The leak in the stuffing box resulted in the vessel taking on water. Because of the 
reduced pump capacity, the crew were not able to rid the vessel of the water. The water 
reduced the vessel’s stability by introducing a free surface effect and reduced freeboard. 
The vessel also had an inherent 5° list to starboard that would have increased as the water 
was taken on. The TSB report concludes that this was the most likely cause of the vessel 
sinking/capsizing in good weather. The fact that the vessel was operated with such poor 
upkeep suggests that the operators did not understand the effect that shipped water had on 
the vessel’s stability. The risk that was taken by operating the vessel in such poor shape 
could have been avoided with a better understanding of stability. 
6.6.4 Example of Small Scale Design 
An example of poor design contributing to the capsizing of a vessel is the capsizing of 
the Lannie & Sisters II as discussed in the previous section (Transportation Safety Board 
of Canada, 2008).  Upon recovery of the vessel it was discovered that the freeing ports had 
no flaps to prevent the ingress of water through freeing ports that had been cut into the hull. 
This would have led to an increase of the ingress of water. 
6.6.5 Multiple Causes: Capsizing of the Melina & Keith II 
Rarely can capsizing be attributed to a single cause. As per Table 8 and Table 9, in 
many cases, it is often a combination of causes that leads to a vessel capsizing. This is 
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illustrated by the Melina & Keith II capsizing incident. The Melina & Keith II was a small 
fishing vessel operating off the coast of Bonavista, NL, when it capsized on September 12, 
2005. The Melina and Keith II had a length and gross tonnage of 61.6 feet and 126.6T, 
respectively. Prior to capsizing, the crew were hauling nets through doors on the starboard 
side of the vessel. The TSB report notes that during hauling operations, the vessel had a 
starboard list. When approximately half of the nets were on board, there was a “moderate 
roll to starboard” that resulted in about 5cm of shipped water. The pumps were able to 
handle the initial shipped water and the vessel recovered. A short time later, another 
starboard roll occurred and the vessel took on 15-20cm of water, which the pumps could 
not handle. With a heavy list, the vessel rolled once more and water entered the vessel 
“steadily” through the hauling door. As the crew rushed to the port side of the vessel, the 
Melina & Keith II capsized. Four of the eight crew members on board at the time of the 
accident died (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2007).  
As per TSB’s investigation report, multiple causes played a role in the capsizing of the 
Melina and Keith II. An important contributing factor was operator’s poor practice in 
loading the vessel. First of all, the vessel had an inherent starboard list that was most likely 
due to asymmetrical placement of fixed weights on the vessel.  This list was worsened 
further by loading fish, shrimp, and ice in the port and starboard pens. The TSB reported 
that the weight of the contents in the starboard side pen was approximately 3T greater than 
that of the port side pen. The effect of the list on the vessel was detrimental to stability 
because it reduced the vessel’s righting moment and freeboard on the starboard side. 
Furthermore, the vessel was considered heavily loaded at the time of the capsizing. This 
reduced the vessel’s freeboard and made it more susceptible to shipped water. In the case 
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of the Melina and Keith II, the operator’s poor practice is twofold: first, operating with an 
inherent starboard list makes the vessel more vulnerable to capsize for the reasons 
mentioned previously. Second, the original list was worsened by unsafe loading. These 
poor practices suggest that the operator lacked an adequate knowledge of stability and the 
detrimental effects that improper loading can have on a vessel.  
While the operator’s actions undoubtedly played a large role in the capsizing of the 
Melina and Keith II, unsafe modifications were also reported to have reduced the vessel’s 
initial stability and put it at a greater risk of capsizing. In 2000, the TSB reports, the vessel 
underwent major modifications that increased the displacement and the vertical center of 
gravity of the vessel. Not only did this reduce the vessel’s freeboard, but the increase in the 
center of gravity reduced the transverse stability. Finally, the freeing ports of the vessel 
were welded shut during these modifications. This would prove hazardous as it prevented 
any shipped water from clearing from the deck and the free surface effect from the shipped 
water further reduced the vessel’s transverse stability.  
As there was no stability assessment performed following the modifications in 2000, 
it can be concluded that the modifications were made without consideration of the potential 
impact on the vessel’s stability. The decision to not perform stability work following 
modifications that substantially increased the vessel’s displacement is indicative that the 
owner lacked knowledge of the significance of the changes on the vessel stability. The 
design decision to weld freeing ports shut also suggests that owner did not consider, or was 
not aware of, the free surface effect of the shipped water that could be not be cleared 
without freeing ports.  
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The TSB’s report also discussed the fact that as a small fishing vessel, the Melina & 
Keith II was not required to submit stability data and still met the regulations of the SFVIR. 
As discussed by the TSB, the Melina & Keith II, like many other SFVs, was at a greater 
risk of capsize than vessels meeting other class requirements (such as the Large Fishing 
Vessel Inspection Regulations) because of the lax regulations. The vessel’s likelihood of 
capsize was increased due to unsafe modifications and operator’s poor practice, both 
reflecting a lack of understanding of vessel stability and awareness of the risk posed by 
capsizing. 
6.7 Operators’ Understanding of Stability 
Operators’ understanding of stability plays a critical role in a fishing vessel’s safe 
operation. The results of the analysis of investigation reports, roundtables, and interviews 
all provided information that allowed for a general assessment of operators’ understanding 
of stability. 
6.7.1 Investigation Reports 
The four most common contributors to vessel capsizes were identified as operators’ 
practice, unsafe modifications, lack of maintenance, and small scale design flaws. All of 
these causes can be, at least, partially attributed to a lack of understanding of vessel stability 
and awareness of the risk of capsizing.   
Operators’ practice contributed to an overwhelming majority of capsizing events. At 
95%, operators’ practice presents itself as the most significant contributor to a vessel 
capsizing. The decisions operators make while fishing that impact their vessel’s stability 
are likely a reflection of their understanding of vessel stability. The fact that poor loading 
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(and other operators’ decisions) were as prevalent as they were in the analysis suggests a 
lack of understanding of basic stability principles by operators involved in the accidents.  
As capsizing events continue to occur, it is clear that, in the majority of cases, causes 
are a direct result of, or can be linked to, operators not understanding stability. Owners and 
crews unknowingly put themselves in danger. To reduce capsizing incidence, it would be 
most effective to educate owners and operators on stability concepts and effects as related 
to the design and operation of their vessel. Operators should be equipped with sufficient 
knowledge of stability to make informed decisions that will improve safety in the 
commercial fishing industry.  
6.7.2 Interviews and Roundtables – Benefits of Training 
The interviews demonstrated that operators who have received formal stability training 
have a strong understanding of vessel stability. The ability to identify when stability is 
initially poor or has been reduced during operations is necessary to take preventive 
measures to avoid capsizing.  
Operators with formal stability training also tended to be familiar with technical 
concepts such as metacentric height and the free surface effect. They were able to relate 
these concepts to the stability of their vessel and this was reflected in best practices the 
group discussed. Some of the operators were able to use a stability book but rarely did they 
consider it an important tool to ensure that stability was maintained. No operator 
interviewed with stability training felt that stability documentation alone was sufficient to 
ensure a stable vessel. There was consensus among the group that operators’ decisions play 
the most important role in regards to stability.  
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There was a significant discrepancy in the level of knowledge of operators who 
received stability training and those who did not. Operators without formal stability 
training did not demonstrate a strong understanding of stability. This was most obvious 
when no operator in the interview group understood the relationship between comfort and 
stability of a vessel. This suggests that untrained operators may not be aware of a situation 
developing in which their vessel is becoming susceptible to capsizing. 
Some operators, most often with 30 or more years of experience but without stability 
training, mentioned multiple actions they performed to maintain stability that were 
examples of good practice. While they did not understand the technical details, this group 
was generally aware of common hazards that can reduce stability. This indicates that in 
some cases, long experience and intuition has led to good practice.  
Operators without stability training were generally less concerned with capsizing than 
those with stability training.  Untrained operators were also more likely to blame vessel 
design as opposed to operator practice as the primary cause of many capsizing events. This 
again returns to the conclusion that operators without stability training are less aware of 
the risk posed by capsizing. Specifically, they are more likely to assume their vessel is 
stable with less regard to how their actions impact stability.  
Results from roundtables suggested that the level of operators’ understanding of 
stability depends largely on the amount of formal training an operator has received. There 
was an evident discrepancy in the level of knowledge of operators who had received formal 
stability training and those that did not. Further, those with formal training showed a greater 
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awareness of the risk of capsizing. The gap in knowledge between the two groups of 
operators was apparent throughout the roundtables. 
The impact that formal stability training had on operators’ understanding of stability 
was apparent from the interviews and roundtable discussions. From interviews with 
operators, there was a clear divide between operators who had received formal stability 
training and those that had not. Operators with no training did not have as strong an 
understanding of stability and were less concerned with the risk of capsizing. However, 
untrained interview participants appeared as capable operators. Even without training, 
these interview participants were aware of best practices. This alludes to the importance of 
experience concerning safe operation of a fishing vessel. 
From discussions with operators during both the interviews and roundtables, there was 
an observable relationship between an operator’s understanding of vessel stability and the 
amount of stability training received. In general, there was a positive correlation between 
these two variables. Operators who had received some form of technical training showing 
a greater understanding of stability and awareness to the risk of capsizing than those who 
did not.  
6.7.3 Discrepancy in Roundtables and Interviews 
Regarding operators without stability training, there was some discrepancy in the level 
of stability knowledge of interview participants and roundtable participants. Interview 
participants’ knowledge was much more consistent amongst the group, while there was a 
wider spectrum for roundtable participants. There are two factors that have been identified 
as the most probable causes of the discrepancy.  
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First, the influence of other members of roundtable sessions must be considered when 
taking participants’ answers into account. There is a chance that a participant may answer 
a question based on a previous participant’s answer and the group’s reception to that 
answer. Because of this possibility, interviews are considered a more reliable way to assess 
operators’ understanding of stability. 
The second factor is the range of experience of roundtable participants was greater 
than that of interview participants. This provided a correspondingly wide range of 
responses. This illustrates the importance that experience has for operators with no stability 
training. While experience is not a replacement for education, it provides operators with 
valuable intuition that can be used to make informed decisions.  
6.8 The Link between Investigation Reports and Discussions with 
Operators 
Before any recommendations can be made to reduce the frequency of capsizing in NL, 
it is important to establish a link between the results from the analysis of investigation 
reports (section 5.1) and from discussions with operators (sections 5.3 and 5.4).  The 
primary conclusion from the analysis of common causes of fishing vessel capsizes is that 
the decisions and actions of operators have by far the most significant impact on the 
likelihood of a vessel capsizing. This finding is most strongly supported by the statistic that 
operators’ actions played a role in 95% of the capsizes studied. Operators’ actions and 
decisions was the most common primary cause found in the analysis by approximately 
60%. 
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Any operator’s action or decision that increases or reduces the probability of a vessel 
capsizing is likely a reflection of that operator’s understanding of stability. This is 
especially relevant for a capsizing event that is deemed to have occurred due to, at least in 
part, how an operator loaded their vessel. Overloading or added top weight contributed to 
40 of the 60 capsizes studied in section 5.1. It is difficult to attribute these actions to 
anything but a lack of understanding of vessel stability. 
Discussions with operators during both the roundtables and interviews suggested a 
strong correlation between an operators’ understanding of stability and risk awareness and 
the amount of training the operator had received. Therefore, it is probable that an increase 
in training among members of the NL fishing community would result in an overall 
improved understanding of stability. With an improved understanding of stability, the 
number of operators’ decisions that make a vessel more susceptible to capsizing may be 
reduced. Better informed operators will likely reduce the frequency of capsizing in NL. 
The premise that training is the best defense against capsizing is supported by statistics 
analyzed of capsizing events in Canada from 2004 to 2017 (see section 6.2). As described 
in that section, the trend of capsizes per employment suggests that these events are 
declining over that same time frame. A possible explanation for this trend is the fact that 
as of 2007, operators receiving a Fourth Class ticket have been required to undergo formal 
stability training. In order to make a more definitive conclusion, additional analysis that 
accounts for the number of operators who have formal stability training may provide 
stronger evidence but the conclusions from the current study point strongly in the direction 
of operator training.  An increase in the proportion of operators who receive stability 
training should be the most effective means to further reduce capsizes in the future. 
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7.0 Recommendations  
Based on the findings from investigation reports and discussions with operators, the 
most significant root cause of fishing vessel capsizing events is a lack of stability awareness 
on the part of operators. This covers operational actions, vessel modifications and issues 
of maintenance. Operator’s stability awareness, or lack thereof, can be directly linked to 
the amount of formal training received although some fishers with long experience have 
gained similar knowledge and awareness. As the number of operators who receive some 
form of stability training increase, it is likely that the number of stability related incidents 
involving fishing vessels will decrease. Therefore, in order to reduce capsizes of fishing 
vessels in Newfoundland and Labrador, an educational program leading to improved 
awareness knowledge of stability among members of the fishing community is strongly 
recommended.  
Many vessels in Canada do not require operators with any formal stability training 
(DFO, 2016).  Conclusions can be made with reasonable confidence that a significant 
percentage of operators in Canada lack any stability education. Included in this group are 
any operators who received a Fishing Master Fourth Class certificate or less prior to 2007. 
After 2007, training became more extensive with the introduction of the “Ship Stability 
and Construction 1” (SCS-1) course to the Fishing Master Fourth Class certification 
program. As of 2018, certification for vessels not requiring a Fourth Class certificate still 
does not include formal stability training. Refer to section 3.2 for more detail. As 
demonstrated from discussions with operators, operators who have not completed some 
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form of stability training are less likely to have an adequate understanding of vessel 
stability.  
7.1 The Need for Improved Understanding of Stability 
In order to improve both awareness of the risk of capsizing and understanding of 
general stability principles in Newfoundland and Labrador, it is recommended that an 
educational program be put in place for operators who currently have not received formal 
stability training. The program’s main objective would be to better educate operators on 
stability principles and practice with the ultimate aim of avoiding capsizing events. During 
interviews and roundtables, all participants expressed openness (of varying degrees) to an 
educational program with the potential to improve operations. Based on these discussions, 
it is recommended that such a program be offered through an organization such as the 
NLFHSA. Furthermore, groups are more likely to be receptive to any training program that 
is instructed by a fellow operator.  This is based on discussions in which participants 
expressed a lack of regard for those without any fishing experience making regulatory 
decisions.   This view may extend to an instructor. 
The primary deliverables for an educational stability program would be based on what 
is currently being taught in the SCS-1 course that is part of the Fishing Master Fourth Class 
certificate. Operators who are confident and knowledgeable in the components offered by 
this course are much more likely to make decisions while fishing that reduce the likelihood 
of a capsizing event. An outline of the proposed stability program is discussed in section 
8.0 and Table 24. Subject titles are taken directly from Transport Canada’s The 
Examination and Certification of Seafarers 6th Revision section detailing the SCS-1 course 
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of the Fishing Master Fourth Class certificate (p. 261). Extensive details on each subject 
can be found in that document. 
7.2 Other Recommendations 
This research has identified a possible explanation for the trend in decreasing capsizing 
events in Canada and suggests that this trend may be due to improved training among 
fishing vessel operators (see section 6.2.2). This assessment was made while considering 
the number of fatalities reported by TSB and employment numbers in the fishing industry. 
At the same time, fishing vessel operator training requirements were considered. While 
this information allowed for a speculative conclusion to be drawn, it is possible to form a 
more definite and confident conclusion if more information was made available. In 
particular, there was no information available that detailed the number of operators each 
year who had received some form of formal stability training in Canada. This information 
could be applied to the number of capsizing fatalities per employment to make a more 
confident assessment of the role that formal training has on the frequency of capsizing. It 
is recommended that governing bodies such as TC keep track of this statistic to be used for 
future research. 
Documenting near miss capsizing events was an original goal of the project. These 
could be used to supplement investigation reports to identify the most frequent causes of 
capsizing. As discussed in section 2.4, documenting near misses has been used in other 
industries to successfully reduce accidents. In order to supplement investigation reports 
with near misses, the number of near misses should be much higher than the number of 
reported accidents. Recruitment of operators via interviews and roundtables was not an 
effective way to collect near misses.  
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Currently, there is no such near miss reporting system in the Newfoundland and 
Labrador fishery. The introduction and implementation of a system could help to reduce 
not only capsizes in the province, but all types of incidents related to fishing vessels. It has 
been shown in other industries that near miss reporting tends to increase the overall safety 
culture of an operation. An anonymous online reporting system is a potential way to 
document near misses. Operators could use the system to report any near miss events. They 
would describe the incident to the best of their ability. From this description, an investigator 
would make an attempt to attribute a possible cause to the event. If such a system is to be 
implemented successfully, operators must be encouraged to report near miss incidents 
without fear of reprisals from their employers or government officials.  
Possible future work would be the development of a near miss reporting system. If this 
system can record a large number of near misses (compared to accident reports), it will be 
possible to determine common causes of capsizes, and other accidents, with greater 
confidence. A possible impediment to this system may be a lack of incentive for operators 
to report near misses. This aspect should also be included in any future study. 
118 
 
8.0 Outline of Proposed Stability Educational 
Program 
The primary recommendation from this research to reduce capsizing in Newfoundland 
and Labrador is the introduction of a stability education program in the province. In order 
to receive certification from the Professional Fish Harvesters Certification Board 
(PFHCB), operators who have not completed some form of formal stability training would 
be required to complete the program.   The program is made up of two sections: maintaining 
vessel stability and maintaining seaworthiness of a vessel. The subjects in each section 
address all of the causes highlighted in the analysis of capsizing investigation reports 
(section 5.1). Within each section, the program is designed to be followed sequentially as 
presented in Table 24. The program begins by emphasizing basic stability principles. Once 
participants have a strong grasp on this aspect, they would move towards applying that 
knowledge to vessel operations. The program totals 40 hours, designed to be separated into 
five eight-hour days. 
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Table 24: Outline for Proposed Stability Educational Program 
It is important that any proposed stability education program address the common 
causes that have been highlighted in section 5.1. Table 25 highlights which module 
addresses these common causes. As is shown in the table, a program covering what is 
currently taught in SCS-1 would effectively address the common causes identified as the 
primary contributors to many fishing vessel capsizes.  
Subject
Estimated 
Duration (Hours)
Subject
Understanding Stability Basic Terminology 4 Fishing Vessel Types
Understanding Transverse Stability Principles 6
Maintain Integrity of the Hull and 
Superstructures and Prevent Water 
Flooding
Effect of Vessel's Operations Including Catch 
Handling
4
Survivability of the Vessel in Case of 
Flooding and Damage Control
Effect of Environmental Conditions on 
Vessel's Stability
4 Vessel Inspection and Maintenance
Effect of Vessels and Gear Modifications on 
Vessel's Stability
4
Estimating the Metacentric Height of a Vessel 
and the Height of the Vessels COG
2
Total 24 Total
Total Duration of Program: 40 Hours
16
Estimated Duration 
(Hours)
1
6
4
5
Outline for Stability Educational Program
Maintain Vessel Stability Maintain Seaworthiness of the Vessel
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Table 25: Common Causes Addressed by Proposed Stability Education Program 
Further to the concepts outlined in the table, the following recommendations are made 
to enhance the likelihood of an educational program being successful in reducing the 
frequency of capsizing events in Newfoundland and Labrador: 
 The course is to be offered through the NLFHSA (or other approved training 
providers). In order for operators to be licenced through the PFHCB, operators 
would have to complete this program if they do not currently hold certificates 
that include formal stability training. 
 The course is to be instructed by a fishing vessel operator with an extensive 
knowledge of vessel stability. As minimum requirement, the instructor is to 
Understanding Stability Basic Terminology
Understanding Transverse Stability Principles  
Effect of Vessel's Operations Including Catch 
Handling

Effect of Environmental Conditions on 
Vessel's Stability

Effect of Vessels and Gear Modifications on 
Vessel's Stability

Estimating the Metacentric Height of a Vessel 
and the Height of the Vessels COG

Fishing Vessel Types
Maintain Integrity of the Hull and 
Superstructures and Prevent Water Flooding
 
Survivability of the Vessel in Case of Flooding 
and Damage Control
  
Vessel Inspection and Maintenance 
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have completed the SCS-2 (a more comprehensive version of SCS-1) course 
and have extensive operating experience. 
 The course should make significant use of demonstrations to illustrate 
technical concepts. Note taking should be kept to a minimum. The course 
should include hands on opportunities for participants. 
 The subject “Understanding Transverse Stability Principles” should have 
sufficient time allotted to discussing the relationship between vessel stability 
and vessel motions. This relationship can seem counterintuitive and is often 
misunderstood by operators if they have not received formal stability training. 
It is dangerous if operators do not understand this basic stability principle 
because they are likely to believe that a “comfortable” vessel implies stability. 
 When covering the free surface effect, the program should discuss in detail the 
detrimental effects of certain types of species that can behave as a liquid. In 
particular, pelagic species were often discussed in the roundtables and 
interviews as posing a significant risk of a shifting load. The dangers of sea 
cucumbers should also be discussed. Sea cucumbers were often brought up in 
discussions with operators as being the most dangerous species to fish for.   
 The program modules are to each incorporate case studies of capsizing events 
using Transportation Safety Board investigation reports. Discussions on the 
causes of each event will highlight the consequences of a lack of stability 
knowledge. 
 The course should emphasize the risk of capsizing to create improved 
awareness among participants. 
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 Participants must receive a passing grade on a written assessment at the end of 
the week. 
 The course could also introduce the idea of near miss reporting as a means of 
improving safety culture and the operations of specific vessels. 
 Following completion of the program, a handbook outlining best practices 
should be given to participants to be used as a reference 
Programs of similar nature have been implemented in BC (Fish Safe’s four-day long 
Stability Education Course) and in the UK (Seafish offers three one-day stability awareness 
courses of varying complexity). These courses address the primary causes of vessel 
capsizes that have been outlined in this study. In particular, they stress the impact that 
loading has on a vessel’s stability and the importance of maintaining watertight integrity. 
The courses are also instructed by fellow harvesters which is an important consideration 
for a similar program in NL. These programs have been implemented successfully and 
there is no reason to believe a similar program could not be utilized in the province to 
improve education and awareness of stability related issues among operators. Equipped 
with a stronger understanding of vessel stability, operators in the province are more likely 
to make better decisions that reduce the likelihood of capsizing their vessel.  
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9.0 Conclusion 
As in many of the world’s developed countries, capsizing of fishing vessels continues 
to pose a problem in Canada. In Newfoundland and Labrador in particular, the tight knit 
fishing community has been hit hard by fatalities from stability related incidents such as 
the Ryan’s Commander, Melina & Keith II, and the Pop’s Pride. As capsizing has one of 
the highest fatality rates among fishing vessel accidents, reducing the frequency of these 
events would likely result in a noteworthy reduction in the number of fatalities in the 
province’s fishing industry. This thesis attempts to take a methodical approach to establish 
a link between the common causes of fishing vessel capsizing and operators’ understanding 
of stability. From the link between these two parameters, the thesis proposes 
recommendations for a stability awareness program to reduce the frequency of fishing 
vessel stability incidents in NL. 
Based on findings from the research, it is recommended that in order to reduce fishing 
vessel capsizing events in NL, stability awareness be improved among operators. This 
could be done through an education program that would be offered through an organization 
such as the NLFHSA. Similar programs have been implemented in other parts of Canada 
and in other countries and there is no reason to believe a stability education program could 
not be successful in NL. The program should be aimed towards operators who are currently 
not required to undergo formal stability training by Transport Canada. In order to be 
certified as a professional fish harvester in Newfoundland and Labrador, it is recommended 
that these operators complete a program similar to one that has been outlined in section 
8.0.  
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While the risk of capsizing will never be completely eliminated in the fishing industry, 
it can be reduced through improved education and awareness. To reiterate what was 
brought up in a roundtable session by an operator: “Education awareness allows you to 
take a calculated risk as opposed to a blind risk.” 
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Appendix A: Roundtable Outline 
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Capsize Prevention for Fishing Vessels: Focus Group Outline 
Outline for Focus Group 
Introduction 
- Welcome participants and thank them for coming 
- Pass out consent form and allow participants to read over them. Discuss and answer 
any questions they may have 
Begin session 
- Go around the table. Each participant begins with the following: 
 name 
 where they live/where they fish 
 how long they’ve been fishing 
 what type of vessel(s) they use 
 what type of fisheries/species are they involved in 
- What does it mean to have a stable vessel? 
 How do you know/determine if your vessel is stable? 
 What things do you consider in determining the stability of your vessel? 
 Is your vessel equipped with a stability book? Do you think the stability 
books are useful? 
 What’s more important: Initial/inherent vessel stability or operators’ 
operations? 
- How do you maintain the stability of your vessel? 
 What do you do to maintain the stability of your vessel? 
 Do you always do/consider these things? If not, why not? 
 Do you think most operators do/consider these things? If not, why not? 
- What poses the largest risk to the stability of a vessel? 
 In your opinion and experience, what are the things that pose the 
largest/greatest risk to fishing vessel stability and capsizing? 
 In your opinion and experience, what are the most common things that pose 
a risk to fishing vessel stability and capsizing? 
 Introduce case study of capsizing? What’s your opinion of the situation? 
Could it have been prevented? How? 
 Use TSB report 
- Have there been instances when you have felt: 1) that the vessel’s stability was 
compromised or 2) that your vessel was close to capsizing? 
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 What happened? 
 In your opinion, why did it happen? 
 How often? 
 Is this common in the fishing industry? 
- What would you consider the most effective way to reduce/prevent the loss of 
stability or capsizing?  
 Stability books/stability testing? 
 Formal stability training? 
 Encouraging (through education/awareness) stability best practices? 
- Have you completed any type of training in vessel stability or stability best 
practices?  
 Would you be interested in a course/training on vessel stability? Why or 
why not? 
 What type of course do you think would be most effective? 
 Do you think other harvesters would be interested in such a program? 
 What do you think of BC’s Safe Catch program? Could something similar 
be implemented in NL? Why or why not? 
Wrap up session 
- Thank everyone for their time 
- Provide contact information 
- Explain that I’m interested in individual interviews with anyone who has had a near 
miss. They can contact me privately if they’d be interested in participating 
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Appendix B-1: Capsizing Incident Report’s Vessel 
Details
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Date
No
1 Ryan's Commander M04N0086 149.4 19.79 64.93 7.32 SFV 9/19/2004 35-48 3-4
2 Lannie & Sisters II M06N0074 14.7 9.63 31.59 NA SFV 9/17/2006 5-15 N/A
3 Melina & Keith II M05N0072 126.62 18.78 61.61 NA SFV 9/12/2005 10-15 2
4 Big Sister M07M0088 13.54 10.7 35.10 NA SFV 11/13/2007 20-25 1-2
5 Cape Fin-Tose M06N0082 98.5 19.79 64.93 NA SFV 11/1/2006 5 Calm Seas
6 L' Acadien II M08M0010 34.36 12.56 41.21 NA SFV 3/29/2008 10-15 N/A
7 Strait's Pride II M90N5017 93 19.83 65.06 6.64 SFV 12/17/1990 30-45 4-6
8 Miss Cat Harbour M97N0093 11.9 14.9 48.88 NA SFV 7/14/1997 5-10 Calm Seas
9 Cap Rouge II M02W0147 47.3 14.7 48.23 NA SFV 8/13/2002 17 1-1.5
10 Hope Bay M04W0034 126 22.1 72.51 NA SFV 2/26/2004 16-21 2
11 Prospect Point M04W0225 70.2 18.29 60.01 NA SFV 10/29/2004 10 N/A
12 Ocean Tor M05W0141 99.7 23.16 75.98 N/A Fishing Vessel 7/26/2005 20-25 2
13 Sea Urchin M07N0117 <15 10.64 34.91 N/A SFV 4/11/2007 35 1 - No stability work required or performed
'- Post accident analysis showed that the vessel didn't meet STAB 4 criteria.
- No stability work required or performed
- No stability work required or performed
- Inclining experiment performed
- Two stability books written and submitted for approval at the time of capsize: one for shrimp and crab; another 
for herring, capelin, or mackerel. Both booklets met TC regulations
- No stability work required or performed
- No stability work required or performed
- Not required to submit stability data but inclincing tests were performed in 1974 and, following modifications, in 
1987.
- Not required to submit stability data, but a stability report was approved in 1982 which stated that the vessel mus 
tnot have more than 5 Te of water ballast under fully loaded conditions to ensure sufficient freeboard
- Not required to submit stability data but stabiility data was submitted and approved following construction of the 
vessel in 1978.
- The vessel was lengthened in 1986 and a revised stability book was submitted. Thisr report noted errors found in 
the original stability book regarding the location of the COG and draft. TC requested that additional work be 
performed for "worst operating conditions" with updated parameters. However, there is no record that these 
calculations were ever performed or submitted.
- The revised stability booklet was never used by the vessel. It was stamped and returned to the naval architect. 
At the time of capsizie, the original stability booklet was still being used. It was invalid at that time.
Length
 (ft)
Report Number
Weather Stability
Stability Work 
Performed
Vessel
- Not required to perform any stability work as per SFVIR
- Optional abbreviated inclining experiment performed by NA. Not as thorough as tests required by TC.
 Result was Not accurate because incorrect displacement was used.
- RC was compared to "Elite Voyager" which had stability work done and met TC regulations. But dimensions of 
vessels did not agree.
- Post accident analysis showed various criteria below SFVIR stab 4 criteria, most notably the range of positive 
transverse stability
Vessel Name
Gross Tonnage
(Te)
Length
 (m)
Beam 
(m)
Vessel 
Class
Date
dd/mm/yyyy
Wind
(knots)
Wave Height
(m)
- No stability work required or performed
- In 1982, an inclining experiment was performed and two stability books were submitted: one for herring packer 
and one for bottom dragging. The latter was not a requirement and only stamped "noted". The former was 
approved.
'- Modifications were made in 1990. A naval architect estimated new loading conditions in order for the vessel to 
meet stability requirements. A inclining experiment was supposed to be performed following modifications but 
there is no record of this occuring.
Canada
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14 Love and Anarchy M08W0189 14.57 10.82 35.50 N/A SFV 9/4/2008 13 1.5
15 Le Marsouin I M09L0074 24.58 14.57 47.80 N/A SFV 5/18/2009 10-15 1.5
16 Craig and Justin M10M0014 14.63 11.72 38.45 N/A SFV 5/1/2010 N/A Calm Seas
17 Jessie G M12W0054 14.66 11.7 38.39 N/A SFV 5/4/2012 N/A Heavy Seas
18 Pacific Siren M12W0062 14.55 10.58 34.71 N/A SFV 5/9/2012 14-20 1.2-1.4
19 Caledonian M15P0286 259.92 30.63 100.49 N/A Fishing Trawler 9/5/2015 15 1
20 Lady Devine M94W0026 12.9 10.97 35.99 N/A SFV 4/14/1994 25-30 1
21 Courageous M95W0025 44 17 55.77 N/A SFV 6/20/1995 20-30 N/A
22 Dalewood Provider M95W0222 39 15.22 49.93 N/A SFV 12/10/1995 38 "High"
23 Stephane P II M96L0037 9.89 7 22.97 N/A SFV 4/27/1996 "Calm" 0.6
24 Inskip M95W0121 34.7 16 52.49 N/A SFV 8/29/1995 N/A "Clear and Calm 
Seas"
25 3J'S '93 (THE) M96M0128 14 11.58 37.99 N/A SFV 9/23/1996 20-25 "Rough and 
Confused Seas"
26 CFV 151816 M97N0067 N/A 8.6 28.22 2.6 SFV 01/15/1997 20-25 2-3
27 C19496NB M16A0140 2.7 7.1 23.29 2.44 SFV (Open 
Speedboad)
6/16/2016 N/A 0.5
28 Five Star M14P0121 6 8.69 28.51 N/A SFV 6/12/2014 28 N/A - No stability work required or performed.
- An stabilty booklet was submitted and approved. However, modifications were made and not accounted for, 
which yielded the stability booklet inaccurate.
- The modifications put the vessel's intact stability below STAB 4 requirments. 
- No stability work required or performed.
- No stability work required or performed.
- Post accident analysis showed that the vessel did not meet most of the STAB 4 criteria
- No stability work required or performed.
- No stability work required or performed.
- No stability work required or performed
- Post accidient analysis showed that, in the vessel's departure condition, it did not meet STAB 4 equivalent 
criteria (IMO)
- No stability work required or performed.
- There is no mention in the report of any stability assessments being performed. Based on TC regulations, the 
vessel was not required to have any stability work performed.
- The vessel was subject to LFVIR. As such, it conducted an inclining experiment and produced a stability booklet 
in 1976. 
- Post accident analysis showed that, over the 40 year life of the vessel, the lightship displacement had increased 
by approximately 18.6%. No additional stability work was performed. Post accident analysis showed that at the 
time of capsize, the freeboard was severly reduced. 
- No stability work required or performed.
- No stability work required or performed.
- No stability work required or performed.
- No stability work required or performed.
- No stability work required or performed.
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29
Le Bout de Ligne
M90L3033 58.8 16.8 55.12 5.59 SFV 12/13/1990 35 3.5-4.5
30 Sea Serpent 25 M14A0289 5 7.62 25.00 N/A SFV 6/26/2014 5-10 0.5
31 CFV #132145 M93N0001 1 5.5 18.04 1.82 Wooden Open 
Fishing Boat
7/5/1993 10-15 1
32 Sea Gypsey M09N0031 63 13.91 45.64 N/A SFV 9/12/2009 20-25 3
33 Carraig An Isac MCIB/197 N/A 6.22 20.41 2.56 SFV 1/20/2011 8.1-10.8 3
34 Catherine L No Number N/A 5.96 19.55 1.9 SFV (Open 
Punt)
7/18/2005 16.7-27 2.4-3.8
35 Honeydew II MCIB/135 166 22.7 74.48 7.32 Fishing Vessel 1/11/2007 48.1-54.0 8-18
36 Kyle Mhor MCIB/29 15.96 9.94 32.61 4.24 SFV 10/31/2000 21.6-27.0 "Rough"
37 Dinsih MCIB/125 379 35.5 116.47 8.1 Fishing Vessel 
(Stern Trawler)
5/24/2006 10.8-21.6 "Moderate to 
Rough"
38 Rising Sun MCIB/118 5.64 8.29 27.20 3.41 SFV 11/29/2005 10.8-21.6 "Slight to 
Moderate"
39 Katami NTSB/MAB-11/03 148 22.3 73.16 7.9 Fishing Vessel 10/21/2008 69.5 7.62
40 Advantage NTSB/MAB/14-16 73 17.5 57.41 6.3 Fishing Vessel 31/09/2012 "Light" 1-1.2
41 Christopher's Joy NTSB/MAB-15/09 120 22.8 74.80 7 Fishing Vessel 9/23/2014 25 1.5-2.7
42 Hawaii Five-1 NTSB/MAB-16/07 114 21.6 70.87 6.7 Fishing Vessel 11/25/2015 25 2.1-2.7
43 Lydia and Maya NTSB/MAB-17/17 104 21.8 71.52 6.2 Fishing Vessel 9/17/2016 27 1.2-2.4
44 Evanick NTSB/MAB-98/02 36 15.2 49.87 N/A Fishing Vessel 4/25/1998 30 3.7-4.9
45 FV Lady  Mary NTSB/MAB-11/01 105 23.1 75.79 6.5 Fishing Vessel 3/24/2009 35 3.7
46 Viking 7 Marine 26/10 0.85 6.85 22.47 N/A Recreational 
Craft
7/6/2014 13.6-15.5 1.2-1.5
- No stability work required or performed.
- Report does not mention stability work. None was required and likely none performed
- The Viking 7 was a recreational craft used for tourism purposes. There was no mention of stabiltiy work 
performed on the vessel.
- No stability work done (i.e. it was an "uninspected" vessel)
- Sea trials were conducted in calm to assess intital stability by "feel" of the vessel
- Prior to capsizing, the captain noted the slow roll period. Suggests poor stability characteristics
- No stability work performed.
- No stability work required or performed.
- No stability work required or performed.
- No information in report on stability work. See note above on stability requirements.
- No information in report on stability work. However,  Ireland's Department of Tourism, Transportation, and 
Sport requires all vessels less than 15m in length to undergo a roll test to determine the GM
- An inclining test was performed and a stability book produced in 2008. However, calculations used a length of 50 
feet, not 54. The vessel had been modified in 2002 by adding a four foot extension to the stern. The discrpency 
was spotted and the book was being reporduced at the time of the accident.
- No information in report on stability work. See note above on stability requirements.
- The vessel did not have a stability book.
- Vessel not required to have a stability book but one was issued in 1988 and was on board the vessel. The loading 
suggests that operators were following the guidence of the stability book. However, the stability book was never 
updated to reflect modifications to the vessel. 
- No stability work done (i.e. it was an "uninspected" vessel)
- The vessel did not capsize, it strictly sank. Therefore, the stability  characteristics are not discussed in great 
detail. The events that led to the flooding, however, are the same as those for many capsizing events.
Ireland
USA
Norway
- Modifications were made in 1995. Following these, an inclining test was performed and a stability report issued. 
An updated stability report was issued in 1998 following further modifications. For vessels less than 79 feet, 
reports are not required to be submitted for approval. Following the incident, the reports were analyzed and found 
that they did not meet multiple loading conditions for intact and damaged when compared to requirments for 
vessels greater than 79 feet in length
 - A satbility book was on board  at the time of the incident and "it showed compliance with the stability criteria of 
the Torremolinos Protocol in a sufficient number of load conditions to cover the work cycle of the vessel and that 
there was sufficient information to allow the Skipper to maintain adequate stability. This was sufficient to comply 
with the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (Fishing Vessels) Regulations, 1999."
- One of the conditions of the stability book states maximum drafts that correspond to a negative freeboard. In 
these conditions, the newly installed fish chute would be underwater. The fish chute failed and allowed an ingress 
of water
- "Marginally" passed a roll test in 2004
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Table 26: Capsizing Incident Reports: Vessel Details
47 Marina Sjø [Marine] 2009/05 N/A 9.12 29.92 2.64 Recreational Craft 
(but given 
designation for 
commercial fishing 
by authorities) 
3/2/2009 "Occasionaly 
Strong"
1.5-2
48 Monica IV Sjø [Marine] 2011/02 N/A 9.63 31.59 3.06 SFV 9/8/2009 "Gale force" 2-2.5
49 Tamara Marine Safety Investigation 
Report No. 185
N/A 12.4 40.68 4 SFV 9/14/2002 20-24 4-6
50 FV Sally Jane SM74 N/A 18.06 13.6 44.62 4.86 SFV 7/27/1998 4-6 "Calm"
51 FV Sally Jane SM74 MAIB No. 21/2014 18.06 13.6 44.62 4.86 SFV 9/17/2013 17-21 "Moderate"
52 Bounty MAIB No. 02/2006 10 9.8 32.15 N/A SFV 5/23/2005 7-10 "Moderate"
53 Fraoch Ban N/A 23.66 15.12 49.61 5.67 SFV 8/15/1999 4-6 "Slight Swell"
54 Angela MAIB No. 14/2001 27.66 16.99 55.74 6.1 SFV 2/6/2001 17-21 2
55 Kairos MAIB No. 05/2016 163 18.6 61.02 N/A Fishing Vessel 
(trawler)
5/18/2015 30 4
56 FV Harvest Hope MAIB No. 21/2006 356 28 91.86 8.7 Fishing Vessel 
(trawler)
8/28/2005 35 3
57 FV Flamingo MAIB No. 15/2003 82 23.12 75.85 N/A Fishing Vessel 
(trawler)
7/7/2002 11-16 1
58 FV Sundance MAIB No. 22/2002 3.21 9.07 29.76 3.2 SFV 9/10/2001 11-16 N/A
59 FV Stella Maris MAIB No. 20/2015 12.08 9.96 32.68 N/A SFV 7/28/2014 "Light air" "Calm seas"
60 Majestic N/A 218.27 22.86 75.00 6.4 Fishing Vessel 
(trawler)
6/13/1989 11-16 2-3 - Stability work was approved for the vessel.
- Stability book was approved for the vessel. 
- No stability work required or performed.
- Stability book was approved for the vessel. 
- No mention of stability work performed  in the report. For a vessl of that size, it is likely that stability work would 
have been mandatory.
- No stability work performed or required.
- No stability work performed or required.
- Post accident analysis showed that the vessel had poor stability characteristics compared to vessels greater than 
15m in length which are required to have stability work approved. 
- Stability book was approved for the vessel. 
- Stability book was approved for the vessel.
- No stability work performed or required
- After capsizing in 1998, the vessel was salvaged and the owner produced a full stability book. Vessel met 
stability criteria.
- As this was a recreational craft given designation for commercial fishing, there were very little requirments to 
adhere to. Post accident analysis showed that stability requirements did meet requirements outlined in the Nordic 
Boat Standard
- No information on stability work performed.
- No inclinging test conducted. Manufacturer's technical documentation estimated initial stbaility based on a 
lightship displacement and hull geometry that was incorrect.
United Kingdom
Australia
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No
1 Ryan's Commander
2 Lannie & Sisters II
3 Melina & Keith II
4 Big Sister
5 Cape Fin-Tose
6 L' Acadien II
7 Strait's Pride II
8 Miss Cat Harbour
9 Cap Rouge II
10 Hope Bay
11 Prospect Point
12 Ocean Tor
13 Sea Urchin
14 Love and Anarchy
15 Le Marsouin I
16 Craig and Justin
17 Jessie G
18 Pacific Siren
19 Caledonian
20 Lady Devine
21 Courageous
22 Dalewood Provider
23 Stephane P II
- Vessel left with an inherent starboard list which was known to the crew. This reduced the vessel's ability to 
right itself on the starboard side.
- Tanks were left partially filled which made the vessel susceptible to the free surface effect.
- Lack of permenant ballast reduced the initial stability of the vessel
- The loading of the vessel made is more susceptible to capsizing. 275 lobster traps were loaded on the deck, 
when post accident analysis showed that beyond 171 traps, the vessel would not meet STAB 4 criteria. The 
freeboard was reduced and the height of the COG increased. 
- 5 aft freeing ports were blocked off which prevented the drainage of shipped water
- Dangerous loading.  Approximately 5 Te of gear stored above the vessel's original COG, this increasing the 
COG. This reduced the stability of the vessel.
- Numerous modifications were performed over the life of the vessel which reduced it's freeboard.
- Modifications were made that changed the COG of the vessel . While the gross tonnage remained approximately the 
same, the modifications likely had an impact on the vessel's stability. 
- Vessel was not loaded in agreement with the stability book. Loading of the fuel and fish/seawater tanks 
increased the COG and displacement listed  in the stability book. This reduced stabilty
- The vessel displacement gradually increased over the life of the vessel. This reduced the freeboard and reduced 
freeboard and rendered the previous stability work inapplicable.
- A leak in the shaft tunnel resulted in the flooidng of the engine room which reduced 
reserve buoyancy and freeboard.
- The vessel had  a permenant portside list. The cause of the list was unknown.- The operator loaded the vessel in such a way that reduced the vessel's stability. This included additional fishing 
gear  and approximately  800 kg of fish on deck.
- Water shipped on deck entered fish holds through hatches that were not watertight. 
This led to the free surface effect and further reduced the vessel's stability.
- The seine net was not secured which increased and slid to the starboard side of the vessel. This worsened the 
rolling due to environmental forces.
'- Not all doors were watertight which allowed an ingress of water. This worsened the heel of the vessel
- The owners made several modifications that increased the vessel's COG. Refer to the report for the full list. This reduced 
the vessel's ability to right itself.
- Vessel was loaded with heavy equipment stored high on the vessel. This increased the COG and reduced 
stability. 
- Vessel operated with seawater in the holds that was supposed to have been drained prior to departure. The 
implications of the free surface effect were not understood by the crew and stability was further reduced.
- Non watertight hatches which led to an ingress of water
- The operators' were seining for sardines at the time of capsizing. This fishery was relatively new to the area at 
the time of capsizing. When trapped in the seine, sardines will dive towards the bottom, creating a heeling moment 
on the vessel. It is not clear if the operators were aware of the risks posed by sardine seining at the time of 
capsizing. 
- In 1994 the owner replaced the original cargo boom with a heavier model.
- The seine was enlarged.
- The steel winch was replaced with an aluminum winch.
- None of these modifications were captured by an updated stability booklet.
- Ineffective gaskets resulted in the vessel not being sufficiently watertight. Led to 
downflooding that introduced the free surface effect.
- Leaking manhole covers likely led to flooding of holds from water on deck. This 
would have reduced the vessel's righting energy
- Despite numerous warnings of harsh weather, operator did not seek shelter and continued to fish. 
- Storm conditions resulted in the port paravane being lost, creatoing a large starboard heel
- Storm conditions also resulted in shipped water
- Fish pen design allowed for transverse movement of fish when full. This added to the vessl's heel
- The staboard paravane was not able to be released when the portside paravane was lost
- Semi permenant ballast was removed from the vessel follwing a transom extension. This increased the COG
- Timber which was supposed to be stored in the fish hold was moved to the deck. This loading further increased 
the COG
- The high COG was increased further due to tanks being full above the wheel house
- Roll reduction gear was not deployed
- Hatches were left open and unsecured which led to unrestricted downflooding
- Tanks and fish holds were all partically full. This condition added to the free surface effect from the 
downflooding
- Since the 1987 stability test, gear was added that increased the displacement of the vessel. This reduced the inherent 
stability and made the vessel more susceptible to capsizing
- Vessel was likely loaded not in accordance to the stability booklet. Insufficient freeboard would have made the 
vessel sucseptible to shipped water from waves led to the free surface effect
- Vessel had an inherent list but operators continued operations. The righting energy was reduced on the heeled 
side.
- Over the lifetime of the vessel, many modifications were made that increased the displacement and VCG of the vessel. 
These modifications reduced stability and freeboard. This included adding A-Frame and winches on main deck
- Freeing ports were welded shut and shipped water could not drain
- No high level bilge alarm to alert crew of ingress of water
- Operators were aware of leak in stuffing box but continued operations
Causes
Lack of Maintenance
Vessel
- ART tanks were not drained. When initial list occurred due to wind and waves, slack water in tank gravitated to 
port side, worsening the list.
- Fishing gear (trawl net) was on upper deck instead of being stored lower in vessel. Increased VCG
- Vessel took on water through leak in stuffing box
- 5 of 6 bilge pumps not working
- Propeller blades damaged. Vibrations due to damage likely increased leak into 
stuffing box
Vessel Name Operators'  Practice Unsafe Modification Poor Design
- ART was located above main deck, increasing the VCG
- Freeing ports were welded shut and the shipped water on deck could not be drained. 
- No high level bilge alarm to alert crew of ingress of water
- Batteries located in lower decks of vessel where they would be quickly submerged 
by water and rendered useless
- Freeing ports had no flaps to prevent ingress of water
- Crew members noticed that the vessel seemed to be sitting lower than usual in the water. This suggested that 
there was likely a leak but operations continued anyway.
- Scuppers were plugged which prevented drainage of ingressed water.
- The weight and height of loaded lobster traps were loaded such that the VCG increased and 
the freeboard was reduced.
- The stability books stated that during seining operations, the lazarette fuel tanks were to be empty and trawling 
gear to be removed from the vessel. This practice was not followed. Tanks were 80% full and trawling gear was 
on board.
- The heeling moment created by seining operations combined with the loading of the vessel led to capsizing 
- Vessel not constructed for ice but was operating in first year ice conditions
- Damaged steering system and had to be towed out
- During tow, clutch was engaged and engine was running. This caused the vessel to sheer to port where it hit 
and was propelled onto ice. While on the ice, the vessel capsized.
- Loading of the vessel reduced stability. Due to storage constraints, numerous items were stored on top of the 
deck house. This increased the COG and reduced stability
- Paravane stabalizers were used to reduce vessel motions. However, the master was not aware of the effect 
paravane stabalizers have on vessel stability. They increase the COG and reduce stability.
- Owner loaded the vessel havily with prawn traps. The increased COG led to a reduction in stability and 
freeboard was also reduced. A slow roll period was observed which points to marginal righting energy.
- A watertight door was left open which led to flooding.
- There was a smalll vessel warning in effect at the time of capsizing but the owner continued operations
- Modifications were made to the vessel in 1990 that were supposed to include an increase the the breadth. Stability data 
was submitted and approved based on this breadth increase. However, the final modifications did not include the breadth 
increase, yielding submitted stability book inaccurate. 
- Vessel removed fishing gear and was transporting timber. This loading condition was not accounted for in the 
stability booklet.
- Lobster traps loaded on the deck that increased the COG, reducing stability. Post analysis showed that in the 
loading ocndition, it did not meet STAB 4 criteria in multiple categories.
- Empty fish hold worsened loading's effect on stability
Canada Canada
- Water entered the hull through an unknown leak
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No
24 Inskip
25 3J'S '93 (THE)
26 CFV 151816
27 C19496NB
28 Five Star
29
Le Bout de Ligne
30 Sea Serpent 25
31 CFV #132145
32 Sea Gypsey
33 Carraig An Isac
34 Catherine L
35 Honeydew II
36 Kyle Mhor
37 Dinsih
38 Rising Sun
39 Katami
40 Advantage
41 Christopher's Joy
42 Hawaii Five-1
43 Lydia and Maya
44 Evanick
45 FV Lady  Mary
46 Viking 7
47 Marina
48 Monica IV
49 Tamara
- There was an unequal distribution of weight when 2 of the 3 members of the crew moved to the lee side of the 
vessel and a list was created. When a large wave  hit the vessel it was not able toright itself and it capsized
- A large catch of crab was loaded on the vessel's working deck, increasing the COG and reducing stability
- Water was added to the tore, further increasing the COG
- Vessel left port with inherent list
- Captain made decision to continue fishing in harsh conditions
- Stern extension added and effects on stability not assessed.
- 5000 lb skiff was stored on aft deck, increasing the vessel COG and reducing stability
- Vessel was overloaded beyond the manufacturer's specificiation. Reduced freeboard that led to an ingress of 
water
-"accident occurred as a result of lack of compliance with recognised design standards for 
recreational craft."
- ISO 12217-1:2013 specifies the minimum freeboard  to the waterline of downflooding openings. 
The Viking 7 did not meet these requirements
- Modifications also included the addition of three ice boxes on the working deck. This would have raised the COG and 
reduced stability
- Watertight bulkheads were penetrated. Led to multiple compartments flooding instead of just 
one.
- Freeing ports welded shut.
- Vessel was rigged with heavier fishing gear than designed to support. This would have increased the COG and 
reduced stability
- Small freeing ports did not allow for sufficient drainage of shipped water. 20% of Nordic Boat 
Standrard requirements
- Heavy equipment and steel plates were stored above accomodation spaces which increased the COG of the 
vessel and reduces stability
- Captain was aware of poor stability but did not take actions to remedy situation such as weathervaning or 
reducing speed
- Watertight door was left open which led to an ingress of water
- Deckhouse was assymetrical which prevented proper drainage of shipped water
- Crew blocked freeing pors with steel plates which prevented the drainage of shipped water
- Heavy cargo and gear was stored on upper decks, increasing COG and reducing stability
- COG was further increased because of a suspended load of  ~7000lbs. Vessel transited with suspended load. 
The boom carrying the load broke and the load fell to the deck. Load should have been lowered deck before 
moving.
- Vessel had an initial heel that was likely due to shifting cargo
- A drain plug was either not reinserted or not reinserted correctly into a drain hole and an ingress of water 
occurred. 
- The vessel had no bilge pumps to remove shipped water.
Causes
Lack of Maintenance
Vessel
Vessel Name Operators'  Practice Unsafe Modification Poor Design
- Operated with "champagne" present in the fish hold. None of the crew knew the impact the free surface effect 
has on a vessl's stability.
- Operations involved lifting a heavy load which caused a heeling moment and raised the center of gravity.
- Unsecured loads of fish slid as the vessel rolled to port, worsening the angle of heel.
- The operator continued to fish in deteriorating weather conditions instead of heading to port. In the conditions, 
the operator chose to travel to rougher shallow waters rather than calmer deep water.
- Fish pans were left unsercured which worsened the angle of heel.
- Vessel was overloaded with lobster traps that severely reduced freeboard.
- The lobster traps were loaded in a way that increased the COG and reduced the vessel's stability.
- Condition of the fish chute was not monitored and its deterioration was not noted.
- The vessel was ballasted with loose materials that likely shifted as the vesel rolled. This improper loading would 
have increased the list.
- The cover the the fish has was foam that may have floated off with shipped water. This would have lef to an 
ingress of water and flooding.
- The decision to continue fishing in harsh conditions made the vessel susceptible to capsizing. This was due to ice 
accretion which increased the COG of the vessel and reduced stability. The vessel was also travelling in following 
seas which likely led to broaching in large waves, again making the vessel more susceptible to capsize.
- A fish box and stabalizers were added to the vessel without any assessment of the impact on the vessel's stability.
- While hauling up a third line of lobster traps, the line became tangled with the other lines and it pulled the vessel 
downward. This reduced the freeboard and eventually led to shipped water. Decision to cut the line was made 
too late.
- Vessel may have been overloaded which reduced its stability
- Lazarette cover not secured. This would have resulted in shipped water flooding the lazarette. 
- Lack of freeports and the small size of scuppers did not allow for the shipped water on deck to 
drain.
- Fish box allowed for an ingress of seawater without effective drainage. This would have 
increased the COG and introduced the free surface effect.
- The lazarette cover was found to be off. This would have led to flooding from shipped water - Modifications were made that increased the vessel's weight by approximately 5%. This reduced the vessel's freeboard 
and made it more susceptible to flooding.
- Vessel was operating in very harsh conditions that likely led to swamping and capsizing. The report states "the 
weather conditions at the time were more than a match for the 18-foot open punt".
- It is  likely that watertight hatches and doors weren't shut. This resulted in an ingress of shipped water in rough 
conditions
- The vessel was heavily loaded at the time of capsize which reduced the vessel's freeboard. As this was 
primarily attributed to gear on deck, the COG was increased  which reduced the vessel's stability.
- The fishing gear deployed during opertions had the effect of increasing the COG of the vessel. Operator was 
not aware of the effect that this had on the stability of the vessel. When turning, the vessel could not overcome 
the heeling moment created by the rudder and capsized.
- Numerous changes were made throughout the life of the vessel and the stability book was never updated.
- Poorly loaded. The fish hold was full so an additional 900 kg of fish were loaded (unsecured) on deck. This 
would have reduced the free board and inherent stability of the vessel as the height of the COG was increased. 
The shifting of the unsecrued load on deck led to a large angle of heel that the vessel could not recover from.
Canada Canada
Ireland Ireland
USA USA
Norway Norway
Australia Australia
- Owner made multiple modifications to the vessel without any assessment from a naval architect
- The vessel underwent modifications  and extensive repairs in May, 2006. This included a fish chute. The modifications 
were not accounted for with a survey to ensure previous stability work was still valid. In certain conditions the fish chute 
would be underwater and failure of the fish chute would lead to flooding.
- Following the roll test in 2004, various pieces of heavy equipment were installed that increased the COG of the vessel and 
reduced the freeboard. This had a negative effect on the vessel's stability.
- Operator chose to operate in harsh weather conditions despite numerous warnings. Most other vessels in the 
area sought shelter.
- The vessel was overloaded with approximately twice the frozen cargo as outlined in the stability report (120,000 
lbs vs 60,000 lbs). This severely reduced freeboard.
- Watertight doors were left open which allowed for flooding
- Stability report did not account for changes as the vessel was modified after 1998 from a shrimp trawler to fish for cod. - Area of freeing ports were much smaller than those required by vessels greater than 79 feet (1.6 
ft
2
 vs 10 ft
2
). This allowed for shipped water to accumulate on the deck.
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Table 27: Capsizing Incident Reports: Contributing Causes
No
50 FV Sally Jane SM74
51 FV Sally Jane SM74
52 Bounty
53 Fraoch Ban
54 Angela
55 Kairos
56 FV Harvest Hope
57 FV Flamingo
58 FV Sundance
59 FV Stella Maris
60 Majestic - Vessel was trawling when net became snagged in the seabed. The tension on the line was assymetrical and 
cauased the vessel to heel. Flooding occurred through doors that were left open.
- Due to loading, the vessel had a 7° list prior to the incident. 
- Vessel's watertight integrity was  comprimised because doors on the shelter deck were left open during 
operations.
- While crew were gutting fish, the vessel listed to starboard and began to flood. Led to capsize.
- Fish boxes were stored on deck when they should have been stored in the hold. Increased the COG and 
reduced stability. Not in compliance with stbaility book.
- The vessel had a full hopper on deck which further increased the COG and reduced stability.
- While trawling, the trawl snagged the seabed and the vessel became stuck.
- Vessel was loaded such that it had very little freeboard.This resulted in the vessel becoming swamped when it 
was hit by a wave. Led to list and eventual capsize.
- Freeing ports' size was insufficient to clear shipped water. The area was less than recommended
- Trawl gear became snagged in a pipeline on the seabed
- Tension on the line caused the vessel to heel. Port transom door was left open which allowed for flooding.
- A cabin window was also left open. Flooding increased as water entered through this window when the heel 
increased.
- Additional ballast was added for stability purposes. However, this reduced the freeboard lower than the original design. - Freeing ports were welded shut.
- Unable to close transom door once there was shipped water. Made it impossible to cease the 
ingress of water
- While trawling, the weaklink on the port side net broke. Caused a heeling moment starboard on the vessel.
- Auto piot was left on while trawling which would have worsened the heel.
- When water was taken on, watertight doors were not shut which resulted in flooding.
- Arrangment of derricks during cleaning raised the COG.
- Derrick lengths were increased which raised the COG and reduced stability. Modifications were not known to authorities.
- Bilge alarms did not sound to alert the crew of flooding.
- Tonnage valves (similar to freeing ports) were not working properly and did not allow 
the vessel to rid itself of shipped water.
- Crew were trawling and snagged a load that was too large for the winch to handle. When they trie to lower 
back to the seabed, it bacame caught in the stern and would not lower. The load caused the vessel to heel and it 
eventually became swamped.
- Skipper continued to try and lift the load although it was abnormally heavy. It should been released instead of 
trying to haul it to the deck.
- Lifting arrangment usually resulted in a starboard list. Arrangement also reulted in a very high 
COG when hauling in loads
- Freeing ports were found to be smaller than recommended.
- While trawling, the crew caught a heavy load. As they attempted to lift the load on deck, they  realized it was 
too heavy as it caused the vessel to list. They attempted to lower it back to the seabed but the load because 
caught on the stern. As the list continued, the freeports became submerges and flooding occured.
- Given the weight in the net, the owner should have recognized the risk posed by attempting to lift the load 
aboard. Should have lowered the load to the seabed before trying to recover it.
- Gear was regularly stored on the wheelhouse. Increased the COG and reduced stability.
- Modifications were made to the vessel which involved replacing equipment with lighter parts. Because the new equipment 
was lighter, it was assumed that stability characteristics were improved. However, the height of the equipment was not 
considered.
- The new A-Frame was higher than the older one. With a higher lifting point, the heeling moment that arose from lifting a 
catch on deck was increased.
- Freeing ports should have been placed higher in the bulwark. This may have prevented flooding 
as it would have taken a larger angle of heel for flooding to occur.
- Location of fish hopper increased the COG of the vessel
- Vessel capsized when trying to recover a lost trawl. Resulted in wire load on the winch that heeled the vessel.
- Trying to recover the trawl in harsh weather led to shipped water.
- Downflooding occurred through an air vent.
- While fishing for eel, a large list occurred and the vessel capsized. The stability book did not account for eels.
- Pen boards were not installed correctly. Gaps allowed the laod to shift in the holds. 
- Eels in the holds introduced the free surface effect and reduced stability. Pen board arrangement was not 
sufficient to reduced FSE.
- While quay side, the vessel was lifting fishing gear. 2 sets of gear each weight approx. 1.8 Te were lifterd 8.5 m 
above the deck. This effectively raised the COG of the vessel and reduced stability.
- Vessel was low on fuel, fresh water, and ice. Because the holds lower in the vessel would have been close to 
empty, the height of the COG would have been further reduced
- There were minor modifications made to the vessel with no considerations to the vessel's stability.
- Uneven loads in the port and starboard trawl nets resulted in a significant heeling moment. Likely due to load in 
starboard net being released. Operator was unable to release contents from the port net.
- Derrick was raised while turning. This increased heeling moment on the vessel. Stability significantly reduced
- Watertight hatches and doors were left open which resulted in flooding after the vessel heeled. 
- Operators did not follow stability books. Aft tanks were routinely full instead of at 50% as required by stability 
books. Reduced freeboard. 
- Length of derricks resulted in significant heeling moment. Smaller derricks with a shorter 
moment arm would have produced a smaller heeling moment under assymetrical loading
Causes
Lack of Maintenance
Vessel
Vessel Name Operators'  Practice Unsafe Modification Poor Design
United Kingdom United Kingdom
Canada Canada
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Appendix C: Detailed Roundtable Results 
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Roundtable 1 
1. What does it mean to have a stable vessel? 
When posed this question, all participants agreed that the roll motion of a vessel is one 
of the most important indicators of a vessel’s stability. Participants recognized that a tender 
vessel with a slow roll period is more susceptible to capsizing than a stiff vessel that would 
be considered uncomfortable. They were aware that comfort and stability are at a cost to 
each other. The importance of ensuring no initial list and that the vessel is “upright” was 
brought up. If there is an inherent list, a vessel’s stability is likely in jeopardy. Finally, all 
participants agreed that it is difficult to assess a vessel’s stability with no experience aboard 
that vessel. It is important to be familiar with the vessel before commencing operations, 
and stability should not be simply assumed based on prior naval architecture or engineering 
work. 
2. Do you have a stability book? Do you think they are useful? 
Opinions on this topic were much more divided. Some members felt that stability 
books served little to no purpose. Participant 1 stated that he “never had a stability book” 
and “I don’t think it has a positive effect.” Some participants also stated that they did not 
know how to use or read a stability book. Participant 3, however, expressed that he felt 
stability work was important.  He stated that he knew how to use his stability book and felt 
it was beneficial. Further, he felt that the inclining test was a good indicator of stability and 
that he “wouldn’t think about going out without a stability test.”  
While opinions varied on the importance of stability books in maintaining a stable 
vessel, there was agreement that operator experience and best practices are imperative; 
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stability work by naval architects and engineers on its own is not enough to ensure a stable 
vessel. There was consensus that operators’ best practices are achievable without a stability 
book. 
3. How do you maintain the stability of your vessel? 
Answers to this question were varied, but there was no disagreement from a participant 
regarding another participant’s answer. Answers included: 
- Ensure the vessel is watertight 
- Avoid shifting loads (both on deck and in the hold) 
- Know the weather conditions and take precautions as necessary 
- Have experience on the vessel 
The final point regarding experience is an important consideration for this study and 
this was another point in which there was agreement amongst all participants. In order to 
maintain stability of a particular vessel, it is important to have experience on that vessel 
and know how it behaves. This point resonates with what was brought up with stability 
books: operator practice and experience plays a significant role in vessel stability.  
4. What poses the largest risk to the stability of your vessel? 
The most common answer to this question was the species being caught. It was stressed 
that species that act as a free surface in the hold of a vessel pose the largest risk to capsizing 
that vessel. In the Newfoundland and Labrador fishery, these species are predominantly 
mackerel and herring. The “low viscosity” of these species in bulk results in the load 
shifting in the hold and makes a vessel more susceptible to capsizing. The group also spent 
considerable time discussing the risk that sea cucumbers pose to operators. Participants 
explained that sea cucumbers have the ability to change shape. This characteristic allows 
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the species to escape their hold through any small holes or openings in pen boards, thus 
creating a shifting load. Further, sea cucumbers can plug pumps, which hinder an 
operator’s ability to rid the vessel of shipped water. Sea cucumber is a relatively new 
fishery in Newfoundland and Labrador, and the group felt that it would likely cause 
problems as more operators begin to partake. 
Shifting loads was brought up once again by the group. For the catch in holds, it was 
agreed that the pen boards are the most important means of preventing shifting loads. On 
the vessel deck, strapping down any equipment was stated as the most important measure 
to take. These extra considerations were considered an important part of preventing shifting 
loads to avoid capsizing. 
Finally, it was agreed by all participants of the roundtable that down-flooding posed a 
significant risk of capsizing because of the free surface effect. All participants understood 
that the free surface effect reduced a vessel’s stability. It was agreed that the most likely 
causes of down-flooding for a fishing vessel are operating in harsh weather and a lack of 
maintenance. Operating in harsh weather can lead to shipped water. If the vessel is unable 
to rid itself of the shipped water, it can find its way into the holds and introduce the free 
surface effect to the vessel. If vessels are not maintained, their watertight integrity may 
become compromised. This often results in leaks and flooding. In many instances, a 
combination of operating in bad weather with a poorly maintained vessel can lead to down-
flooding. On the topic of harsh weather, a participant mentioned that many operators are 
willing to fish in rough conditions, so it is important that operators know how to handle 
their vessel.  
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5. What are the most effective ways to reduce capsizing? 
All participants of the group agreed that the most effective way to reduce capsizing 
was improved education and awareness among fishing vessel operators. Ensuring that 
operators understand the effects of changing a vessel’s center of gravity and that of a free 
surface were brought up as two important aspects. Formal stability training was mentioned 
as being important, but there is a need for both formal training and experience. The 
importance of stability education was summarized by a Participant 3: “Education 
awareness allows you to take a calculated risk as opposed to a blind risk.”  
A participant suggested that additional educational programs be offered by the 
NLFHSA. This speaks to the recognition amongst the group that education is important. 
However, participants felt that any voluntary programs offered should not replace the 
current formal training required by certain operators, but instead supplement it. It was also 
brought up that individuals must be motivated to pursue additional training if it is not 
required by any regulations.  
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Roundtable 2 
1. What does it mean to have a stable vessel? 
Participants cited the “feel” of a vessel as the primary indicator of that vessel’s 
stability. When pressed on how a stable vessel would feel compared to an unstable vessel, 
a participant said that unstable vessels tend to be “more sluggish” and do not answer 
properly. Loading was also discussed and it was pointed out that excessive top weight can 
lead to an unstable vessel.  As the discussion progressed, experience was brought up. 
Members agreed that it was not possible to determine a vessel’s stability strictly by its 
“feel” - the operator must have extensive experience on the vessel and know how it 
behaves. Expanding on that point, the consensus amongst the group was that it would not 
be possible to step aboard a new vessel and assess its stability by how it “felt.” 
Participant 6, who operated a 34’11” vessel, said that a previous vessel they operated 
was unstable. When asked why, they replied, “it was always bobbing up and down.” The 
operator felt that because the vessel was stiff and uncomfortable, it was not stable.  When 
Participant 6 relayed this to the group, they were quickly corrected by another member 
(Participant 7) who said that the vessel was likely stable because it responded quickly to 
disturbances. This response was met with general agreement within the group.  Upon being 
corrected, Participant 6 contributed little for the duration of the roundtable.  
2. Do you have a stability book? Do you think they are useful? 
Two of the seven members of group had stability books (Participants 2 and 3). They 
felt that the stability books were useful and they provided the operator with confidence. 
There was little reply from the other participants on stability books. However, a participant 
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pointed out that many of the vessels lost have been equipped with stability books. When 
posed with the question of whether operators’ practices or inherent stability was more 
important, consensus amongst the group was operators’ practices. The group felt that 
stability analysis by itself is not sufficient to prevent capsizing. 
3. How do you maintain the stability of your vessel? 
Participants of the group initially mentioned loading as an important consideration for 
maintaining a vessel’s stability. It was well known amongst the group that it was important 
to avoid top weight and keep loads low. Ensuring that shifting loads are prevented was also 
mentioned. A participant said that modifications should be considered in order to maintain 
a stable vessel. On this point, Participant 4 asked whether or not raising the deck of a vessel 
three feet would have an impact on a vessel’s stability. A participant with extensive training 
and a sound understanding of stability (Participant 2) answered and explained that it would.  
In this portion of the roundtable, the type of species was brought up as being an 
important consideration for maintaining a stable vessel. As was discussed in the first 
roundtable, a participant said that sea cucumber was the worst species for shifting loads. 
Seal, capelin, and squid were also mentioned as being problematic for shifting loads.  
Finally, experience was mentioned as being an important part of ensuring a vessel’s 
stability. The group agreed that, in general, experienced operators have better practices. 
Members were in agreement that in today’s fishery, operators are more aware of the 
importance of stability and knowledge is improving in this area. A participant highlighted 
the need for operator awareness and stressed that everything possible must be done to 
encourage safe practices and identify possible hazards. 
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4. What poses the largest risk to the stability of your vessel? 
Points brought up in the previous question were mentioned again (height of gear, 
loading of the vessel, shifting gear/loads, species), but the majority of this question 
revolved around free surface. Participant 2 stated, “Free surface is the killer.” Participant 
2, who as mentioned previously had extensive stability training, contributed the greatest 
amount to this portion of the discussion. He stated that partially loaded vessels are at the 
greatest risk of capsizing because there are often problems with dewatering. As a result, 
the free surface effect becomes a problem and can make a vessel more susceptible to 
capsizing. The participant stressed that many operators still do not understand the free 
surface effect and that a free surface is often detrimental to the safe operation of a fishing 
vessel. 
Down-flooding and a lack of maintenance were cited as other significant risks to 
vessels capsizing. This was considered more dangerous than overloading a vessel by 
Participant 2 when he stated, “A fully loaded vessel that does not down-flood won’t 
capsize.” However, it was pointed out that in rough weather, a heavily loaded vessel can 
lead to a difficult situation because the operator may be unaware he or she is taking on 
shipped water. This, in turn, can lead to down-flooding.  
5. What are the most effective ways to reduce capsizing? 
On this point, the group agreed that it was best to focus on implementing best practices 
to reduce capsizing. Stability books were encouraged by participants who had stated they 
found them useful earlier in the roundtable. When training was brought up, the general 
consensus was that most operators would be interested in an awareness program that 
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focused on stability. For operators of smaller vessels, training should be more practical 
than the formal training currently required by operators of larger SFVs. 
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Roundtable 3 
1. What does it mean to have a stable vessel? 
This question was met with initial silence. Upon encouragement from the chair, 
Participant 4 said that there was a “feeling of safety” on a stable vessel. When asked what 
he meant, he explained that a vessel that is more comfortable in rough water is more stable. 
His comment was not corrected by any other members of the group.  
The group was asked by the chair how they would describe an unstable vessel to a 
non-fisherman. Participants 2 and 3 described that the vessel would have high freeboard 
for a comparatively small draft. This suggests the participants were aware that a high center 
of gravity reduced stability. When pressed to describe how an unstable vessel would feel, 
they responded with “tippy.” This term may refer to an uncomfortable vessel which would 
have high initial stability. 
Participants mentioned that it is important to tie gear down to avoid shifting loads and 
that the loading of the vessel affects its stability characteristics. A participant said that the 
onus is the builder to ensure the vessel is stable. Another participant spoke up and said that 
he felt the onus is both on the builder and the operator. This second comment was agreed 
on within the group. It was clear that while the participants felt that vessel design was 
important, they also recognized the role of operators in ensuring safe operations.  
2. Do you have a stability book? Do you find them useful? 
No participant had a stability book or had used one before. They offered no opinion 
on whether they felt they were beneficial or not. 
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3. How do you maintain the stability of your vessel? 
The group was repeatedly prompted for a response to this question. However, no 
participant offered any input. After multiple attempts, the chair moved on to the next 
question.   
4. What poses the largest risk to the stability of your vessel? 
Shifting gear and rough weather and waves were mentioned as two primary risks of 
vessel stability. Participant 1, who had the least experience, was quick to mention weather. 
The other participants agreed it was shifting gear. Participant 2 said that common sense 
was important when considering the risk of a vessel capsizing. He explained that common 
sense referred to knowing how to handle your vessel in rough weather and knowing how 
to “manage the waves.” In other words, experience is considered important for an operator. 
This resonates with ideas discussed during the first two roundtables. 
5. What are the most effective ways to reduce capsizing? 
When posed this question, there was again little response. Based on the group’s 
reluctance to answer, the chair asked if they considered capsizing to be a risk. The 
consensus was that no, they did not. Participant 2 said, “[I] probably wouldn’t go out if I 
thought like that.” This comment was not met with any opposition or disagreement from 
other members.  
One of the incidents analyzed in section 5.1 was the Miss Cat Harbour. This vessel 
capsized in the region and the participants were familiar with the incident. It was brought 
up at one point during the discussion and led to the most involved conversation of the 
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roundtable. When discussing the incident, Participant 3 blamed the autopilot of the vessel 
malfunctioning. The TSB report, however, cited operator’s practice as the primary cause 
of the vessel capsizing.  
Members said they would be open to and educational program that focused on stability 
training. Participant 2 stated that “it wouldn’t hurt none.” When asked about the best way 
to implement an educational program, consensus was that multiday classroom sessions 
with an instructor would be best. All members preferred this option to a web based training 
program that they would complete at their own pace. 
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Appendix D: Detailed Calculations for Hypothesis 
Test of Slope of Regression Line 
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To test for statistical significance, a null hypothesis was established which stated the 
slope of the regression line (b1) was zero. In other words, the number of capsizes is 
independent of the year. The alternative hypothesis was then established as the slope of the 
regression line being less than zero. If the probability of the slope of the observed 
regression line (-0.037) occurring given that the assumed slope is zero is sufficiently small, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and it can be concluded with confidence that the alternative 
hypothesis is valid. For this analysis, probability will be considered sufficiently small if it 
is less than 5%. Hypothesis testing of a single linear regression analysis uses the t - 
distribution as it makes an inference of a general trend based on a sample’s mean and 
variance (Walpole et al., 2012).  
 
Table 28: Hypothesis Testing of the Regression Line Slope 
 
H0 Null Hypothesis b1 = 0
H1 Alternative Hypothesis b1 < 0
Hypothesis Testing
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Table 29: Regression Analysis Calculations 
 
Table 30: Regression Analysis and Hypothesis Testing Results 
The t – value in Table 30 was calculated by subtracting the null hypothesis’ slope from 
the observed slope and dividing the difference by the standard error. 
𝑡 =
𝑏1 − 0
𝑆𝑆𝐸
 
Year x y x*y x^2 Sxx Syy Sxy
2004 1 4.1 4.1 1.0 42.3 0.7 -5.6
2005 2 3.6 7.2 4.0 30.3 0.1 -2.0
2006 3 4.3 12.8 9.0 20.3 1.0 -4.6
2007 4 2.4 9.7 16.0 12.3 0.7 2.9
2008 5 4.4 22.1 25.0 6.3 1.4 -2.9
2009 6 1.9 11.4 36.0 2.3 1.8 2.0
2010 7 3.3 23.3 49.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
2011 8 1.4 11.0 64.0 0.3 3.5 -0.9
2012 9 2.4 21.8 81.0 2.3 0.7 -1.2
2013 10 3.2 32.4 100.0 6.3 0.0 0.0
2014 11 4.4 47.9 121.0 12.3 1.3 3.9
2015 12 3.2 38.1 144.0 20.3 0.0 -0.3
2016 13 4.5 58.1 169.0 30.3 1.5 6.8
2017 14 2.3 31.6 196.0 42.3 1.0 -6.4
Sum 105 45.3 331.3 1015.0 227.5 13.7 -8.3
x = Independent Variable, y = Dependent Variable
Parameter Symbol Value
Average Dependant Variable y_bar 3.2
Average Independant Variable x_bar 7.5
Regression Line Slope b1 -0.037
Regression Line Intercept b0 3.51
Error Sum SSE 13.35
Variance of Error s^2 1.11
Standard Deviation of Error s 1.05
Standard Error sb1 0.070
Number of Observations n 14
Degrees of Freerom DOF 12
t - value t -0.52
Probability p 0.30
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The probability was then calculated in excel using 12 degrees of freedom5 and t – value 
of -0.52 (this can also be obtained by referencing published t – value tables). As per Table 
30, the probability that the observed regression slope is due to noise in the sample is 30%. 
This value is significant and greater than the 5% threshold originally cited. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected with confidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The number of degrees of freedom for a t - distribution is the number of observations minus two (there are 
two values that can vary in the data set: mean and variance). Since there were 14 years, the degrees of freedom 
for this analysis was 14 - 2 = 12  
